

# Report on minority groups in Somalia

*Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya*

*17 to 24 September*

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### **1. Background**

A relatively large number of Somali asylum seekers in some European countries claim to belong to one of the so-called minority groups in Somalia. This is the case in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Information on the security and human rights situation as well as on the relations between these minority groups and the so-called major Somali clans in Somalia is fragmented and to some degree uncertain. This lack of information may be attributed to the large numbers of minority group members that have fled Somalia since the outbreak of the civil war and the poor security situation in their traditional homelands, making reliable information from these areas difficult to obtain. Also, there has been no detailed study of the position of minority groups undertaken since Cassanelli's report on vulnerable minorities for the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board in 1995.

Against this background, and in view of the large number of minority group members from Somalia that are refugees in Kenya, the British Home Office, the Danish Immigration Service and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to carry out a joint fact-finding mission to Nairobi. The mission was carried out from 17 - 24 September 2000. The delegation of the mission comprised Louise Anten, Co-ordinator Africa Region, Department of Asylum and Migration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands; Jens Weise Olesen, Senior Regional Adviser (Africa), Danish Immigration Service, Denmark, and Richard Pearce-Higginson, Somalia Country Officer, Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Home Office, United Kingdom (UK). The delegation's terms of reference are attached as annex 2.

The delegation wishes to express its gratitude towards those agencies, organisations and individuals that have contributed to the information presented in this report, especially representatives of Somali minority communities in Somalia and Kenya; United Nations Co-ordination Unit for Somalia (UNCU-Somalia), Nairobi; United Nations Development Programme for Somalia (UNDP-Somalia), Nairobi; United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), Nairobi; War-torn Societies Project (WSP), Nairobi/Hargeisa; and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Nairobi.

The report was finalised on 24 November 2000. Developments that took place between the end of the mission and this date have been included in the report, on the basis of UN and press reports.

### **2. Introduction to sources and methodology**

During its mission to Nairobi, the joint British, Danish and Dutch delegation held meetings with a number of representatives, elders and women of Somali minority communities, some of



them living as refugees in Kenya. These meetings included the Bajuni, the Bantu, the Eyle, the Madhiban and the Tunni communities as well as various Benadir communities (among which the Ashraf and Bravanese). Representatives of these groups were identified with the assistance of United Nations (UN) agencies in Nairobi. The delegation also held meetings with representatives of UN agencies and embassy staff of the countries concerned as well as with independent observers. A list of persons consulted may be found at section 12.

It should be noted that the sections on the Shekhal and the Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyn) are based partly on written historical and anthropological sources. The delegation to Nairobi did not meet with representatives of the Shekhal or Digil and Mirifle clans.

This report includes information gathered not only from interviews and meetings in Nairobi in September 2000 but also information obtained during earlier Danish and Nordic fact-finding missions to Somalia and to Nairobi, a Dutch mission to Somalia and Nairobi, from the British Home Office and from a meeting that a member of the delegation held with UNHCR, Branch Office for Kenya, on 28 September 2000.

The testimonies from individuals and spokespersons of Somali minority groups included in this report must be considered in the actual and historical context of the time in which they underwent their experiences. Many members of minority groups in Somalia experienced extreme situations during the civil war in their home country and are thus deeply affected by their experiences. Some suffered personally from such severe physical human rights violations and/or witnessed such violations that it was very difficult for these persons to relate their stories to the delegation without being painfully affected by their own memories and some of the questions asked by the delegation.

The civil war in Somalia was to a large extent a clan-based war, a very violent and destructive war in which the various population groups and clans have accused each other of committing physical violence and abuses, including murder, rape, abduction, looting etc. Beyond any doubt, the minority populations, especially in central and southern Somalia, have suffered severe losses in human as well as material terms. Because it can be difficult to identify impartial sources of information among members of the Somali diaspora, and because of the risk of one-sidedness and possible exaggerations, the delegation has included other sources in its report in addition to the testimonies of the representatives of the Somali minority groups.

The report also includes information from a number of written sources. Among these are documents, reports, books etc. from UN agencies, news agencies, humanitarian Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and researchers on Somalia.

The delegation learned that in some cases it is very difficult to obtain definitive answers to questions on minority groups regarding their sub-groups, their affiliations and other relations, including the incidence of intermarriage, with Somali clans, whether one puts these questions to members of the minority groups themselves or to members of Somali clans. Such information is sensitive and neither of the two sides is very willing to admit being either despised or an oppressor, or be vulnerable before stronger groups in a position of power. Also, statements about one's affiliations are in part cultural and political statements, in the sense that they declare one's identity and political standpoint.

Furthermore, as the French researcher Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos explains, the war, the persecution, the exodus of groups to e.g. Kenya and the resettlement programmes for Somali refugees in Kenya, precipitated the process of identity construction. In Mombasa, where many refugees gathered, the logic of humanitarian aid, as well as idleness, the concentration of refugees in small, relatively homogeneous camps, and finally resettlement criteria all helped towards a reconstruction of identities around the concept of minority status. Since resettlement in the West is limited, very strict selection criteria were developed by Western countries to favour the most threatened people. In this context, minority status was equated to discrimination and therefore the need for resettlement. Consequently, refugees made significant historical changes in the establishment of a 'minority position'. For example, descendants of Bantu slaves, for whom a resettlement was planned in the land of their ancestors in Tanzania, preferred to be called Mushunguli rather than Goshu, the name they were given in Somalia. Also, the mixed race traders of the coastal ports decided to regroup under the generic term 'Benadir' that designates greater Mogadishu. As a result, those indigenous to the area succeeded in calling themselves 'Benadiri' even if they were not of mixed blood at all. This reconstruction of identity does not in any way alter the fact that minorities would, for a number of reasons, have problems on returning to Somalia.

Perouse de Montclos notes that the criteria used by Westerners to sort out candidates for resettlement were equally faulty, confusing a community's identity with territoriality. Brava, for example, was chosen to define traders of Arab or Indian origin who inhabited the port. However, on looking closer at Brava we discover communities with very diverse backgrounds despite numerous instances of intermarriage. On the one hand there are immigrants of Arab origin, while on the other hand there are the Somali of the Brava surroundings, whose minority status is more doubtful because they are part of the Tunni lineage of the Digil.

Perouse de Montclos concludes that the concept of minority is quite ambiguous and that its manipulation by refugees hardly clarifies it. All these minorities form a third of the Somali population (when the Digil/Mirifle are included). It is the civil war that created a sense of 'political solidarity' or 'common minority consciousness', assimilated with that of a victim. The minority notion is thus taken with a conflict dimension, outside of any demographical contingencies. The degree of discrimination overrides the number, be it a question of social class (the low caste *sab*), professional categories (Bajuni fishermen) or foreign elements (the traders of Arab origin).

The delegation learned that in some cases minority groups living as refugees in Kenya have developed a very strong sense of common political solidarity and identity, which may not have been so pronounced when these people were living in Somalia before the civil war of the 1990s. Members of certain minority groups are ready to identify themselves with groups or sub-groups with which they may not have had such a close relationship when they were living in Somalia. Some refugees would even label themselves by terms that were never in use before the war. According to UN sources in Nairobi the term 'Benadiri' was not in common use before the war, but today a number of minority populations living along the southern Somali coast are ready to identify themselves as Benadiri, and they will use the label for the purpose of being recognised as belonging to a minority group.

In the Human Development Report Somalia (1998) the authors draw attention to the fluidity of

Somali clan identity, which is often poorly understood by outsiders. Firstly, each Somali can trace back his or her genealogy over thirty generations, giving Somalis membership in many sub-clans on their family tree. Which level in one's lineage is mobilised as one's "clan" depends entirely on the issue at hand. For example, in the past decade of stateless conflict, broad clan conflict between the Darod and Hawiye clan-families has over time devolved into much lower levels of clan identity. Secondly, clan links can be shifted and rediscovered according to the situation at hand. Clans migrating out of their home area will often take on the identity of the dominant clan (*shegad* status). If the situation dictates, they will rediscover their old lineage. Maternal clan links often provide vital flexibility for individuals conducting business or seeking security across clan lines. Thus, while the Somali clan system is usually portrayed as a fixed family tree, it is a tree on which a good deal of grafting takes place.

UNHCR-Nairobi recently prepared an overview of Somali clans and groups, with their areas of residence. UNHCR stresses that the overview is not a definitive document and that it should be taken mainly as an orientation tool. The document is annexed to this mission report (annex 3). As can be seen, the UNHCR overview generally corresponds with the findings of the mission, although there are slight differences (which will be specified in the chapters on the minority groups of this report).

It would seem that in reality, genealogically speaking, many of the minority groups could be anywhere on a scale of genealogical affiliation (through intermarriages), running from complete separateness to complete assimilation, and that what they say about their affiliations is as much a political statement as a historical or genealogical fact.

Names of minority groups are not always consistently used by the various persons interviewed by the delegation, and by various authors. In the first part of the chapters of this report dedicated to the various minority groups an attempt is made to clarify which names are in use for which groups.

A number of representatives from the various minority groups and international organisations requested that they should remain unidentified in this report. Their requests have been respected. The identity of all persons consulted during the mission is however known to the delegation.

The joint delegation to Nairobi did not visit Somalia on this occasion as the political and security situation in parts of Somalia is deeply affected by the present tense relations between various politically minded clan-based groups and administrations. This situation is to a large degree related to the peace-conference that took place in Arta, Djibouti and the establishment in August 2000 of a Somali "Parliament" in Arta, the so-called Transitional National Assembly (TNA), which is now in the process of establishing itself in Mogadishu.

The current political developments and the overall security situation in Somalia will be presented in more detail in the following section of the report. More detailed information on the security and human rights situation of the minority groups in Somalia covered in this report will be found in the sections covering particular minority groups below. These sections also contain information on the minority groups' and sub-groups' geographical distribution in Somalia, language, socio-economic situation and relationship to other population groups and clans, and, in some cases, information on the situation of Somali minority refugees in Kenya.

In the report, care is taken to present the views of the various spokespersons in a transparent way. Unless otherwise indicated, all statements within a paragraph are to be attributed to the source mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph.

### **3. Overall political developments and the security situation in Somalia**

#### **3.1 Arta peace process in Djibouti**

For the purpose of being updated on recent political developments and the security situation in Somalia, the delegation met with David Stephen, Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia, UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS); Bernard Harborne, Chief, UN Co-ordination Unit for Somalia (UNCU); Wayne Long, Chief Security Officer, UN Development Programme for Somalia (UNDP-Somalia) and Matt Bryden, Co-ordinator, War-torn Societies Project (WSP), all of whom informed the delegation of developments following from the Arta peace conference held in Djibouti. Please note that some of the details of the recent political developments in Somalia have been filled out with news reports from BBC and CNN.

A peace conference chaired by Djibouti's President Ismail Omar Guelleh opened in May 2000 at Arta, Djibouti with the backing of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) grouping of states, the UN, the European Union (EU) and the League of Arab States. This was the 13<sup>th</sup> major peace effort for Somalia since the collapse of central government in 1991, and, significantly, the first peace initiative that set out to work around civil society rather than the armed clan-factions.

Nearly 2,000 delegates, including clan elders, religious leaders, businessmen and intellectuals, attended the Arta conference, with the aim of drafting a power-sharing arrangement and a constitution to see Somalia through a three-year transitional period. Some leaders of armed clan-factions attended, most notably Ali Mahdi of Mogadishu's Abgal USC/SSA faction. Absent from the conference were the authorities of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in the north-west and the Puntland State of Somalia in the north-east, and Mogadishu "warlords" Hussein Aideed, Musa Sude, Osman Ato, Mohamed Qanyare and Hussein Bod. David Stephen informed the delegation that a formula to include the clan-faction leaders in the peace process could not be agreed at Arta but efforts continue, led at present by the Yemeni President, to find a way for them to be able to participate in the new institutions.

#### **3.2 Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and new President**

In August 2000 the Arta delegates elected 172 members of a 245-member provisional parliament for Somalia, the so-called Transitional National Assembly (TNA), for a three-year period. The TNA is structured along clan lines. There are 49 seats for each of the main Somali clan-families, the Dir (including the Isaaq), Hawiye, Darod and Digil-Mirifle (Rahanweyn), plus 29 seats reserved for members of the minority groups, referred to at Arta as the "Alliance Clans Community". The seats allocated to the main clan-families are divided out amongst the various clans and sub-clans, with five seats for each clan-family reserved for women. President Guelleh of Djibouti was mandated to select twenty members of the TNA, to correct any

possible imbalances in the assembly's composition. Annex 4 shows the division of seats among the various clans and groups.

The TNA elected Abdiqassim Salad Hassan as President of Somalia for a three-year transitional period from among 24 candidates. Abdiqassim's election received public backing from the UN, EU and League of Arab States. Abdiqassim, a Hawiye of the Habr Gedir sub-clan Ayr, was Minister of the Interior and Deputy Prime Minister under Siad Barre. He has received the support of business interests, Ali Mahdi (who had stood against him for the presidency) and the Islamic Shari'a courts, some of which have pledged the support of their militias to his new authority to enable it to establish itself in Mogadishu. Abdallah Derow Isaak, Secretary-General of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), was elected as Speaker of the TNA.

In October 2000, Abdiqassim appointed as Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galayadh, a businessman and prominent member of the northern Dulbahante clan of the Darod. Abdiqassim asked Galayadh to form a "government of national reconciliation and reconstruction". Galayadh served briefly as Industry Minister under Siad Barre. However, Abdiqassim's administration has yet to establish a permanent base inside Somalia. Neither has he held any discussions with the authorities in Somaliland and Puntland, which stayed away from the Arta conference and have refused to recognise his authority or status as President, or solved the problem of how to include leaders of armed clan-factions that have so far opposed the Arta peace initiative. Abdiqassim has begun to consolidate his position internationally with a round of foreign visits, including to UN headquarters.

Abdiqassim made his first visit to Somalia in his new capacity as interim President when he visited Baidoa in early September 2000. Thousands of people attended a rally in Baidoa to welcome him. He made a surprise visit to Mogadishu later in September 2000 and met with no resistance to his visit from the clan-faction leaders that had threatened to oppose any such visit to the capital. Four of the armed clan-faction leaders were in Yemen for talks with the Yemeni government at the time of Abdiqassim's visit to Mogadishu.

25 of the seats in the TNA are reserved for women. This represents a major breakthrough in women's rights and is the first time that women have been guaranteed parliamentary representation in Somalia. Abdiqassim has spoken of the important position of women, who constitute over half the population of Somalia, and has stated his intention of including women in his government.

There are also 29 seats in the TNA reserved for members of the minority groups, including five seats reserved for women from the minorities. The UN regards the position and treatment of women and minorities as very important. David Stephen stressed that the UN will, to a large extent, measure the success of the new institutions created by the Arta conference by how well they deal with issues surrounding women and minorities. David Stephen informed the delegation that Abdiqassim has some family connections with the Benadiri and that he has appointed a former Somali Ambassador to India, Mohammed Osman Omar, who is a Reer Hamar, as his chef de cabinet.

David Stephen informed the delegation that the transitional charter agreed at Arta provides for a human rights commission and a land commission. He believes that if the Somaliland

administration is ever to participate in the new structures established at Arta it will want the issue of human rights abuses committed in the north-west in the late 1980s and early 1990s by the Siad Barre regime placed high on the agenda of any commission. David Stephen informed the delegation that the TNA includes two members that Somaliland regards as major human rights violators, General Morgan and General Gani. Gani has already taken his seat at Arta. Morgan did not attend the Arta conference but was nominated by his clan for a TNA seat.

All representatives of the UN agencies emphasised that continued Rahanweyn (Digil-Mirifle) support for the new structures established at Arta will be crucial. The TNA may establish itself in Somalia at Baidoa, controlled by the RRA, if an early move to Mogadishu cannot take place for security reasons. Continued Rahanweyn support for Abdiqassim and the TNA is likely to depend largely on progress on the issue of land. Hawiye militias occupied large tracts of Rahanweyn land during the civil war and Rahanweyn delegates at Arta insisted that the land issue be given a high priority and that the creation of a land commission was incorporated in the national charter. Hawiye delegates at Arta expressed their willingness to resolve land problems but made no specific commitments to return occupied land. The RRA is presently divided between those supporting Rahanweyn participation in the Arta process, as favoured by traditional Rahanweyn elders, and those, including prominent RRA leaders, who oppose it.

All representatives of the UN agencies stressed that one of Abdiqassim's earliest priorities must be to establish an effective police force in Mogadishu and demobilise the existing clan-based militias in the city (see also Section 3.3.5).

Somaliland and Puntland remain outside the Arta process and neither administration is recognised under the Arta agreements as a legitimate authority. Although the transitional charter agreed at Arta allows for federalism, it does so on the basis of the 18 administrative regions established under Siad Barre's government. Seats are allocated in the TNA for the clans and minorities that inhabit the territories controlled by the Somaliland and Puntland authorities.

### **3.2.1 Position of North West Somalia (Somaliland)**

Although President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal's self-declared Somaliland administration stayed away from Arta, there was nevertheless strong representation by delegates from the Dulbahante, Warsangeli, Issa, Gadabursi and some Isaaq clans, though not the Habr Awal or Habr Yunis. David Stephen believes that there is more openness in Somaliland, and Puntland, towards the Arta process than the authorities are prepared to concede, and the public have been well-informed about developments at Arta through television and radio.

Wayne Long considered that Egal's administration has shown increasing signs of paranoia towards the developments at Arta. Habeas Corpus has been suspended and civil rights curtailed, with new powers being given to the police and military to detain people. There is reported to be a wanted list circulating in Hargeisa of those who attended the Arta conference. Also, David Stephen informed the delegation, the Somaliland authorities have begun to issue "Somaliland" passports, a measure that they have previously refrained from.

While much of the Somaliland authorities' actions and statements over Arta may be viewed as rhetoric, in September 2000, a Dulbahante member of the new TNA and former member of the Somaliland parliament, Garaad Abshir Salah, was arrested on his return to Somaliland from

Djibouti and sentenced to seven years in gaol for treason. His arrest was seen by many as a gesture by President Egal to demonstrate that he is still in charge in Somaliland. Some 60 to 80 delegates from the Somaliland area attended the Arta conference and only Garaad has been arrested to date. In early October 2000, Garaad was pardoned by Egal and released from prison. Opinion in Somaliland over the Arta process is divided and in late August 2000 thousands of people in Somaliland staged demonstrations against the Arta conference and Abdiqassim. David Stephen stated that there is strong opposition to the Djibouti peace process and the Transitional National Government (TNG) from pro-Somaliland movements such as the "Red Flag Group".

The Somaliland, and Puntland, authorities have accused Abdiqassim of being an Islamic fundamentalist. David Stephen considered that although Abdiqassim is very religious, he should not be regarded as a fundamentalist and it may be the intention of the Somaliland and Puntland authorities to discredit him in the eyes of the West, and Ethiopia, which traditionally has concerns about militant Islam in the region.

### **3.2.2 Position of North East Somalia (Puntland)**

The Puntland administration was initially willing to participate in the Arta conference, but most of its delegation withdrew early in the proceedings. However, a few members of the delegation remained at the conference, led by Hassan Abshir, who was Puntland's Minister for Home Affairs. Abshir became the chairman of the Arta conference. Puntland's President Abdullahi Yusuf saw Abshir's continued participation in the conference as a challenge to his authority. Yusuf has stated that he will only talk with Abdiqassim if he withdraws his claim to be President of all Somalia, makes various amendments in Puntland's favour to the transitional charter drawn up at Arta and de-recognises the delegates from Puntland who remained at Arta.

A large number of the delegates from the north-east that remained at the Arta conference have been able to return to Puntland without arrest, although this may possibly be because they have supporters backed by militia to defend them against the Puntland authorities if necessary. There have been limited skirmishes around Galkayo between supporters and opponents of the Arta conference but these have been contained so far. It was reported in September 2000 that several commanders in Puntland had been dismissed for failing to arrest people returning from the Arta conference.

Wayne Long considered it likely that Abdiqassim would appoint a Prime Minister from the Darod clans to balance the interests of the main Somali clan-families. Abdullahi Yusuf had been suggested as a possible Prime Minister, despite his hostile public stance towards the Arta conference. Another possible Darod contender for the post was Hassan Abshir. Both Yusuf and Abshir are Majerteen but from different sub-clans. There was thus scope for a serious split in Puntland within the Majerteen clan. In October 2000 Abdiqassim appointed a former industry minister under Siad Barre, Ali Khalif Galayadh, a Darod from the Dulbahante clan, to be Prime Minister. Potential remains, however, for a border conflict south of Galkayo, where Hawiye clans, who have generally supported the Arta process, populate the area bordering Puntland.

### **3.2.3 Prospects for a central authority in Somalia**

All representatives of the UN agencies considered that it is much too early to predict whether or not Abdiqassim will be successful in establishing a central government for Somalia with any meaningful authority. Much will depend on whether he is able to establish his authority in Mogadishu at an early date, and whether the authorities in Somaliland and Puntland can be brought into the process. A place in the peace process also needs to be found for the leaders of armed clan-factions, although all the representatives of the UN agencies stressed that the power and influence of the so-called "warlords" has diminished noticeably in the past two years, and the Arta peace process is important because it has placed great importance on the role of civil society. Nevertheless, all UN sources consulted by the delegation strongly underlined the need to take a "wait and see" approach to the political developments in Somalia.

David Stephen considered that, in the short term, Abdiqassim's main aim will be to establish an administration with real authority in southern and central Somalia, based possibly initially in Baidoa but moving at an early date to Mogadishu, with Somaliland and Puntland remaining outside the Arta process for the time being but to be included at a later date. Both Somaliland and Puntland have indicated that they will not negotiate seriously with Abdiqassim until he has pacified the south and established his authority there.

David Stephen outlined to the delegation what he considered to be the best case - worst case scenarios for the Arta process in coming months. The best case scenario is one in which Abdiqassim establishes a civil authority in Mogadishu, pacifying the "warlords" and bringing stability to southern and central Somalia. Somaliland and Puntland will, realistically, remain outside the Arta process for the foreseeable future. The worst case scenario would see Abdiqassim and the TNG failing to establish control in Mogadishu, with southern and central Somalia remaining in a state of turmoil, but also seeing the stability of northern Somaliland and Puntland threatened at the same time.

### **3.3 Security Situation**

#### **3.3.1 General**

A UN source informed the delegation that at the moment there is no large-scale violence in Somalia, only highly localised incidents. The source indicated though that tensions exist in certain areas arising from the developments at Arta. In Galkayo, Puntland, for example, Majerteen clan supporters of Puntland President Abdullahi Yusuf are strongly opposed to the Arta process whereas the Hawiye clan Habr Gedir south of Galkayo is in favour. There is also some potential for tension or conflict in the disputed Darod-populated Sool and Sanaag regions of eastern Somaliland, claimed by Puntland, if Puntland were to join the Arta process in the future but Somaliland remained outside. Mogadishu, the prospective seat of the Transitional National Government (TNG), with the majority of the warlords against the new government, is a potential tension area and continues to see sporadic violence. The Baidoa area could also see tensions, as the RRA and the Rahanweyn clan elders are split over support for the Arta process and the TNG.

According to the UN Somalia Monitor, October 2000 edition Somalia continues to be divided by a combination of widespread endorsement of the TNG well as widespread tension relating to the peace process. There are persistent but still unconfirmed reports that that there is



opposition support for an alliance of regional authorities consisting of Somaliland, Puntland, a yet unformed "Jubaland" and a yet unformed "Hawiyeland". Allegedly, this alliance would have both a political as well as military component.

The UN Somalia Monitor adds that a four-man delegation from the Marehan-based Somali National Front (SNF) central committee has returned from consultations in Ethiopia, and has joined the RRA and General Morgan's Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) for negotiations in Baidoa.

Since the peace conference in Arta, Djibouti, the relationship between the Ethiopian government and the interim government of Somalia has become somewhat strained. The IRIN Update on the Horn of Africa reported on 15 and 16 November 2000 that President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan of Somalia is visiting Ethiopia on 16 November 2000. He is expected to meet Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to discuss the relationship between the two countries. The Ethiopian government postponed the trip. Somali government sources have said that Abdiqassim is expected to request the Ethiopian government to help establish stability in Somalia, and to seek assurances that Ethiopia would not support Somali factions opposed to his new government. Diplomatic sources said Ethiopia would want a commitment from the new Somali government that Somalia would not be used as a base for attacks on Ethiopia by armed groups opposed to the Ethiopian government. The relations between the new Somali government and the Ethiopian government have been strained by the presence of Ethiopian troops in Gedo region in south-western Somalia, and in the South-Central regions of Bay and Bakool, diplomatic sources told IRIN. Ethiopia has also been accused of supporting faction leaders opposed to the new government in Somalia. According to CNN (19 November 2000), Somali Foreign Minister Ismail Hurreh Buba said talks in Addis Ababa with Ethiopian Government officials had "cleared all suspicions" between the two Horn of Africa states.

According to the IRIN Update on the Horn of Africa (16 November 2000), many of the Mogadishu-based faction leaders [opposed to the TNG] are currently in Yemen at the invitation of President Ali Abdullah Salih. Somali interim President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan is also expected to visit Yemen soon. President Salih has been trying to mediate between the faction leaders and the new government, but this is the first attempt to bring the two sides together for direct talks.

Bernard Harborne informed the delegation that UN access in southern Somalia is presently limited to Bay, Bakool and Gedo regions. The UN hopes to be able to resume operations in Belet Weyne, Hiran region, soon. Even if the TNG is able to establish itself in Mogadishu in the near future, the UN agencies do not envisage being able to re-open their offices in Mogadishu immediately.

### **3.3.2 North West Somalia (Somaliland) and North East Somalia (Puntland)**

The security situation in and between Somaliland and Puntland remains good and no major conflict is expected between the two authorities over the disputed Sanaag and Sool regions in eastern Somaliland, although this might change if Puntland were to enter the Arta process without Somaliland. Bernard Harborne stressed that the UN continues to operate freely in both Somaliland and Puntland and work with the administrations there and will continue to do so,

whatever developments arise from the Arta process in central and southern Somalia. However, tensions lie beneath the surface in both territories and there is considerable opposition to the position taken by the Somaliland and Puntland authorities to the Arta conference.

According to the IRIN Update on the Horn of Africa (15 November 2000) a demonstration in Hargeisa, Somaliland, on 11 November 2000 resulted in two deaths as a crowd of people were protesting against the arrest of Sultan Mohamed Abdulkadir of the Idagale sub-clan of the Isaaq. Abdulkadir was arrested on his return from Djibouti, where he attended the Somali peace conference. He is an elected member of Somalia's TNA. The source added that "the Somaliland authorities are strongly opposed to the Djibouti process and have arrested people who attended the conference". More than 60 people were arrested following the demonstration. On 21 November 2000 the same source reported that Somaliland's President Egal had pardoned Mohamed Abdulkadir and released him from prison. Decrees have been issued by Egal pardoning those who participated in the Djibouti talks, on condition that they renounce the Djibouti process. According to IRIN the BBC has reported that those arrested in connection with the demonstration on 11 November 2000 have all been pardoned and released.

### **3.3.3 Hawiye clans in central Somalia (Galgaduud, Hiran & the Shabelle regions)**

David Stephen informed the delegation that, while pleased that the President selected by the TNA is a Hawiye, the Hawiye clans nevertheless remain at odds with each other. Wayne Long advised that there are on-going disputes within the Hawiye down to "sub-sub-sub-clan" level. There have been major clashes in the territory between Jowhar and Belet Weyne between the Hawadle and Gaaljaal clans. In Mogadishu most Abgal sub-clans are fighting each other, the Habr Gedir sub-clan Sa'ad is split in two and the Murosade occasionally clash with the Habr Gedir sub-clan Suleiman and the Habr Gedir sub-clan Ayr. The Galgaduud region is, however, calm.

Generally, rival Hawiye groups are seeking to bolster their positions ahead of any lasting settlement that may follow from the Arta peace process, although at present most of the Hawiye armed factions, other than Ali Mahdi's Abgal-based USC/SSA, have been resolutely opposed to Arta and Abdiqassim.

Kalunga Lutato, Head of Somali Operations, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Branch Office for Kenya, considered Hiran region to be part of the Central and Southern Somalia "problem area" because of the clashes that have occurred there between rival Hawiye clans; Hiran region contains pockets of insecurity. He said that UNHCR does not consider Hiran region sufficiently secure for "promoted returns", which take place only to the areas north of Galkayo, i.e. to Somaliland and Puntland. South of Galkayo UNHCR only supports "facilitated returns" on an individual basis, under which those who express the wish to return are given basic assistance and are fully informed of the security situation and the risks inherent in return.

Wayne Long informed the delegation that clashes in Hiran region have occurred between the Hawiye clans Hawadle and Gaaljaal in the Belet Weyne area. There is no immediate prospect of reconciliation between the Hawiye clans in Hiran. Bernard Harborne did, however, inform the delegation that the UN hoped to be able to re-establish its presence in Belet Weyne soon.

Most recently the UN has reported that a peace agreement between the conflicting parties has been concluded and that the agreement seems to hold. According to the UN Somalia Monitor, October 2000, Belet Weyne and the immediate area remain quiet and peaceful. The Governor and elders have committed themselves to support the TNG. They have the support of what appears to be most Somali residents of the Hiran region. The peace agreement between the Hawadle and the Gaaljaal continues to hold.

Wayne Long furthermore explained that a three-sided power struggle is taking place in the Lower Shabelle regions, where the rich agricultural lands have been much fought over in recent years. Habr Gedir occupiers, who have held much of the area since the mid-1990s, have exploited indigenous clans and minorities. Much of Aideed's funding comes from banana plantations in the Shabelle regions. The Shari'a court militias that have emerged as a powerful force in the past two years are a third element in the struggle for power in the Shabelle regions. The court militias are usually Habr Gedir-based but are in direct conflict with the clan-based militia of Aideed and there have also been clashes between different court militias, even though militia members have come from the same clan.

### **3.3.4 Bay and Bakool Regions**

All representatives of the UN agencies informed the delegation that there are still some divisions within the RRA over how much support to give to Abdiqassim's new administration. Originally there were plans to base the TNG in Baidoa, at least initially before a move to Mogadishu.

According to a UN source the very recent history of conflict with the Hawiye, particularly Hussein Aideed's Habr Gedir militia, has left some Rahanweyn leaders reluctant to sacrifice recent gains in favour of a government led by a Hawiye. Ethiopian forces remain in Bay and Bakool regions backing the RRA.

The Baidoa area could see tensions, as the Rahanweyn elders and the RRA are split on the matter of support for the TNG. The Rahanweyn elders support the TNG but the RRA leadership is against it. According to the UN Somalia Monitor, Baidoa continues to be politically and militarily tense. On 4 November 2000 the RRA arrested 17 traditional Rahanweyn leaders who support the TNG. Over the following weekend, this led to two armed confrontations between the RRA and militia controlled by Rahanweyn elders, resulting in two deaths. Several Rahanweyn elders are reported to be on the run in the bush. Although he remains opposed to the TNG, RRA number two Sheikh Aden has reportedly strongly criticised the military leader of the RRA, Hasan Muhammad Nur 'Shatigaduud', over this action.

IRIN Update on the Horn of Africa reports on 16 November 2000 that confusion affecting loyalties and decision-making within the RRA in Baidoa has led to a deterioration in security. Sources in Baidoa told IRIN that reported sackings of local officials were reflective of the "indecision" of Hasan Muhammad Nur 'Shatigaduud'. According to IRIN's source, the Governor of Bay region, Muhammad Ali Adan, has been dismissed as well as the RRA liaison officer and the commander of the militia.

Hasan Muhammad Nur 'Shatigaduud' announced his opposition to the TNG after initially being elected a TNA member at the Arta peace conference. He travelled to New York with the new

Somali President, but later returned to Baidoa, withdrew his support, and arrested those who attended the Arta elections for the TNA. Sources in Baidoa told IRIN that insecurity in the town had increased with militia "getting out of hand" and shooting around the town. Roadblocks had sprung up near the town.

### **3.3.5 Mogadishu (Benadir Region)**

Armed clashes and banditry have continued in Mogadishu. All the representatives of UN agencies that met with the delegation stressed that one of Abdiqassim's earliest priorities will be to establish an effective police force in Mogadishu and demobilise the existing clan-based militias in the city, essential if his administration is to be able to relocate there from Arta.

David Stephen and Wayne Long informed the delegation that Abdiqassim has appointed a security committee under General Mohamed Nur Galaal, a Habr Gedir, and General Jil'ao, an Abgal who is close to Ali Mahdi, to oversee the establishment of a new police force. The important task of demobilising the Hawiye militia is therefore in the hands of a professional Habr Gedir-Abgal partnership. General Galaal was a member of the former national police force, a respected body, and is not considered clan-minded.

A recruitment drive for at least 4,000 officers for a new Mogadishu police force began in September 2000. Faction leaders including Hussein Aideed, Musa Sude and Osman Ali Ato reacted by threatening to prevent the deployment of any new police force in territory that they control. There is strong business backing for the new police force and the Chairman of the South Mogadishu Shari'a court declared his support for it. Some Shari'a courts, however, have declared their unwillingness to have their militias incorporated into the new force because they oppose the inclusion of members of the "warlord" militias in the same force. An attack later in September 2000 by Aideed's forces in an area of Mogadishu's Bermuda district controlled by Ali Mahdi was seen as a setback to Abdiqassim's plans for restoring order to the capital.

Two supporters of the TNG have been killed in Mogadishu. General Yusuf Talan was killed on 18 October 2000 shortly after he had been appointed as head of the committee on disarmament. Hasan Ahmed Elmi, a member of the TNA, was killed on 12 November 2000. In both cases no-one claimed responsibility for the murder.

According to the UN Somalia Monitor, October 2000, Mogadishu is quiet, but politically and militarily tense. Random banditry continues. Opposition forces remain in control in key areas, including Villa Somalia - the seat of the government - and there is still risk to guests of the government. The TNG Defence Minister Abdullah Baqor Musa "King Kong" has called for former Somali Army members to assemble at bases near Mogadishu for duty. By mid-November 2000 the UN had received reports to the effect that 10,000 men had responded to the call.

### **3.3.6 Gedo region**

Wayne Long informed the delegation that Gedo region is calm and is one of the quieter regions in southern Somalia. It is also agriculturally productive. The security situation at present allows UN staff to move freely in the area without escort and it is possible to drive from Mandera in Kenya via Luuq as far as Baidoa. Ethiopian forces may be found in territory up to 100 km

inside Somalia and they effectively keep the peace in the area where the borders of Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya meet, mainly in around the towns of Luuq, Dulo and Belet Hawe. While Ethiopia is not in direct control of this territory, its forces will intervene if the security situation deteriorates there. The Marehan-based Somali National Front (SNF) faction has district chiefs in the north of Gedo but its position is somewhat weaker in southern Gedo, where Islamic fundamentalist influence remains. From a purely security point of view, Marehan and even Bantu could be repatriated in safety to Gedo.

According to the UN Somalia Monitor the Ethiopian forces were still in Gedo region in October 2000. Their combined strength is estimated to be approximately 300 troops and they are based in Belet Hawe, Luuq and Dulo. Reports indicate that they have stepped up patrolling recently in terms of both size and intensity, but the Gedo region remains quiet.

### **3.3.7 Kismayo and the far south**

Wayne Long informed the delegation that Kismayo and the area south to the border with Kenya remain in a chaotic state and are very unsafe. Many people have fled Kismayo city. Clashes between Marehan and Ogaden forces, and in-fighting between rival Marehan clans, continue along the southern border with Kenya. The far south of Somalia is also prone to Islamic fundamentalist activity.

## **4. Introduction to the minority groups in Somalia**

### **4.1 Historical background**

Several representatives of the minority groups stressed that most of the so-called minority groups in fact constitute the original population groups of Somalia, who were driven to the fringes of Somalia when the major Somali clans expanded southward. Some of these groups consider the civil war of the 1990s and its aftermath as a next, and for some groups final, phase in this process of driving the original population groups from Somalia.

Historical claims and grievances play an important role in current political debates in Somalia. Moreover, interpretation of history is itself a contentious political issue. Descriptions of the historical backgrounds of Somali minority groups and clans are based only partly on historical facts, while another part is based on myths that serve to define the identity and/or political allegiance of the group or clan. This explains why there may exist different versions of the history of Somalia, according to the different actors at different times on the Somalia scene.

In the tenth or eleventh centuries, Somali clans pushed into the eastern Horn of Africa, first northward from southern Ethiopia, and then southward into the inter-riverine regions. At the time Oromo and other pastoral tribes as well as hunter-gatherer groups, such as the Eyle, inhabited the Somali interior. *Bantu* communities farmed along the river valleys. Along the coast, several ancient trading cities had been established since the ninth century by a mix of Arab, Persian and other communities who developed their own ethnic identities as *Benadiri*. The *Bajuni*, a Swahili fishing people, also lived on the southern coast.

In the inter-riverine regions between the Juba and Shabelle rivers, the Digil-Rahanweyn clan,

composed primarily of other clans absorbed into the lineage as they settled, adopted a sedentary, agro-pastoral lifestyle.

The southward expansion of the Somali clans accelerated again in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, when clans from the central and north-eastern regions, probably responding to population pressures in their marginal, arid lands, crossed the Juba river and migrated all the way into northern Kenya. At the same time, Somali populations along the Benadir coast imported slaves from East Africa to provide labour for a rising slave-based grain export economy along the lower Shabelle river. Descendants of those slaves, along with remnants of the original Bantu farming populations, constitute the Jarer (Jereer) or Bantu minorities that populate agricultural villages in much of the Shabelle and Juba river valleys.

This history of, often violent, migration left several important legacies to the Somalia of Siad Barre. First, it produced a dominant Somali culture as well as universal adherence to Islam. Yet, significant diversity existed beneath the surface of what appeared a highly homogeneous society. The ancient coastal populations retained their distinct ethnic identities outside the Somali lineage. Bantu communities, though usually affiliated with Somali clans, were considered a low-status ethnic group and continued to endure racial prejudice. The more settled, agro-pastoral Rahanweyn clans of the inter-riverine areas were significantly different in culture, political organisation and language from their nomadic cousins. Siad Barre's political ideology of Somali nationalism and equality tended to mute these differences and draw members of minority groups into co-operation with the regime. Since the collapse of the state in 1991, however, these ethnic distinctions have vigorously reasserted themselves. The Rahanweyn, Bantu and coastal populations were the main victims of both a famine and a civil war imposed on them by the dominant pastoral clans. Large numbers of these groups subsequently fled the country. In the past twenty years the position of these groups, who traditionally are not armed and who fall outside the Somali clan law of blood compensation, has remained precarious, especially in the conflict areas.

## **4.2 Present situation of minority groups in Somalia**

During the civil war the minority groups of Somalia were among the most vulnerable and victimised populations in the country. These groups did not have any militia as most major Somali clans did. Generally members of the various minority groups were and still are unarmed and they were very often victims of the killings, lootings, rapes, abductions, exclusions, displacements and other forms of aggression committed by members of the major Somali clan-based militias. This was and still is the case in parts of central and southern Somalia.

Some of the minority groups sided with, or have been forced to side with, various militias during the civil war years and some also sided with, or have been accused of having sided with, the regime of Somalia's former dictator Siad Barre. When war anarchy broke out in central and southern Somalia these minority groups faced severe retribution and acts of revenge from the militias that had been fighting the Siad Barre regime. According to Cassanelli some of these minority groups were even subject to waves of invasions by successive militias (Cassanelli, 1995, p. 7).

Dr Adam Abdelmoula, Human Rights Officer, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Nairobi, informed the Danish Immigration Service in August 2000 that there are four main human rights concerns in Somalia, namely the status of the minorities, the plight of the displaced, the status of women and the situation of civil society groups under the control of the "warlords".

The Somali minority populations are not evenly distributed throughout Somalia. There is a concentration of minority groups in the central and southern parts of Somalia, especially in urban centres along the coastline and along the two main rivers, Shabelle and Juba. In the urban centres of Mogadishu, Merka, Brava, Afgoye and Kismayo one may find the remains of what used to be functioning minority communities with their own cultural identity. Also, along the two rivers a large Bantu population still live as agriculturalists, although they have been under heavy pressure from the major Somali clans to hand over their agricultural land to members of these clans. Inland in Somalia one may find other minority populations including various religious groups such as the Ashraf, and also the Midgan groups who have special occupational skills.

Kalunga Lutato, Head of Somali Operations, UNHCR-Nairobi, informed a member of the delegation that although members of minority groups in Somalia are, at the present time, generally not individually targeted by members of the major Somali clans or their militias, under certain conditions they might be. This is typically the case when a former positive relation or alliance between a minority group and a major Somali clan is subject to a change as a result of a shift in the local power balance between major Somali clans and their militias.

Such changes of relations between major clans and minority groups still occur in Somalia. A recent example of this took place in June 1999 when a so-called "alliance", or understanding, between the Bajuni minority group in southern Somalia and General Morgan's Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) militia broke down with the defeat of the SPM forces and the conquest of Kismayo by an unusual alliance of the Aideed-controlled Somali National Alliance (SNA) militia and the Marehan-based Somali National Front (SNF) militia. The Bajuni communities in Kismayo and on the Bajuni islands suffered from serious suppression and repeated looting by the allied SNA/SNF forces. Kalunga Lutato explained that some of the Bajuni fled all the way to Bosaso in North East Somalia (Puntland) while those that stayed behind sent an appeal dated 26 September 2000 to the UNHCR office in Nairobi for assistance, stating that their islands and property were being looted repeatedly by the Somali militias.

Kalunga Lutato explained that minority groups are especially vulnerable to fluctuations in the local power balance, as they are mostly unarmed and totally dependent for their protection on a major Somali clan-militia. If that protection disappears they are at the mercy of their new "masters". This situation applies, for example, to a number of the Bantu communities along the Shabelle River, especially those in Lower Shabelle region.

Another aspect of vulnerability among the minority populations in Somalia is that there is no national government with institutions to protect these populations against the militias and individual Somalis. Kalunga Lutato gave an example of such vulnerability among the Bravanese. The Bravanese did not normally intermarry with members of the main Somali clans or other groups and consequently their own distinct ethnicity was fairly well preserved. They

were, in a way, an isolated and distinct people and their property, and their women, were beyond the reach of members of the Somali clans. When the state collapsed in 1991 and the Bravanese lost their "protection" from the central government they soon became targets for various militias that raged through the coastal areas of central and southern Somalia. The militias especially targeted Bravanese women and many were raped or forced into marriage with non-Bravanese Somalis. The Bravanese women were seen as "attractive" to the Somali militias in the sense that before the collapse of government they were "inaccessible" but when the government fell they were easy victims.

Kalunga Lutato stressed that in order to deal with asylum claims from members of minority groups in Somalia it is important to understand what kind of persecution a minority group has experienced during the war. It is important to know what has happened to them in Somalia. Groups such as the Bantu who have lost their property and land are unlikely to be able to return to Somalia in the foreseeable future. That is also why the UNHCR is in the process of resettling Bantu refugees currently in Kenya in other countries such as the United States. Should the situation in Somalia become "normalised" and the threats against members of the minority groups be stopped some of the "minority" refugees should be able to return home. However, a settlement of the whole question of private ownership of property in Somalia, especially houses and land, will be crucial for such a normalisation to take place.

Wayne Long, Chief Security Officer, UNDP-Somalia, considered that the minorities in Somalia are generally not in control of their own lives. Even in northern Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland) the dominant Isaaq and Majerteen clans effectively determine the position of the minorities. Small groups of Midgan (Gaboys) are living in both Somaliland and Puntland but they have little influence with the authorities on matters concerning their own communities. In Somaliland the minorities have a small representation in the Parliament, but in real terms their influence is extremely limited.

Wayne Long emphasised that minorities can rarely challenge the dominant Somali clan militias on a military basis, as they have no military capability of their own. One exception to this is the Bimaal, who he described as a "neo-Somali" group, part of the Dir clan-family but of mixed Arab ancestry, who have no organised militia but are able to assemble small armed groups to challenge Habr Gedir dominance. Also, some Bantu communities along the Shabelle river, who have been continually losing their traditional lands and properties to encroaching Somali clans, have been able to assemble small defensive groups against predatory Somali clan militias.

The transitional charter agreed at the Arta peace conference in Djibouti provides for the establishment of a land commission. However, Wayne Long estimated that it might take a very long time before the land issue is resolved in Somalia, maybe even as long as 50 years. He added that a fact to take into consideration in regard to the land issue is that many of the present "soldiers" in the militias are mostly from the rural areas and many were nomads.

According to Wayne Long, Bantu working on plantations in the south live in a situation akin to slavery. Bantu have no bargaining power against the main Somali clans, particularly the Hawiye in Lower Shabelle and the Darod in Lower Juba. In most southern and central areas there is not even a vague pretence of rights or representation for minorities, with the exception



of a few isolated areas where the power of Somali clan militias and the Shari'a courts is limited, such as Qorioley and Brava. In Brava, Habr Gedir control, established in the mid-1990s, weakens at times. In the past two to three months much of Aideed's militia force has moved back towards Mogadishu, in anticipation of a power struggle in the capital in the wake of developments at Arta. At times such as this, when militia power diminishes, the Bravanese are able to resume some degree of control over their lives. Some local authority is able to assert itself, providing it is not seen as a direct threat to Aideed's overall position. Bravanese may even be able to regain property taken by Habr Gedir occupiers although such regained property is always liable to be retaken when militia control reasserts itself.

Some Bajuni were resettled on their traditional islands south of Kismayo by UNHCR two years ago, but Wayne Long informed the delegation that returnees have not fared well. Somalis from dominant clans have harassed returnees and the area is also prone to Islamic fundamentalist activity. Bajuni returnees have little control over their lives on the islands and it has been reported that dominant Somali clans even control their water supply. The delegation held a meeting with elders from the Bajuni clan who stressed that the position of returnees to the islands was hopeless and many had made their way back to Kenya.

A UN source in Nairobi estimated that in the present situation there are no longer any generic threats to any of the minority groups in Somalia. But the delegation was also told that the Reer Hamar community of Mogadishu and the Bravanese community of Brava have almost ceased to exist in Somalia. They have been dispersed, number a few thousand at the most along the southern coast, and have nothing to go back to. The same source added that the new government (the TNG established at the Arta peace conference in Djibouti) would be seen not as a government of the minorities but as a government of the victors.

A UN source informed the delegation that while Midgan (also referred to as Gaboye in northern Somalia) suffered during the civil war, they are now safe in Somaliland and Puntland. Some Gaboye work for UN projects in Somaliland. Their position is similar in southern and central Somalia. Midgan from the south might be able to relocate to the north without being threatened, although they might find themselves in conflict with northern Midgan (Gaboye) for the same jobs.

Finally, several sources pointed to the latest political developments in Somalia and emphasised that for the first time in Somali history the minority populations of Somalia are representing themselves in a national parliamentary assembly (the TNA) although the assembly is not yet established firmly in Somalia. During the Djibouti conference the minority communities were allotted 29 seats in the TNA. A few of the minority communities such as the Shekhal have been included in the Somali clan with which they are attached or affiliated. The Shekhal is included in with the Hawiye clan-family's TNA seat allocation. But most of the minority communities are being represented in the TNA through their own group, the so-called "Alliance Clans Community", which has 29 seats in the assembly.

### **4.3 Somali minority refugees in Kenya**

Several representatives of the minority groups interviewed drew the delegation's attention to the present difficult situation of their groups in Kenya, since the closure of the coastal camps

for Somali minorities in 1997 (e.g. the Bajuni, the Bantu and the Benadiri, see also chapters 5.5, 6.5 and 7.5).

Regarding the closure of the coastal refugee camps in Kenya in which a number of minority groups had been staying, Kalunga Lutato stated that the closing of these camps came about for a combination of reasons. In 1994 the Kenyan Government decided that the Somali refugees should leave the so-called designated camp areas near Mombasa. A large proportion of so-called minority refugees from Somalia stayed in these coastal camps. The Government found no justification for the camps to be located in the populated areas near Mombasa. The Government then designated the Dadaab refugee camp as a major place of refuge for all Somali refugees. Those that had problems in the Dadaab camps were later moved to Kakuma.

According to Perouse de Montclos the Kenyan Government policy towards refugees is to keep them in camps away from the main urban, economic and tourist centres of the country. Furthermore they are kept in a state of dependence that is supposed to compel them to return to their homeland as soon as possible.

Kalunga Lutato explained that Somali refugees who have left their refugee camp in Kenya are no longer supported by the UNHCR. This is part of the agreement between the UNHCR and the Kenyan Government. Somali (and any other) refugees can only be assisted in the so-called designated areas, i.e. the recognised refugee camps. However, once a refugee has left the camp he or she is still under the protection of the UNHCR and is still recognised as a refugee in Kenya.

Kalunga Lutato added that according to the knowledge of the UNHCR no Somali citizen - whether a person from a minority group or a person from one of the major Somali clans - recognised as a refugee in Kenya has been deported to Somalia. He was not able, however, to exclude fully the possibility that this has ever happened.

The UNHCR has agreed with the Kenyan Government that Somali asylum applicants (and all other asylum applicants) should be provided with an ID card that states that they have a pending refugee case at the UNHCR in Kenya. But Kalunga Lutato acknowledged that it is a problem that Kenya does not register refugees.

A recent IRIN report on the security situation of Somali refugees in the Kenyan Dadaab camps is attached to this report as annex 5.

## **5. Bajuni**

The delegation met with a group of elders from the Bajuni community in Nairobi. All had left the Bajuni islands in the early 1990s and had spent time in the Jomvu UNHCR camp in Mombasa before it was closed in 1997 (see also annex 6). One of the elders had returned to the Bajuni islands in the late 1990s but had since come back to Kenya. The elders are now in Nairobi as they chose not to relocate to the Kakuma camp when Jomvu closed.

### **5.1 Groups and sub-groups, geographical distribution**

The Bajuni elders described the Bajuni as a united people that are not divided into sub-groups.

Their community was scattered across the Bajuni islands south of Kismayo, in the city of Kismayo itself and in coastal settlements south of Kismayo to Raskamboni and the border with Kenya. Lee Cassanelli refers to small Bajuni communities in Brava and Mogadishu in addition to the population in Kismayo and the islands.

The elders stated that Kismayo was the original home of the Bajuni people. The name Kismayo translates into English as "top of the well". The Bajuni can trace their origins in Kismayo back to the thirteenth century. Some Bajuni moved to the remote islands and south along the coast towards the border with Kenya when the main Somali clans moved into the Kismayo area in the nineteenth century, although some remained in the Majengo district of Kismayo. Cassanelli comments that most anthropologists believe the Bajuni represent a mixture of Arab, Bantu, Somali and possibly Malay backgrounds.

According to the elders the Bajuni population was distributed in the following locations, running south from Kismayo to the border with Kenya:

- Kismayo (mainly in the Majengo district of the city)
- Nchoni - a coastal settlement
- Fuma Iyu Na Tini - an island
- Koyama - an island
- Chovaye - an island
- Istanbul - a coastal settlement
- Chula - the most populated island
- Ndoa - an island
- Kudai - an island (location of a police station)
- Burkavo - a town
- Raskamboni - a town (location of a former Somali navy base)

According to Perouse de Montclos the Bajuni are locally called *tiku*, and they are essentially found on the islands of Koyama, Ngumi, Chovayi or Chula and in the city of Kismayo, of which they claim paternity.

The elders described how the communities on the islands maintained close links with each other and with Bajuni communities along the coast and in Kismayo. Bajuni from the islands would usually have spent a part of the year in Kismayo, where it was essential to travel for trading fish, purchasing essential commodities, medical treatment and any official business with government bodies.

The elders estimated that before the civil war the total number of Bajuni was some 11,000, although they were not exactly sure of the number. Cassanelli estimated the number of Bajuni at perhaps 3,000 to 4,000.

With the collapse of central government in 1991 and the ensuing clan-based civil war many Bajuni fled the islands and coastal settlements and moved south to Kenya. Some Bajuni remained on the islands and even in Kismayo but during the civil war it was not possible for the Bajuni that had left for Kenya to maintain communication with those that had remained in

Somalia.

## 5.2 Language

According to the elders most Bajuni speak some Somali, although the main language spoken by the Bajuni is Kibajuni, a dialect related to Swahili. The Bajuni elders advised the delegation that younger Bajuni, who have lived mainly in exile, alienated from mainstream Somali society, may have only a very limited knowledge of Somali but they stressed that they should know at least some key words in Somali as their family elders would have taught them. Bernard Harborne, Chief of the UN Co-ordination Unit for Somalia, with whom the delegation met, also stated that most Bajuni are able to speak some Somali in addition to Kibajuni.

The Bajuni elders informed the delegation that, although their language, Kibajuni, is related to Swahili, their language is very different to the Swahili dialect spoken in the areas of Kenya immediately below the Kenya-Somalia border, including the islands that continue from the Somali border down along the coast towards Mombasa, although there are some common words.

## 5.3 Socio-economic situation

### 5.3.1 Relationship with other groups and clans

The Bajuni elders considered that the Bajuni had traditionally held a low status in Somalia and were regarded as inferior by the Somali clans. The Bajuni had enjoyed very few educational or employment opportunities and most had survived as fishermen.

Perouse de Montclos considers the Bajuni as a community apart from all other Somali populations. They do not lay claim to being Somali, Bantu or Swahili and they may even have Indonesian or Yemenite origins. Perouse de Montclos explains that even before independence the Bajuni felt marginalised and they formed a short-lived political movement, called the Fiqarini Youth. Since then the region of the Bajuni has been the scene of serious fighting between the Hawiye and the Darod clan militias. The Bajuni were on good terms with the Darod, but were accused of treachery when they refused to fight against the Hawiye. Perouse de Montclos adds that while the Bajuni organised the Darod exodus to Kenya, they were then blamed for enriching themselves and sinking refugee ships that were refused entry by the Kenyan authorities.

The Bajuni elders explained that under the Siad Barre administration Somalis had been told not to use clan names. The Bajuni had been told to refer to themselves not as Bajuni but as "jazira", meaning islanders. Despite the official policy of Siad Barre opposing clanism the term jazira enabled clan Somalis to identify the Bajuni as non-Somali. The elders explained that it was difficult at that time for Bajuni to acquire passports or seamen's certificates and other official documents and that they were discriminated against in dealings with government institutions.

The Bajuni elders made it clear that the Bajuni do not consider themselves to be a Benadiri people, although they did acknowledge that they had some links with the Bravanese people who live further along the coast past Kismayo towards Mogadishu. Trading links existed

between the Bajuni and the Bravanese before the civil war. The Bajuni traded fish for various commodities with the Bravanese. One member of the Bajuni group that met with the delegation stated that his sister is married to a Bravanese man, but the Bajuni elders emphasised that such examples of intermarriage came about through the traditional trading links between the Bajuni and the Bravanese rather than from any particular kinship bond.

The UNHCR genealogical table of Somali clans and groups (annex 3) shows the Bajuni as a Bantu sub-clan. The delegation did not, however, receive information from any other source that indicated that this was the case.

The Bajuni elders stated that the Bajuni have no close links with the people in Kenya who live immediately below the Somalia-Kenya border on the coast and islands. The islanders in Kenya did assist the Bajuni when they left Somalia in large numbers in the early 1990s, before they travelled on to camps in Mombasa, but links with the islanders in Kenya have not continued since the Bajuni moved into the camps.

### **5.3.2 Occupations**

The elders informed the delegation that the principal occupation of the Bajuni was fishing in the waters around their islands in small boats. Fish were traded in coastal towns, mainly in Kismayo, although the Bajuni enjoyed trading links with the Bravanese further along the coast from Kismayo towards Mogadishu. There are a number of usually uninhabited islands in the chain of islands that run south from Kismayo to the border with Kenya. It was usual for the fishermen to remain for part of the year in small camps on some of these islands, where fish would be dried ready for trading.

Some Bajuni women worked, mainly gathering shellfish on the islands. They would not accompany the men on the fishing boats or stay with them in the seasonal fishing camps on the uninhabited islands.

The Bajuni do not fish the waters south of the Somalia-Kenya border as to have done so would have incurred hostility from the local fishermen there and from the Kenyan Navy, which patrols the waters along the border.

Those Bajuni that had returned to the islands when the Jomvu UNHCR camp was closed in 1997 had been unable to assume their former occupations as fishermen, as the group of elders explained. Their property had been taken and they could not reclaim it from clan Somalis who occupied it. Returnees had been robbed of everything they possessed when they reached the islands and even those who had managed to resume fishing had had their nets cut and boats taken from them. In order to survive on the islands some Bajuni had attempted small-scale farming, but are always at the mercy of the Somali clans that still occupy the islands.

## **5.4 Security and human rights situation**

The Bajuni elders informed the delegation that in the late 1980s, as Siad Barre's rule weakened, the Bajuni began to suffer more at the hands of Somali clans. Groups of Somalis mounted looting raids on the Bajuni islands. As Barre's administration collapsed in 1990 and 1991 the Bajuni were attacked by organised Somali clan militias, who wanted to force the Bajuni off the

islands, particularly the Ogadeni SPM from Raskamboni and, later, Aideed's USC/SNA forces. Attacks became more severe and rape of Bajuni women was common. Bajuni property in Kismayo was occupied by the Marehan and mainly by the Majerteen on the islands. As the situation deteriorated in the civil war many Bajuni left Somalia for Kenya, the majority having left during 1992, by which time their position had become untenable.

The Bajuni elders stressed very strongly that they considered themselves unable to return to Somalia. Somali clans still occupy the islands and Kismayo remains in a state of near anarchy. Although there have been no reports of Bajuni returnees being killed, returnees have been unable to recover their property and cannot support themselves economically. The elder who had returned to the Bajuni islands when the Jomvu camp had closed in 1997 described his experiences on reaching home. He had been beaten and forced to work for no pay, only food, for clan Somalis who still occupy the islands. After two months he decided to return to Kenya, even though he knew that he would not receive any support from UNHCR as he had left the camps.

Wayne Long, Chief Security Officer, UNDP-Somalia, confirmed that the position of Bajuni returnees to the islands was very poor and that it was very hard for them to maintain themselves in the face of harassment from occupying Somali clans. He understands that Somali clans even control Bajuni water supplies on the islands.

Kalunga Lutato, Head of Somali Operations, UNHCR-Nairobi, informed a member of the delegation on 28 September 2000 that with the fall of Kismayo in June 1999 to allied SNA/SNF forces a Bajuni-SPM "alliance" was destroyed and Bajuni property on the islands was looted by SNA/SNF militias, forcing many Bajuni to flee. Some Bajuni made their way to Bosasso in Puntland. Those Bajuni that remain on the islands are still suffering as the SNA/SNF forces that took Kismayo regularly attack the islands, looting property and boats. He added that two days earlier UNHCR had received an appeal from the Bajuni still on the islands stating that the islands were now occupied and controlled by Somali militias.

Wayne Long informed the delegation that the security situation in the far south of Somalia is chaotic and very unsafe, with clashes continuing between rival Somali clan militias. The area is also prone to Islamic fundamentalist activity. Regarding Kismayo, he described the situation there since the city's capture by SNA/SNF forces as "hell".

## **5.5 Bajuni refugees in Kenya**

The Bajuni elders informed the delegation that most Bajuni who fled Somalia in 1992 had initially travelled to Mombasa and were accommodated there or in the Marafa camp near Malindi. From 1993 they were accommodated at their own request in their own camp at Jomvu. In 1997 the Kenyan Government asked UNHCR to close Jomvu camp. The Bajuni elders stated that UNHCR, at the time, considered that conditions in the Bajuni islands were sufficiently good for the Bajuni to be able to return there. UNHCR therefore gave the Bajuni in Jomvu the choice of relocation to the Kakuma camp, inland in the Rift Valley, or returning to the Bajuni islands in Somalia. UNHCR encouraged Bajuni elders to return to the islands, as this would then encourage other Bajuni to follow.

Kalunga Lutato explained that Jomvu camp was closed for a combination of reasons. Firstly,

the Kenyan government decided that Somali refugees should leave the designated areas along the coast as there was no justification for camps to be sited in populated areas, such as around Mombasa. The Kenyan government designated the Dadaab refugee camp as the major place of refuge for Somalis. Those that had problems there were later moved to Kakuma camp. A second consideration was that up to May-June 1999 the areas of origin in Somalia of some minorities, such as the Bajuni, were seen by UNHCR as being safe for returns. A large majority of Bajuni were therefore repatriated to the Bajuni islands. Kalunga Lutato stated that UNHCR was sorry that some Bajuni had not opted for repatriation as the closure of the camps on the coast meant that some Bajuni had to transfer to Kakuma camp in north-western Kenya, an inland area far away from the sea and the normal Bajuni environment. UNHCR had believed that the Bajuni would only stay in Kakuma for a temporary period but in June 1999 the allied forces of the SNF and Aideed's SNA took over Kismayo and expelled General Morgan's SPM forces, as a result of which UNHCR decided that further returns to the Bajuni islands were not possible.

According to the Bajuni elders some 2,500 Bajuni returned to the islands in Somalia from 1997 onwards but received no assistance other than the cost of their journey home. Those Bajuni that remained in Kenya were unhappy at the prospect of relocation to Kakuma camp. Being a coastal people they would have preferred to remain in Jomvu on the coast. The Bajuni elders stated that their position in Kenya was very poor, as UNHCR would only provide support to Bajuni who moved to Kakuma camp. The elders that met with the delegation were living in Nairobi and were reliant on donations from sympathetic religious groups and individuals.

Bernard Harborne informed the delegation that UNHCR ended the repatriation of Bajuni in 1999 after Kismayo changed hands and the security situation deteriorated in the far south of Somalia.

## 6. Bantu

The delegation met with a group of Bantu elders in Nairobi. These elders explained that normally a Somali of Bantu as well as of non-Bantu origin will refer to a Bantu as a "Jarer", which indicates that the person has strong curly hair. According to Perouse de Montclos the Bantus are also called *habash* (meaning servants) by the Somali and *shanqila* by the Ethiopian Oromo along the River Shabelle.

The American anthropologist Catherine Besteman regards the term Gosha as referring to the geographical area in which the Bantu live in the Juba Valley area. Gosha is classed as "dense jungle" and denotes the forested banks of the Juba river in Southern Somalia, i.e. the area between Kismayo and the town of Saakow. She makes a distinction between the "Gosha" or Bantu populations of the Juba Valley and the other Bantu farmers of the Shabelle Valley. She claims that the farmers of the Shabelle Valley have a distinct history and a somewhat different position in Somali society. The majority of the riverine farmers of the Juba Valley are descendants of slaves acquired by Somalis in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

According to Besteman it has been estimated that around 50,000 slaves were absorbed into the riverine areas between 1800 and 1890. During this period of expanded agricultural production in the Shabelle Valley, the more remote and forested Juba Valley remained largely uninhabited

until the 1840s when the first fugitive slaves from the Shabelle Valley arrived and settled along the river. They were followed by a constant and increasing number of runaway slaves from the Shabelle Valley. Around the turn of the 20th century between 30,000 and 40,000 former slaves had settled in villages along the Juba river. These settlements were initially established along the lines of East African ethnic affiliations: Yao in one village, Nyasa in another, etc. Even today some villages in the Lower Juba area continue to retain a sense of ethnic distinctiveness, especially those settled by Mushunguli.

By the late 19<sup>th</sup> century settlement patterns had begun to change as affiliations with Somali clans emerged as an important force in shaping village identity. This process took place as former slaves entering the area after about 1890 began to settle in communities of people who had been enslaved to the same Somali clan. Many people that arrived in the Juba Valley around the turn of the 20th century had been enslaved as children or had been born into slavery and thus held only tenuous connections to their original ethnic groups. For them, Somali clan affiliation provided a degree of social organisation and identity. Affiliation with Somali clans was strengthened by the influx of so-called pastoral slaves, for example Oromo pastoralists. Somalis captured Oromo, especially women and children, during raids and wars and they became slaves or servants. Intermarriage between the Oromo and the descendants of the slaves in the Juba Valley occurred. Later, so-called "*reer* Shabelle" immigrants began filtering into the valley, starting in the late 1920s and continuing into the 1960s. Their history is obscure, but they speak Somali, practise Islam and are closely affiliated with the Somali Ajuraan clan in their home area of Kalafu on the Shabelle River across the border in Ethiopia. Many *reer* Shabelle settled in Ajuraan-affiliated villages in the mid-valley area.

Besteman concludes from her historical sketch that it demonstrates the varied background of the people who settled the Juba Valley. These people are referred to in various terms. The derogatory term *adoon* (meaning slave) is still used to describe this population, but the more neutral term *Gosha* has become more prevalent as an inclusive identifier.

Perouse de Montclos explains that refugee status has altered the collective identity of the Gosha. The name Gosha has now been refused or left behind by the Bantu refugees in Kenya. It is considered pejorative because it refers to the "sleeping sickness" of the tsetse fly, i.e. idleness. They instead prefer to be called "Mushunguli" after one of the founders of fugitive slave communities along the Juba River.

The term *jareer* means "hard (or kinky) hair" and literally denotes hair texture and other physical characteristics such as particular bone structures and facial features, which are negatively valued by Somalis. Gosha are said to be bulkier while so-called "pure" Somalis are said to have longer, more slender fingers. But most significantly according to Besteman, the people who are *jareer* are considered more "African", as distinct from Somalis, who are considered more "Arabic". In opposition to the term *jareer* is either the term *jileec* (or *jileyc*), meaning "soft" or, more commonly, *bilis* (which is the opposite of *adoon* or "slave"). Besteman notes that Oromo descendants are not considered *jareer*, but this distinction is blurred by the fact that Oromo have intermarried with *jareer*, the descendants of the slaves.

According to Besteman the term *jareer* has its greatest significance in the cultural values embedded in being *jareer* (or "African"). It is a term that refers to history, that of non-Somali



pagan slave origins, a history devalued in Somali culture and ideology. This has the effect in social terms that carrying a *jareer* identity is a denigrated status within the Somali social structure. On this basis Besteman concludes that the people of the Gosha, grouped together as *jareer*, share a lower status within Somali society.

The Bantu elders with whom the delegation met urged that the Bantu population in Somalia should not be considered as a minority population in Somalia, because, they argued, the Bantu constitute a majority in a number of regions in Somalia.

According to Perouse de Montclos the Bantu of southern Somalia represent a minority whose marginality is more easily seen. They represent less than 2% of the inhabitants of the country. Perouse describes the Bantu as made up of the descendants of slaves and Negroid groups present before the Somali migration. They are generally despised. While some succeeded in making themselves respected and in working on an equal footing with their neighbours, they do not belong to Somali lineages and are considered to be second class citizens.

## 6.1 Groups and sub-groups, geographical distribution

The Bantu elders estimated that between 30 and 40% of the population in Somalia are Bantu, but they acknowledged that no reliable statistics exist. A UN agency in Nairobi could not confirm these figures, but considered the estimate to be a slight exaggeration while at the same time they confirmed that no reliable statistics exist concerning the figures of the various population groups in Somalia. The same agency confirmed however that the Bantu population constitutes a majority of the population in a number of districts along the two main rivers in Somalia.

According to Perouse de Montclos (1997) the Bantu population in Somalia includes nearly one hundred thousand Swahili-speaking Gosha that are sometimes called *dalgolet* ("forest people" in Somali), *molema* (or *mlima*, "mountain people" in broken Swahili), *watoro* ("runaway slaves" in Oromo) or *oji* (from the Italian word *oggi*, "today", because these Bantu were said not to think beyond the present day).

According to the Bantu elders the Bantu mainly occupy the territory between the two main rivers in Somalia, the Shabelle and the Juba, the so-called inter-riverine area of Somalia. The area covers eight regions in southern and central Somalia. The elders stated that in the regions of Middle- and Lower Shabelle, Middle- and Lower Juba, Bay, Benadir and former Upper Juba (parts of which are now in Gedo region) the Bantu population is still today actually a majority.

The Bantu elders stated that so-called Negroid (black-skinned) Benadiri are considered to belong to the Bantu population and are called "Zanj", which means black or land of the black. The Zanj intermarry with the Bantu but the other, so-called 'light-skinned', Benadir population does not intermarry with the Bantu. The Zanj are slaves of the light-skinned Benadiri.

Perouse de Montclos considers the so-called Zendj (Zanj?) as a Negroid group of pre-Somali settlers. They were referred to by Arab travellers and Swahili as Kashour ("fugitives") and Wa-Nyika ("bush people") respectively. Some were later chased away or deported out of Somalia, but others remained in Somalia as farmers, hunters, fishermen, and artisans. They live between the Shabelle and Juba Rivers in the "green" part of Somalia, especially Jalalaksi,

Kurtunware, Sablale, Dujuma, Garbahare and Jowhar districts.

The term "Bantu" covers a large number of sub-groups but these groups all consider themselves as belonging to one large group, the Jarer. However, according to the Bantu elders, some Bantu groups have been "brainwashed" to such an extent that they identify themselves with the non-Bantu clans with which they have been attached for a long time.

According to the Bantu elders the Bantu population is made up of a number of lineages, some of which live in certain areas and some of which are mixed and/or have resettled in other places in Somalia. Only a few groups are distinguished by their location, such as the Mushunguli, almost all of whom live in Lower Juba region. There are a number of well-known Bantu groups that are not attached and have not been swallowed up by the non-Bantu Somali clans. All of these Bantu groups are referred to as lineage-groups:

- Shabelle
- Shiidle
- Kabole
- Mushunguli
- Gabaweyn (Garbaweyn)
- Eyle (Eile)
- Makane

There is another group of less well-known Bantu-lineages, most of which are living in the Lower and Middle Juba areas:

- Manyasa
- Miyau
- Majindo
- Makua
- Mlima
- Pokomo
- Manyika

The Bantu elders explained that many Bantu groups would readily identify themselves with the non-Bantu clan that they are attached to and a Bantu from such a group will say, for example, that he is a Hawadle or an Abgal etc. Such a person considers his identity as totally incorporated into the non-Bantu clan with which he is affiliated. The above-mentioned second group of less well-known Bantu lineages originally came from one of the first-mentioned more well-known groups but have lost their identity to other non-Bantu groups. Migration and intermarriage can also result in a situation where a Bantu will not identify himself as belonging to one of the Bantu groups.

According to Somali sources quoted by IRIN those Bantu that have assimilated themselves with the indigenous clans they live with are known as '*sheegato*', which means they are not bloodline clan members, but adopted.

The UNHCR overview distinguishes three so-called "Bantu groups": Mushunguli, Swahili and Bajuni. The Eyle are considered as a Mirifle sub-clan and the Gabawayn (Garbaweyn) as a separate minority group (see annex 3). Perouse de Montclos considers the Mushunguli and the Eyle (Eile) as Bantu groups. During its mission to Gedo region the Danish Immigration Service was informed that the Gabaweyn is a Bantu group.

A UN agency in Nairobi stated that the group identity of the Bantu population in Somalia is stronger than ever before. A person of Bantu origin will no longer automatically identify himself with one of the major Somali clans or sub-clans as the group identity of the Bantu has generally been strengthened during the civil war.

## **6.2 Language**

The Bantu elders stated that a non-Bantu that has lived among the Bantu in Somalia would very often speak the same Somali dialect as the Bantu in his area. They stated that this was a result of what they described as the "cultural genocide" that the Bantu have experienced in Somalia.

Some Bantu groups have maintained their own Bantu dialect or language while others have completely lost their dialects. The Mushunguli of the Lower Juba still have their own dialect called "kiziguua" and the Mushunguli call themselves "waziguua". Any other Somali will call them Mushunguli. According to Perouse de Montclos the Zigua are of Tanzanian origin and they claim to be the first to have arrived in the Kismayo hinterland where they settled along ethnic lines in order to preserve their culture.

Perouse de Montclos notes that only a small proportion of the Mushunguli spoke a Bantu language while in Somalia (although three quarters of those that sought refuge in Kenya wanted to "return" to Tanzania).

Quoting Somali political sources, IRIN reported on 23 November 2000 that most of the current Bantu population in the Juba valley was originally from Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique. Some of the Bantu in southern Somalia have kept their traditions and speak the language of their ancestors.

## **6.3 Socio-economic situation**

### **6.3.1 Relationship with other groups and clans**

Perouse de Montclos writes that the so-called Negroids (Bantu) are made up of heterogeneous communities that are relatively widespread. At independence there was a Shidle Party but no political movement was able to unite the Bantu from Somalia. Most of these communities are in fact linked to a Somali lineage but with a more or less inferior status. Those of the Shabelle River thus acknowledge the authority of Hawiye clans (the Shidle are associated with the Mobilen, the Kabole with the Molcan, the Makanne with the Badi-Addo, the Rer Issa and the Shebelle with the Ajuran). Those of the Juba River, the Gobaweyn, work for the Gasar Gudda of Luuq, a Rahanweyn lineage that is seen by the other Somali clans as a low Sab caste, but is considered by the Rahanweyn as being 'noble'. Along the Juba River, one also finds hunting, farming and fishing communities such as the Ribbi and the Boni. The Boni, or Bon, escaped the

Oromo and now pay tribute to the Somali. Also other groups along the Juba and Shabelle Rivers are despised. The Eile (Eyle) (see chapter 8) of the Bur Eibi Hills, for example, have a name that, etymologically, comes from *ei*, their hunting dog. It is important to understand that all these names are appellations and not tribes, since the Somali deny the Bantu any genealogy that would legitimise their presence in the South of the country. The Helai of Baidoa thus claim to be a homonymous Rahanweyn lineage, settled at Bur Acaba; this relationship is obviously denied by the latter.

It should be noted that the Bantu elders in Nairobi described the Bantu as the most vulnerable and most seriously affected population in Somalia. They stated that, in contrast to other so-called minority groups such as the Benadiri and Madhiban, the Bantu have no close ties to other Somalis. While the Benadiri often intermarry with other Somalis this never happens between the Bantu and other Somalis. The Bantu are afraid to speak freely in Somalia and are the only group that is totally excluded and marginalised in political, social and economic terms. They claimed that Bantu identity is being suppressed because the 'Cushistic Somalis' want to deny the original ownership of Somalia by the Bantu, who are the true indigenous people and original inhabitants of Somalia.

Former governments in Somalia employed several Benadiri and Madhiban on a high level, but a Bantu has never held a government post as manager or as a Director-General.

The Bantu elders explained that the Siad Barre regime handed over land from Bantu to members of the Darod clans, especially in the Lower Shabelle, Middle and Lower Juba and Gedo regions, where a large number of Bantu were driven from their land. Some ended up as regular slaves on their former land, whereas some became beggars or tried to seek alternative occupations, which was difficult as they were farmers with no other skills. Some Bantu were also forcibly conscripted into the army from 1973 until the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. Large areas of Bantu land were confiscated by the Siad Barre regime and given to non-Bantu Somalis under agricultural development projects supported by foreign donors. Bantu never benefited from such development projects. Even a project where the government exempted imported agricultural equipment from taxation did not benefit the Bantu as the agricultural equipment was bought by Somalis close to the government and then sold to other non-Bantu landowners. The so-called Cushistic or Jileec Somalis have, according to the Bantu elders, established a deliberate policy of suppression and impoverishment of people of Bantu origin in Somalia. This policy was established already during the colonial period and was continued by successive governments of independent Somalia. The independent governments never handed over land to the Bantu and their policy was to keep the identity of the Bantu hidden from the outside world. The government policy was that all land belongs to the so-called "protector", meaning a dominant Somali actor.

The Bantu elders stated that the Bantu in Somalia and in exile in Kenya are not satisfied with the outcome of the Arta peace conference. They stated that the conference did not allocate a proportional number of seats in the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) to the Bantu population. 29 seats were allocated to the so-called "minority groups" (or "Alliance Clans Community", as they were referred to at Arta). When consideration was given to the division of seats among the minority groups the Bantu delegates declared that they wanted 15 seats. However, the Benadir group offered the Bantu only nine seats even though, according to the

Bantu elders, the Bantu are considered to be the "majority of the minority". The situation deteriorated further as the so-called Mediating Committee headed by Dr. Rajis, a Benadir, was, according to the Bantu elders, partial and the Bantu were finally allocated only six TNA seats. The Bantu elders stated that these six seats are all occupied by what they referred to as "infamous" Bantu and the Bantu elite and intellectuals were never invited to participate in the Arta conference.

### **6.3.2 Occupations**

The Bantu communities in Somalia are typically agriculturalists, farmers or labourers on farms and plantations in the area between the Shabelle and Juba rivers in central and southern Somalia. A representative of a UN agency in Nairobi informed the delegation that the Bantu or Jareer population in Somalia know different levels of integration (or "Somalisation"), especially those living along the Shabelle River in central Somalia. Some Bantu are employed as plantation labourers and are almost in a situation of slavery. They are the only workforce available and they have no bargaining power against the main Somali clans, the Hawiye along the Shabelle River in the Lower Shabelle region and the Darod in Lower Juba. The source had no detailed information on the situation of the Bantu population in Lower Juba, southern Somalia. The Bantu are generally a resourceful people, and in North West Somalia (Somaliland) they are working as construction workers and as watchmen. In the North West and in North East Somalia (Puntland) their position is that of an "under-clan". They are safe throughout northern Somalia and in certain cases they could even marry very poor members of one of the major Somali clans.

### **6.4 Security and human rights situation**

The Bantu elders explained that the Bantu are unarmed and are victims of serious human rights violations. They argued that human rights violations against the Bantu population in Somalia are of such a scale that they cannot be compared to the human rights violations against other, non-Bantu, populations in Somalia. They stated that there is an important difference in addressing human rights and addressing minority rights in Somalia because the Bantu population should not be regarded as a minority group.

The Bantu elders considered Somalia as a nation to be more racist than South Africa during its apartheid period. They feel they have no assurance from any future government in Somalia that the rights of the Bantu will be protected and they have no trust in a future government. They claimed that freedom of expression does not exist for the Bantu in Somalia and their voice is not being heard. Proulx de Montclos comes to a similar conclusion when he makes a distinction between the Bantu and the so-called Sab castes (the Digil, mainly the Tunni and the Rahanweyn). The camel-herding clans of northern Somalia despise the latter, but they are still part of the Somali lineage system and they will still be able to negotiate "when the hour of reconciliation arrives in Somalia". Minorities, who are not part of the lineage system, the Bantu and the 'half castes' "argue that they will never benefit from any compensation mediation procedures amongst the Somali clans".

Reporting on the planned resettlement of Somali Bantu in the United States, IRIN (23 November 2000) quotes humanitarian sources as saying that the minority Somali Bantu are

"treated like second class citizens" by Somalis. Insecurity and the civil war in Somalia over the last decade made the group even more vulnerable, according to the source.

Enclosed as annex 7 is a document written for the delegation by Abdulkadir Moallim Omar, a Bantu elder from Luugh-Ganaane District in Gedo region who was interviewed by the delegation in Nairobi. The document details the origins of the Bantu peoples in Somalia, their history and their present situation in Somalia as well as their situation as refugees in Kenya.

Regarding the situation of the Bantu in Somalia, Omar writes that:

"when rivalries began with the overthrow of the military dictatorship, the Bantus became the worst hit. The Bantus' homes and farms and animals were taken over by the different militias not to mention money and other wealth. Some of them were forced to work for the militias that took their land. They worked in conditions not better than slaves. In certain areas the Bantu women cannot go down to the river to fetch water; they have either to pay for the water or they are denied the water or raped at gunpoint. There is a silent policy of ethnic cleansing in Somalia against the Bantu that the rest of the world is turning a deaf ear to."

Omar claims that the Bantu at the farms in both the Shabelle and the Lower Juba regions of Somalia are "forced to work at these farms at gunpoint over 24 hours without food and water most of the time. There are lots of examples of men, women and children who fainted because of hunger, thirst, and fatigue, who when they came to, were accused of pretence and shot dead as a warning to the others not to try to emulate them. Reports reaching us from Somalia claim that hundreds of Bantu young men were abducted by militias and taken to the Central regions of Mudug and Nugaal to look after the camels, when some of them tried to escape they were caught and burnt alive in front of the others. Most of them had to be bought back by their relatives - only a few managed to escape alive and reach home safely. It is commonplace in Mogadishu to take a Bantu man, woman, or family hostage and demand for ransom. Hardly any day passes without having, seeing or hearing a Bantu being killed in Mogadishu."

A UN agency informed the delegation that the Bantu population along the river Shabelle in the lower parts of Hiran region and the upper parts of Middle Shabelle region has been pushed towards the river banks to such an extent that today the Bantu live literally on the river bank itself.

A UN agency in Nairobi described the land issue in Somalia as "dynamite". They pointed out that while the Bantu population has so far been a loser in the land issue, they have never before been represented in a Somali Parliament, as they are now in the TNA. The Bantu population therefore now has more political influence than ever before in modern Somali history. Also, as a result of the civil war in Somalia a large number of Bantu fled the country and are now living in a diaspora in Kenya and in other countries. This has had the side effect that today the Bantu are better educated than ever before.

During the Dutch mission of November 1999 to Hargeisa and Puntland, an NGO source informed the mission that quite a few Bantu went to northern Somalia, especially Bosasso, where they often found work as construction workers. There had been some trouble with indigenous Puntland construction workers because the Bantu brought down wage levels. A UN source confirmed to the mission that large groups of Bantu worked in Puntland, mostly in

construction. A second UN source and the Puntland authorities confirmed the presence of Bantu in Puntland. According to Somali sources quoted by IRIN (23 November 2000), Somali Bantu are almost exclusively found in the South, but many scattered during the civil war to parts of the North, where they work on buildings and take on odd jobs.

The UNCU/FSAU report on IDPs in northern Somalia mentions Bantu as one of the groups among the IDPs in northern Somalia.

## **6.5 Bantu refugees in Kenya and abroad**

The Bantu elders were of the opinion that most of the Somali refugees in Europe and America are of non-minority origin and some of them participated in human rights violations in Somalia before they left their home country. They stated that the Bantu have no economic means to travel to the EU and apply for asylum; consequently there are no Bantu seeking asylum in Europe. The Bantu in Kenya have been offered resettlement in the USA and more than 10,000 Bantu in Kenya will be resettled during 2000 and 2001. European countries have also offered resettlement of the Bantu from Kenya, but the elders stated that it is a serious problem that during negotiations between UNHCR and the receiving countries no Bantu representatives have been consulted. This has resulted in a situation that many of the resettled Bantu are not really Bantu, but belong to other Somali groups of non-Bantu origin. The elders claimed that this has taken place in New Zealand, Australia, Europe and the USA.

The Bantu elders informed the delegation that Bantu refugees initially stayed in UNHCR refugee camps along the Kenyan coast. Today the Bantu are only to be found in the Dadaab camps (3 camps) in Kenya's North Eastern Province and in one camp in Kakuma near Turkana. About 15,000 Bantu are registered in these camps. Very difficult humanitarian and security conditions in the camps have made many Bantu leave the camps and settle in Nairobi, Mombasa and other urban centres in Kenya. These persons are no longer under the protection of the UNHCR and they are vulnerable to harassment from the Kenyan police and risk being deported to Somalia against their will. According to the Bantu elders the London-based Minority Rights Group has reported such incidents. It is not only the Bantu that have these problems in Kenya but all Somalis that do not belong to the major Somali clans.

The Bantu elders made it clear that they will not return to Somalia before they are convinced that they will have a just government with a fair Bantu representation in the Parliament. However, the elders stated, no Bantu believes that justice will come to Somalia and that the Bantu will ever be considered as equal citizens in Somalia; so long as policies in Somalia are made by non-Bantu Somalis there will never be justice for the Bantu. For this reason, the Bantu community appeals to be accepted as refugees abroad. The Bantu elders argued that the United Nations and other international organisations have an obligation to consult the Bantu population to a much higher degree than it is the case today. They believe that the present UN system relates to a large degree only to those who have the power in Somalia and overlooks the suppressed. They feel that if a new government is formed in Somalia the Bantu will face even larger problems than before because international donors and organisations will deal with the government rather than with the minority groups. They believe that the reason why the US Government has accepted to Bantu for resettlement in the USA is exactly because they have realised that the Bantu refugees will never be able to return to Somalia. The Bantu elders

believe that UNHCR will not accept this fact because UNHCR will then lose its strong position in Kenya and Somalia. The elders stated that UNHCR executives enjoy good relations with the Somali warlords and elders who are in control of areas where UNHCR has operations. The elders claimed that UNHCR gives consultation fees to the warlords and the elders in such areas in order to operate there, especially in south-western Somalia. Programmes intended to facilitate the repatriation of refugees have ended up in the hands of people connected with the warlords.

See also annex 7 in which Abdulkadir Mallim Omar states that the situation of the Bantu in the refugee camps in Kenya is no better than their situation in Somalia. He writes that the Bantu in the refugee camps, especially in the camps at Dadaab, Ifo and Hagar-Dheer, are being directly or indirectly intimidated. According to Omar the Bantu in the refugee camps in Kenya claim that Somalis from the main clans are posing as Bantu in order to qualify for resettlement.

## **7. Benadir**

### **7.1 Groups and sub-groups, geographical distribution**

The delegation met in Nairobi with three groups of Benadiri: a group of Benadiri elders from Mogadishu and Merka (belonging to the Ashraf, Duruqbe and Morshe sub-clans), a group of Ashraf elders from Mogadishu, Merka and Qorioley, and a group of Benadiri from Brava, the so-called Bravanese (or Barawan).

From discussions with these groups it transpired that the term Benadiri is used by these groups to indicate the coastal population of Somalia roughly between Mogadishu and Kismayo, who share an urban culture and who are of mixed origin

(Persian/Portuguese/Arabian/Swahili/Somali), separate from the major Somali clans. The groups with whom the delegation met advised that the Bajuni, who live in Kismayo and on the coast and islands further southwards, are not considered to be a Benadiri people. Bajuni elders with whom the delegation met (see section 5 of this report) confirmed this to be the case.

According to Perouse de Montclos, the name Benadiri does not correspond to any well defined sociological reality. In the context of resettlement programmes for Somali refugees in Kenya, the Somali refugee traders of the coastal ports decided to regroup under the generic term 'Benadir', which designates greater Mogadishu. Those indigenous to this area succeeded in calling themselves 'Benadiri'.

Perouse de Montclos adds that the term Benadiri, as a community, did not fully appear before the 1990 civil war (N.B. This is also in accordance with other, UN, sources). In the spoken language, 'Benadiri' implies a cloth, 'alindi, hand woven by artisans in the city and distinguished by variously coloured stripes. Etymologically it comes from a Persian word 'bandar', which signifies 'harbour'. In the strictest sense of the word it applies to the traders who were the first inhabitants of Mogadishu but have always been seen as foreigners by the Somalis: the Bandhabow, the Morshe-Iskashato, the Abdisamad, the Sadiq Gedi, the Bafadal, the Amudi, the Duruqo, the rer Shikh, the rer Manyo, the Gudmane in Hamar Weyne district and the rer Faqi in Shingani district.'

Other sources use the names Reer Hamar or Reer Brava. Reer Hamar means people from



Mogadishu (Hamar Weyne), but some sources (such as the elders interviewed by the delegation) use it to include the whole coastal population of mixed origin. Reer Brava means people from Brava, and is generally used only to indicate people from Brava of mixed origin.

Please note that the UNHCR genealogical table of Somali clans mentions the Barawan (Bravanese), Asharaf and Reer Hamar as separate groups, without including them in the list of Minority Groups (see annex 3).

The delegation gained the impression, by comparing information from the discussions with the groups of elders it met with in Nairobi with information gathered in an earlier Danish mission and with information gathered earlier from informants by the Netherlands Embassy in Nairobi, that not all Benadiri would know all the sub-groups, and that there exist many more sub-groups than the ones mentioned by the elders in Nairobi. It also appears that sub-groups mentioned as living in one town or city quarter may have spread to other coastal towns, and sometimes to inland towns like Baidoa.

The Benadiri elders stressed that Benadiri do not put as much weight on genealogical descent as do the Somali clans. They do not count back many generations although Benadiri life is nonetheless clan-based. Each group or clan, in theory at least, traces its origins to a single male ancestor. The Benadiri elders distinguished:

- four Hamar groups:

- Qalmashube
- Dhabar Weyne
- Shanshiya
- Morshe (Moorshe)

After some discussion they added that the Bandhawaw and Reer Faqi also belonged in this category.

- five Shangani groups, e.g.:

- Amudi
- Baa Fadal
- Reer Sheich
- Abakarow

- twelve 'caps' (sub-groups) in Merka, e.g.:

- Shukereere
- Ahmed Nur
- Reer Maanyo
- Ali'iyo Mohamed
- Duruqbe
- Gameedle

- and the Ashraf.

The elders explained that before the civil war the Benadiri in Mogadishu used to live only in the quarters of Hamar Weyne, Shingani and Bondere. Now Benadiri live in all quarters of Mogadishu.

Another sub-division is made between 'light-skinned' ('gibil ad') and 'black-skinned' ('gibil madow') Benadiri.

Benadiri intermarry, but the elders stated that 'light-skinned' Benadiri do not marry 'black-skinned' Benadiri like Moorshe or Dhabar Weyne.

The delegation also held a meeting with representatives of the Ashraf (Asharaf, Asheraf, Sharifians) community in Nairobi including elders and women. They were all refugees from the coastal areas of Somalia. The Ashraf elders interviewed by the delegation readily identified themselves as Benadiri. The Ashraf elders made it clear that only one Ashraf group (or clan) exists in Somalia. However, this group is further sub-divided on the lines of their male ancestors. The Ashraf of Bay and Gedo regions (Baidoa, Hoddur, Bardera) are the same group as the Ashraf in the coastal areas. One sub-group of the Ashraf called Ashraf Sarman lives mainly in Hoddur (Bakool region), Bay region, Bardera (Gedo region) and Mogadishu. Other sub-groups called Mohammed Sharif, Sharif Ali and Sharif Ahmed live mainly in Kismayo, Merka, Bardera, Jalalaqsi, Jowhar and Mogadishu.

An NGO informant explained on an earlier occasion to the Netherlands Embassy in Nairobi that there are various sub-groups of the Ashraf, including the Sarman who reside in Bay region. According to this source, the Ashraf Sarman have the same skin colour as Somalis, while the Ashraf in Merka have light skin.

The Ashraf elders sub-divided the Ashraf in the following way:

- Hussein:

- Reesharif Magbuul
- Sharif Ahmed
- Sharif Baalawi

- Hassan:

- Mohammed Sharif
- Sharif Ali
- Sharif Ahmed
- Ashraf Sarman.

The Ashraf elders trace their origin to the Prophet Mohamed, whose daughter Fatima had two sons with Ali, named Hassan and Hussein. Any member of the Ashraf community belongs to one of these two lines of descent, from Hassan or Hussein, and any Ashraf (both females and males from the age of two) is able to identify her- or himself as belonging to one of these two lines. The Prophet Mohamed conferred the title "Sharif" upon Hassan and Hussein. Since that time, all their descendants have the name Sharif as part of their name, added to the personal name and the father's, and sometimes the grandfather's, name. From this comes the name of the group, Ashraf being the plural of Sharif. Ali had children by other wives after the death of

Fatima, but they were not "Sharif".

The Ashraf elders indicated that the Ashraf are living in southern and central Somalia, especially in urban locations like Bardera, Kismayo, Baidoa, Hoddur, Merka, Brava and Mogadishu. In Mogadishu the largest concentration of Ashraf was to be found in the Shingani district, but they also lived in Hamar Weyne. Ashraf used to live also in Ethiopia. Some Ashraf from Ethiopia became exiled in Somalia at the time of the Ogaden war in 1977. These Ashraf came from Ogaden, Oromia, Dire Dawa and Harar in Ethiopia and some of them fled Somalia in 1991-92. Those remaining in Somalia reside with other Ashraf.

UN sources confirmed that Ashraf communities are also to be found in the Ogaden district of Ethiopia.

The elders from Brava told the delegation that they consisted of two sub-groups: the Bravanese and the Tunni. Both groups are from Brava and they share to a large extent the same culture. They intermarry between their groups. However, the Bravanese consider themselves Benadiri, while the Tunni do not. The Bravanese are of Persian/Arab/Portuguese/Spanish origin. According to the Bravanese elders the Tunni belong to the Digil clan-family. They are originally from the region of Brava. However, the elders gave the delegation a copy of a letter, written by the Baravani elders in Nairobi to a number of organisations (including UNHCR, the US Immigration Department and Amnesty International) on their situation in Kenya, in which the Tunni are mentioned with the Bravanese as part of the Baravani community (see annex 8).

The UNHCR overview classifies the Tunni with the Digil (annex 3).

The Bravanese sub-divided themselves into:

- Bida
- Hatimi
- Ashraf

The Tunni explained that they are sub-divided into the Tunni Torre plus five *gamas* (sub-groups):

- Da'afarad
- Goygal
- Daqtiro
- Hayo
- Werile

Perouse de Montclos notes that some of the Tunni Torre of the hinterland claim a relationship with the Ajuran, the Gaaljaal and the Gurreh of the Hawiye clan family, while others claim a relationship with the Helai and the Hadam of the Rahanweyn clan-family. In concrete terms, they are the vassals of the Tunni Digil of the Brava Coast.

According to Perouse de Montclos, 'Reer Brava' designates a territorial community. The confusion between territory and clan or ancestral identity brought about the grouping of a much larger body of people than one would have expected from a minority group of traders of foreign origin. Historically, in Brava (like in Merka) the Arabs from Zanzibar allied with the

Tunni, a Digil clan, in order to counter the Hawiye from the hinterland. Brava was the scene of numerous battles, against the Portuguese, Omanis, British, Egyptians, Italians and Somali of the interior (Rahanweyn and Dir), many of them establishing lineage. As a consequence, the races in the city were completely 'mixed up'. Although the common hardships and tragedies experienced during and after the 1990 civil war certainly reinforced the sentiment of an identity and uniqueness, on closer inspection we discover communities with very diverse backgrounds despite numerous instances of intermarriage. On the one hand there are immigrants of Arab origin, while on the other hand there are the Somali of the Brava surroundings, whose minority status is more doubtful because they are part of the Tunni lineage of the Digil.

## 7.2 Language

According to the Benadir community in Nairobi the Benadir populations in Somalia generally speak a dialect that is different from the dialect of the major Somali clans. Even within this dialect there are sub-dialects: the dialect spoken by the Benadiri of Mogadishu is called *Af-Reer Hamar*, that spoken by the Benadiri of Merka is called *Af-Merka*, and the dialect spoken by the Benadiri in Brava and further south is called *Af-Brava*. The Af-Brava dialect is not understood by the other Benadiri. An informant of the Netherlands Embassy stated earlier that the Ashraf in Bay area speak the Rahanweyn dialect.

Most of the Benadiri, including the women, are able to speak and understand the Somali language.

## 7.3 Socio-economic situation

### 7.3.1 Relationship with other groups and clans

The Benadiri elders told the delegation that the Benadiri who are still in Somalia have no protection from any clan; on the contrary, they live under occupation by Somali clans and militias. In available reports on the situation of the Benadiri before the war, no indications have been found that Benadiri stood in a relation of clientship or protection to main Somali clans.

According to UN and NGO sources consulted earlier by the Netherlands Embassy, the Benadiri look down upon pastoralists and keep to their own identity.

Intermarriage between Benadiri and the Somali clans was rare and not generally accepted.

The Ashraf elders explained that the Ashraf have no particular affiliation with any of the major Somali clans. They stated that they used to have good relations with all other clans in Somalia. They were considered a highly respected clan of devout religious members. They travelled widely throughout Somalia as religious teachers and were well received by other clans. Under the Siad Barre regime the Ashraf did not as a group face any security or human rights problems in Somalia. Intermarriage between members of the Ashraf community in Somalia and members of the major Somali clans was rare, according to the Ashraf community in Nairobi, although some intermarriage occurred with the Hawiye (while during the last ten years forced marriages took place with Hawiye and even Majerteen). Marriage takes places almost exclusively within the Ashraf community itself. A relatively large number of the

representatives of the Ashraf community in Nairobi with which the delegation met were related to each other.

### **7.3.2 Occupations**

The Benadiri elders stated that the Benadiri were an urban and educated people, who worked almost exclusively in commercial occupations. The elders mentioned business, fishery, construction, metal work, carpentry, tailoring, weaving and gold smithing as the occupational sectors of the Benadiri. They also mentioned that some Benadiri were medical doctors, engineers or economists. Benadiri women might sell snacks or handicrafts.

The Bravanese and Tunni elders said their people were also commercially orientated or working as craftsmen.

The Ashraf elders explained that the Ashraf are a religious people. They were traditionally considered a highly respected clan whose members travelled throughout Somalia as religious teachers. Before the civil war a relatively large number of Ashraf received education in Somalia, and during the Siad Barre administration a number of Ashraf were employed as civil servants in the administration while others were businesspeople and therefore travelled frequently throughout the country.

Benadiri mostly were self-employed and had a reluctance to working for someone else. They have great entrepreneurial talents.

## **7.4 Security and human rights**

All three groups of Benadiri elders stated that during the civil war in 1991 and 1992 the Benadiri suffered seriously. Lacking any tradition of warfare and any militia, they were often attacked and targeted by looters, who considered them to be very rich, owing to their trade. Cassanelli (1995) claims that many southern minorities were accused by Somali militias of helping to sustain the Barre government in its later years. The Ashraf, however, stated that they were not persecuted because of any perceived close links with Siad Barre.

During its mission to Mogadishu in 1997 the Danish Immigration Service learned from the Dr. Ismail Jum'ale Human Rights Organisation and from representatives of the Reer Hamar community in Mogadishu that the Reer Hamar are considered a wealthy business community by members of the Somali clans and the militias. Because of this, and because the Reer Hamar are unarmed, their homes were repeatedly looted. The same sources estimated that more than 70% of the Reer Hamar population in Mogadishu fled the country during the civil war. In January 1999 the War-torn Societies Project (WSP) in Nairobi and other UN agencies informed the Danish Immigration Service that the Benadiri community was still facing serious human rights violations in Mogadishu, and that members of this community would probably never be able to return in safety to Mogadishu.

The Ashraf elders stated that there are several reasons why members of the Ashraf community have fled Somalia. To some degree members of the Ashraf are considered as 'strangers' in Somalia by the major Somali clans. The Ashraf claim to originate in Arabia and are called "Arabs" by other Somalis. They are considered to be a weak, unarmed religious group with no

social or legal rights.

Many Benadiri women were raped or forced into marriage, as the Benadiri elders confirmed to the delegation. The Ashraf elders stated that their identity as a specific ethnic group has been weakened since the war, as Ashraf women have been abducted, raped or forced into marriage with members of other Somali clans.

Kalunga Lutato explained that the Bravanese would not normally intermarry with members of the main Somali clans or other groups and consequently their own distinct ethnicity was fairly well preserved. They were, in a way, an isolated and distinct people and their property, and their women, were beyond the reach of members of the Somali clans. When the state collapsed and the Bravanese lost their "protection" from the central government they soon became targets for various militias that raged through the coastal areas of central and southern Somalia. The militias especially targeted Bravanese women and many were raped or forced into marriage with non-Bravanese Somalis. The Bravanese women were seen as "attractive" in the sense that before the collapse of government they were "inaccessible" but when the government fell they were easy victims.

The Benadiri have all lost property in Somalia during the war. The majority of Benadiri fled the country, mainly to Kenya. Members of Somali clan militias took the majority of Benadiri homes.

The Benadiri elders stated that there are still Benadiri in Mogadishu and Merka today, although they could not say how many. Those who are still living in Somalia have seen their houses taken by members of Somali clan militias, although sometimes the owners could stay in one room of their house.

The Benadiri elders were fairly sure that none of the Benadiri that fled to Kenya had since returned to Somalia. They described the situation of the Benadiri that remained in Mogadishu and Merka as difficult, as they cannot rebuild their businesses in the presence of the militias, for fear that their resources would again be taken. The elders stated that a few Benadiri had relocated to Bosasso in Puntland, either to seek work there or to move on from there to Yemen, although none of the elders had personal knowledge of any person now in Bosasso, or Hargeisa.

The Bravanese and Tunni elders said that although in the civil war Brava was most affected, the majority of Bravanese remained in the town. They stated that today about 70% of the Bravanese still live in Brava, living under the occupation of Aideed's Habr Gedir USC faction. They described how, although their houses have generally been occupied by militias members, some Bravanese have been allowed to remain living in one room of their house. The Bravanese could not claim back their properties without the risk of being killed.

Wayne Long, Chief Security Officer, UNDP-Somalia, explained that in Brava, Habr Gedir control, established in the mid-1990s, weakens at times. In the past two to three months much of Aideed's militia force has moved back towards Mogadishu, in anticipation of a power struggle in the capital in the wake of developments at Arta. At times such as this, when militia power diminishes, the Bravanese are able to resume some degree of control over their lives. Some local authority is able to assert itself, providing it is not seen as a direct threat to Aideed's

overall position. Bravanese may even be able to regain property taken by Habr Gedir occupiers although such regained property is always liable to be retaken when militia control reasserts itself.

While the Ashraf elders estimated that most Ashraf have left Somalia as refugees, an unknown number still remain in Somalia, the ones that lacked any means with which to leave, and some are still leaving the country. Those who are left behind inside Somalia are living at the mercy of the other Somali clans. They have no protection from any other clan as the Ashraf are not related or allied in any way to any of the major Somali clans. As a religious group the Ashraf do not have an armed militia as many other clans have. They do not consider themselves safe in any part of Somalia, as they do not have a traditional home area of their own that they control. They are an urban population with no larger traditional residential area. Today they are at risk of being looted, raped and even killed by members of other Somali clans and militias.

The Ashraf are a religious clan but they are not supporters of armed Islamic fundamentalist groups such as Al-Ittihad; on the contrary, they fear Al-Ittihad. For this reason the Ashraf prefer not to relocate within Somalia to Puntland, where Al-Ittihad has had some influence in recent years.

An earlier Dutch mission to Somaliland and Puntland in November 1999 found that Reer Hamar and Reer Brava have resettled in Puntland, in small (but unknown) numbers. They live in IDP camps. In general they are not persecuted there and their safety is not at risk, although they suffer discrimination and their socio-economic position is precarious.

In a recent UN study Ashraf are mentioned as one of the clans among the IDPs in northern Somalia.

## **7.5 Benadir refugees in Kenya and abroad**

The three groups of Benadiri elders called the delegation's attention to the position of the Benadiri in Kenya, since they fled Somalia. Most Benadiri were at first received in refugee camps close to Mombasa, like Saint Anne's refugee camp, Hatimy camp, Jomvu camp and Banadir camp. In 1992 these camps were recognised by UNHCR as transit camps and inhabitants were registered by the UNHCR and were to all effect considered refugees. But by the end of 1997 these coastal refugee camps were closed down and the inhabitants were compelled to choose between staying in their camp in Mombasa but no longer being considered as refugees by UNHCR, or relocation to Kakuma camp in the hinterland of Kenya. Most of the inhabitants of the coastal refugee camps opted to stay where they were, being aware of the risks they would face in Kakuma camp where members of the major Somali clans formed the majority of inhabitants. Some relocated to Kakuma camp on the promise that they would soon be resettled to the USA, but since the resettlement process was so slow, 90% of them are now back in Mombasa. Several cases have been recorded of Bravanese living in Kakuma who were subjected to murder, abduction, humiliation and threat.

At present there are about 2,500 Bravanese living in the coastal area of Kenya. In 1999, 97 Bravanese were arrested and taken to the Mombasa Police Station. Afterwards they were sentenced to pay a fine.

The Bravanese have repeatedly appealed to the Kenyan government and UNHCR to find a durable solution to their problems in Kenya.

UNHCR confirmed that the coastal camps had been closed by the Kenyan government because of their proximity to populated areas such as Mombasa. The agency also confirmed that refugees who have left the camps are no longer supported by UNHCR. However, refugees who have left the camps do not lose UNHCR's protection, they are still accepted as refugees. Refugees in Kenya are not living under the threat of being deported to Somalia.

The Bravanese elders in Nairobi gave the delegation copies of several of their requests to the Kenyan government and UNHCR (see annex 8).

The Ashraf elders estimated that about 250 Ashraf families are now living in Kenya. Of these about 100 families are living in Nairobi. An unknown number has been resettled in the USA together with other Benadiris. Members of the Ashraf community in Somalia are still leaving the country as refugees. The Ashraf community in Kenya is in contact with the Ashraf community in Somalia by telephone and other ways of communication.

According to the Ashraf elders in Nairobi, Ashraf refugees remaining in Kenya do not receive any assistance from UNHCR or any other UN agency. They have found it very difficult to make a living in Kenya. Some of the refugees have been employed as unskilled workers, such as housecleaning while others are petty traders. They receive some economic assistance from their relatives living abroad (see annex 9).

## **8. Eyle**

### **8.1 Groups and sub-groups, geographical distribution**

According to Mr Fara Oumari Mohamud, a representative of the Eyle (Eile) community in Nairobi, the Eyle centuries ago had their own kingdom, ruled by King Gedi Ababo, around the hill Bur Eyle close to Bur Hakaba (Bay region). The Eyle were hunters and agro-pastoralists. They believe themselves to be of Falasha (or Jewish) origin before they were Islamised. They were treated by the main Somali clans as religious outcasts.

Fara Oumari Mohamud said that before the war there were some one thousand Eyle families living scattered throughout southern Somalia up to and including the Hiran region, but the majority lived in two districts, Bulo Burte in Hiran region, and Bur Hakaba in Bay region. These remain today the principal areas where the Eyle live in Somalia. Presently, there are approximately two to three hundred Eyle families in Somalia.

The information provided by Fara Oumari Mohamud can be supplemented from other sources.

Lewis (1994a) considers the Eile (Eyle) of Bur Eibe as a Negroid people, living in the area between the two rivers. They cultivate during the rains and hunt in the dry season (with dogs, considered dirty creatures by the 'noble' Somali). Both the Hawiye and the Digil despise them, and there seems good reason to regard them as a pre-Cushitic aboriginal population. They comprise three primary sections, one of which appears to be related to a dynasty of chiefs that ruled the Bur region at some time. Smaller Eile groups are found at Dafet, on the lower and



mid-Shabelle, and among the Shidle.

Mohamed Diriye Abdullahi adds that in the 1960s and 1970s the Eyle had some hunting and farming communities in the vicinity of Mount Eyle (Bur Eyle, Bur Eibe), some 60 km south of Baidoa. Their numbers have been constantly in decline since the 1960s due to assimilation with the Rahanweyn and Bantu agricultural communities or through migration to large towns such as Mogadishu where they found employment as butchers. In Mogadishu, before the civil war, the Eyle occupied a large squatter camp beside the grounds of the National University, to the consternation of the university officials who demanded their eviction. The civil war has scattered the few communities that the Eyle had. Abdullahi considers the Eyle an endangered community that would have difficulty in reconstituting its former settlements around the plains of Mount Eyle.

Fara Oumari Mohamud explained that in 1992, in Mogadishu, he gathered members of eight minority groups to create an NGO, in order to appeal for help to the international community. The NGO implemented a number of projects with donor aid, but in 1998 the members of the executive committee were targeted by Aideed's USC, after which they fled to Kenya.

## **8.2 Language**

Fara Oumari Mohamud stated that the Eyle have the same language as the main Somali clans among whom they live.

## **8.3 Socio-economic situation**

### **8.3.1 Relationship with other groups and clans**

Fara Oumari Mohamud informed the delegation that the Eyle were treated as slaves by the main Somali clans. They had no protection from any clan and their relationships with the clans in their home areas (Rahanweyn, Hawadle) were not good. Also for religious reasons, they were treated as outcasts. There are no physical differences between the Eyle and the surrounding Somali clans. There was no intermarriage between the Eyle and the major Somali clans. There were no Eyle in government institutions, and there are no Eyle involved in the Arta peace process at the present time. Eyle could intermarry with some Benadiri and with Tumaal, but not with Yibir.

Lewis (1994a) describes the Eyle as clients of the Rahanweyn clans, while Abdullahi (1998) mentions the assimilation of Eyle with Bantu and Rahanweyn communities.

The Bantu elders interviewed by the mission consider the Eyle to be a Bantu lineage group (see chapter 6.1).

The UNHCR overview classifies the Eyle as a Mirifle clan (see annex 3). Perouse de Montclos (1997) considers the Eyle (Eyle) of the Bur Eibi Hills to be a Bantu group.

### **8.3.2 Occupations**

The Eyle are hunters and agro-pastoralists. According to Lewis (1994a) they also make

pottery, and their home area is one of the centres of pottery making. Abdullahi mentions that in Mogadishu the Eyle found employment as butchers.

## 8.4 Security and human rights

During the civil war many Eyle fled Somalia for Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen. Fara Oumari Mohamud knew of no Eyle who had fled to the northern part of Somalia.

At the present time there are some two to three hundred Eyle families remaining in Somalia, mainly in the districts of Bulo Burte in Hiran region and Bur Hakaba in Bay region. They are still in a weak position, as they do not bear arms. They cultivate and suffer from the drought that reigns in southern Somalia. Hunting is difficult these days, according to Fara Oumari Mohamud.

There are no indications from other sources that the Eyle are at present targeted by the main Somali clans. Insofar as they live in unstable areas, they could become victims of armed conflicts.

No Eyle have been included as members of the Transitional National Assembly.

## 9. Midgan, Tumul, Yibir (*sab*)

### 9.1 Groups and sub-groups, geographical distribution, origins

In traditional Somali society a number of 'occupational castes' lived scattered in a client status among the majority of 'noble' Somali clans. Various names are used for these groups, and their use is not always consistent.

The northern Somali pastoral society distinguishes three occupational castes, the Midgan, Tumul (also called Tum Tum, Tumaal, Tomal) and Yibir (also called Yibro, Hebrew), referred to collectively as *sab* (which means low-caste). These names are also used by the southern Darod. Another collective term used for these groups in northern Somalia is Gaboye (Geboyo), but Gaboye is also used as another name for the Midgan only. A third collective name used for the three groups is *Baidari*. The terms Midgan, Gaboye and *sab* are derogatory terms.

According to Perouse de Montclos the word *sab* refers to professional castes without territorial, genealogical or ethnic foundation, less than 1% of the country's population. Three quarters of them are shoemakers or barbers who carry out circumcision: they are called 'untouchables', Midgan, and try to impose a new name since the beginning of the war, the 'harmless' Madhiban. Less than a quarter are Tumul blacksmiths. One also finds a handful of Yibir hunters, said to have magic power, and some weavers called Yahhar in the south (according to the name of the shuttle of their weaving loom).

The UNHCR overview distinguishes within the minority groups the Geboyo, Yibro, Yaharo, Tomal and Madhiban (see annex 3).

In the inter-riverine area of southern Somalia, occupational caste groups were scattered through the clan system, but the words Midgan and Yibir used to be unknown, while Tumaal

was simply the name of the occupation of smith and not of a descent group. Here, the occupational castes were collectively known as *boon* or *gum*. But again, by others, Boon and Midgan were used interchangeably.

The delegation met with Mr Yassin Hersi Jama, a representative of the Madhiban, who had lived in Mogadishu from 1980 onwards and in Nairobi from 1990 onwards. He used the term Midgan as a collective term covering the sub-groups Madhiban, Musa Dheryo, Tumal, Yaher, Yibir and Jaje. Written sources mention these same sub-groups among the occupational castes, with the exception of the Jaje.

A UN source in Nairobi considered the Midgan, Yibir and Tumal to be separate groups, while she considered that 'Midgan' is a derogatory term for Madhiban. She informed the delegation that the Yibir are called Yaher in the southern part of Somalia.

Another staff member of a UN organisation informed the delegation that the Midgan, Tumal and Yibir live to this day scattered all over Somalia, but especially in the central and northern areas.

In this report, Midgan, Tumal and Yibir will be considered as three separate occupational castes; the Midgan will be considered to have two sub-groups, the Madhiban and the Musa Dheryo (or Musa Dheere).

The origins of these occupational castes are vague. They are probably related agnatically to the mainstream Somalis, but also ethnically much intermixed, and patrilineally segmented, like the mainstream Somalis. But they are considered by other Somalis to have become impure ('haraam'). The origins of their perceived impurity are not clear. It may have to do with their hunting activities, in which animals are killed in contrast to the Shari'a precepts on slaughtering. Also, the menial jobs to which they are confined are considered impure (see section 9.3.2). Yassin Hersi Jama indicated that the Madhiban originally come from the central area (Mudug and Nugal regions).

The Yibir (or Hebrew) are said to have Jewish origins but have been Muslims for centuries and know nothing about Judaism.

## **9.2 Language**

Lewis (1994a) notes that the Midgan, Tumal and Yibir speak the Somali language of the clan to which they are attached. The Midgan and Yibir also have a special, secret dialect that the major Somali clans would not understand.

## **9.3 Socio-economic situation**

### **9.3.1 Relationship with other groups and clans**

According to Yassin Hersi Jama, the Madhiban do not intermarry with the main Somali clans. When, centuries ago, they moved from their original areas of Nugal and Mudug into the northern parts of Somalia, they needed protection and entered into client-patron relationships with the major Somali clans. Since then they have held no territory of their own. Many

Madhiban used to tell strangers that they belonged to the Somali clan that was their patron clan. They did this partly because they did not want to be seen as vulnerable.

Before the civil war the position of the Madhiban in various parts of Somalia was not strong. Yassin Hersi Jama gave the example of Hargeisa in Somaliland, where Madhiban were restricted to certain jobs like barber or cleaner. For women, he stated that the only job open was prostitution. Madhiban were not able to study, unless a patron from the main Somali clans would allow them. At the time there were some 60,000 Midgan in Hargeisa.

Yassin Hersi Jama informed the delegation that during the civil war the Madhiban suffered greatly. He stated that in Mogadishu in 1990 the Hawiye wanted to kill the Madhiban and many consequently fled the city. In North East Somalia (Puntland) the Madhiban had a client-patron relationship with the dominant Majerteen clan of the Darod and also fought for the Majerteen. Their position was not, however, very strong. They could be killed easily, since no *diya* had to be paid when a Madhiban was killed, according to Yassin Hersi Jama. In Hargeisa, the Isaaq chased the Madhiban in 1994 to Puntland and Ethiopia.

These findings can largely be substantiated and generalised from written sources. According to Lewis (1994a), the *sab* (indicating the Midgan, Tumal and Yibir) are attached to 'noble' Somalia tribes through patronage and perform specific duties, in return for which they are paid and allowed to remain in the territory of the tribe of attachment. The *sab* attached to a 'noble' tribe identify themselves with it in relation to other tribes. They have no recognised genealogy of their own. They are not land owning groups. Conventional paths to upward social mobility are not open to them. They are excluded from the councils of elders. They have no right to claim compensation for murder from 'noble' Somali except through the patron to whom they are attached, and the (lower) compensation is paid to the patron (N.B. this is in contradiction with Yassin Hersi Jama's statement that for the killing of a Madhiban no *diya* is paid). They cannot contract legitimate marriage with Somalis.

According to Perouse de Montclos, *sab* castes cannot demand reparations from a Somali in case of murder, unless they do it through their master.

The *sab* have a reputation for witchcraft and magic. The Midgan's poisoned hunting arrows are feared. The Yibirs are despised by all Somalis, who never speak to them if they can avoid doing so, and are feared for their skills in witchcraft. Whenever a son is born to a 'noble' Somali, and at marriages, a Yibir has the right to a gift in return for an amulet and blessing.

Although the position of the *sab* had many points in common with the position of slaves in Somali society, their position was nevertheless distinct. The *sab* were a ritually impure group of people segregated from the Somalis by general prohibitions, e.g. to eat together or to marry. Although they owned no land, they were nonetheless distinct communities with their own customs. Their adoption by 'noble' Somalis implied a voluntary contract, while ownership of slaves entailed absolute rights of possession. The *sab* have the right to move from 'noble' family to family at will.

Lewis' findings mostly date from well before the Siad Barre era. Even then, he noted that restrictions placed on the *sab* were gradually disappearing. In 1960 the Somali government, in its drive to replace tribal particularism by national solidarity, passed legislation officially

abolishing the status of client and upholding the right of every Somali citizen to live and work where he chose, irrespective of his particular clan or lineage affiliation. Siad Barre, in his policy of modernisation and abolition of tribalism, or 'clanism', tried to emancipate the minorities and some members of the occupational castes, especially Midgan and Yibir, held important offices during his regime, including in the military. As a result the occupational castes supported Siad Barre and they were accordingly expelled after his downfall. In Somaliland, their role in the conflict between Barre and the Isaaq-based Somali National Movement (SNM) earned them the hostility of the SNM rebels, and of the Isaaq as a group. Also, whereas other former adversaries in this area have reconciled, the Midgan, Tumul and Yibir have not been party to any peace agreement. They have found recovery after the war especially difficult and consider themselves as being discriminated against, in spite of the one seat they obtained in the Somaliland parliament.

### 9.3.2 Occupations

The Midgan, Tumul and Yibir are called occupational castes because they traditionally perform specialised occupational services. The Midgan women also performed female circumcision and acted as midwives to the dominant Somali clans.

The Tumul are traditionally blacksmiths, making spears, knives, arrowheads, swords, as well as prophylactic amulets and charms. The Yibir and Midgan are traditionally both hunters and leather-workers, making ornaments, straps, amulets, prayer-mats and saddles. They hunted with bows and arrows poisoned with an extract obtained from a species of euphorbia. Both groups were feared for their witchcraft and magic. Some Musa Dheryo were basket-makers, and attached to the Rahanweyn or to the Isaaq clan Habr Awal. The occupational castes traditionally could not own cattle or horses or 'noble' possessions.

In the last few decades many Midgan, Tumul and Yibir have migrated to the cities, where they have been employed by politicians from more powerful clans as drivers, bodyguards and spies. As described above, Siad Barre elevated several Midgan to important positions in the Ministries of Defence and Education. With no independent clan base or status of their own, such appointees could be trusted to carry out orders. Other clans also employed Tumul, Midgan and Yibir families. To this day their work opportunities are mainly confined to menial jobs such as hairdressing, blacksmithing, metalworking, tanning, shoemaking, pottery and craftsmanship in general. Some Madhiban rose to higher positions, e.g. as artists.

### 9.4 Security and human rights situation

The Midgan, Tumul and Yibir traditionally lived in the areas of the four main nomadic clan families of Darod, Isaaq, Dir and Hawiye in northern and central Somalia. In the last few decades many of them migrated to the cities.

During the civil war that followed Barre's downfall in 1991 the occupational castes were in general not specifically targeted, although as groups without natural clan allies, they were sometimes attacked with impunity. Moreover, particular individuals and families who had visibly supported the Barre regime were vulnerable to targeted retaliation. For example, Abgal militiamen of the USC executed several Yibir who had formerly been their clients. In its

waning days, the Barre regime reportedly armed many Yibir and sent them to the local market to kill Abgal clansmen in retaliation for Abgal rebellion against the government. After Abgal forces succeeded in helping to oust Barre, they turned on their former Yibir clients and massacred them. Having broken with their former Abgal patrons, the Yibir then had no-one to turn to for protection.

Somaliland provides a further example. During the war, members of the Midgan, Tumul and Yibir enlisted in government military service and were assigned to a special unit. Their role in the conflict earned them the hostility of the SNM rebels, and of the Isaaq clans in general. Many fled in fear of retaliation to Ethiopia and Puntland. In recent years they have started to come back, and returnees have been able to reclaim some of the land and property taken from them during the civil war. In 1998, for example, some two thousand Midgan, Tumul and Yibir returned to Somalia from Ethiopia, mostly to Hargeisa.

Midgan, Tumul and Yibir today live scattered all over Somalia, but mostly in northern areas. There is little specific information available on their human rights and security situations. There are no indications that the security of Midgan, Tumul and Yibir is at risk from targeted actions by other clans. At the same time, indications are that their relationships with the major Somali clans have not improved much from traditional times, and that they are still discriminated against in the social and economic spheres. In some instances Madhiban have married into the Majerteen clan.

In the Djibouti peace initiative, Mr. Hersi (aged 68 years), who has been the elected leader of the Yibir for 22 years, was asked to speak at one of the opening sessions of the peace conference. He noted that the Yibir had suffered terribly during the war but wanted badly to forgive and move on. Part of the bad treatment, he conceded, was due to the support of many Yibir for the dictator Siad Barre. But part of it was simply that they are one of the low castes of Somalis, and particularly that they are believed to be ethnic Jews, in a strongly Muslim country. He stated that the Yibir were never given their rights. For many years the Yibir were denied education. They perform work that is considered menial, such as metalworking and shoemaking. Traditionally many earned money through the belief, stretching back perhaps centuries, that it is lucky to give the Yibir a small amount of money when a son is born or at a marriage.

Yassin Hersi Jama declared himself to be against the Djibouti peace initiative, and against the representatives of the Madhiban in the Transitional National Assembly, as he considered that those who chose to be in the power structure of the oppressor could never be the true representatives of the Madhiban (see annex 10).

In Somaliland, Midgan, Tumul and Yibir found recovery from the civil war especially difficult. They feel that they are under-represented politically, with one seat in the Somaliland parliament. Economically they still find themselves mostly in menial jobs, and do not feel sufficiently secure to conduct any business as other clans could confiscate their possessions.

A UN report on the conditions of returnees and IDPs in north-west and north-east Somalia found that in Puntland approximately 10,000 Madhiban from Mogadishu and Bay and Bakool regions live in camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The report also found that IDPs from the South were generally worse off than town residents, but that the problems of the

returnees were also quite severe. Both IDPs and returnees face severe problems in terms of integration within the depressed local economy. The IDPs around Bosasso face great risks in terms of sanitation and health. The meagre shelter available is vulnerable to fires. The Madhiban IDPs are especially vulnerable to spontaneous and forced relocations, and IDPs cited the insecurity of land tenure and ownership as their primary concern.

## **10. Shekhal**

### **10.1 Sub-groups, geographical distribution, relationship with other clans**

The Shekhal clan has been described in various terms such as Sheikhal, Sheikal, Shekhal Lobogi, Shekhal Gendershe or Shekhash.

One source considers them as a minority group, though other sources consider them as associated to the Hawiye, as a sub-clan of the Hawiye or even as a separate clan-family:

Guido Ambroso writes that the Shekhal is a priestly lineage with segments present both in central and southern Somalia as well as eastern Ethiopia. In Somalia they are known as Shekhal and in Ethiopia as Shekhash. The Shekhal claim direct descent from a religious Arab lineage even if some genealogists consider them as part of the Hawiye.

Information gathered by the Netherlands Embassy in June 1999 from UNPOS Nairobi, shows that the Shekhal are associated with the Hawiye. In general, Shekhal clan members have no specific area or zone of residency in the country. They are scattered in different districts and regions of the country. One can find Shekhal (as a family) in Mogadishu, Belet Weyne, Jowhar, Middle and Lower Juba and Gedo. The Shekhal Loboge is a sub-clan of the Shekhal, who have their traditional homeland in Ethiopia (Zone V, the Ogaden).

According to a UN source in Nairobi members of the Shekhal clan are living among the other Somali clans, especially among the Hawiye clans Habr Gedir and Abgal. The Shekhal clan comprises two sub-clans, which are the Martile and the Aw Qudub. The Shekhal sub-clan Martile, meaning "guest", is a member of the so-called Hirab (Herab) alliance, which is an alliance of all Abgal and Habr Gedir clans and the Martile sub-clan. The source said that the Shekhal should not be considered as a Benadiri clan. It was remarked that the Shekhal Martile clan occupies three seats in the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) established at the peace conference held in Djibouti. These three seats are included in the 49 seats that the Hawiye clan-family and its allies were allocated in the TNA. See annex 4.

Wayne Long, UNDP-Somalia understood that the Shekhal should not be considered as a minority group, but as a Hawiye clan that seceded from the Hawiye five to ten years ago and no longer considers itself as Hawiye.

The recent UNHCR overview considers the Shekhal as a separate group, with four sub-groups: Lobogay (Lobogi), Aw Qudub, Gendershe and Aw Hassan.

The sub-group of Rer Aw Hassan is most likely a minority population according to a UN source in Nairobi. This group is represented in the TNA by two seats within the minority grouping called "Alliance Clans Community". The term Aw before a clan-name means 'chief'

and indicates that the clan in question is a respected religious clan. The UN source had no information as to the geographical distribution of the Rer Aw Hassan population in Somalia, or from where they may have originated.

Lewis (1994a) considered the Sheikal Lobogi as a sub-clan of the Hawiye. They are a priestly group or section scattered among the Hawiye clans generally, but sometimes appearing as autonomous sections in some clans, as for instance in the Herab clan of the Hawiye. Lewis (1982) mentions that the largest clan of the Sheikhal is the Reer Fiqi Omar, whose most important lineage, the Reer Sheikh Aw Gutub, lives in the Ogaden.

Ambroso adds that another priestly clan called the Sharifians (or Ashraf) is similar to the Shekhal. Both the Shekhal and the Sharifians are said to have acquired a certain degree of political prominence during Siad Barre's regime.

According to a UN source in Nairobi the Shekhal Gendershe clan of Mogadishu inhabits the "Gendershe" village that borders on the Medina District of South Mogadishu.

A UN source in Nairobi indicated in December 1997 that the Mogadishu-based Shekhal Gendershe clan is one of the minority clans in Somalia, who seek protection from Hawiye sub-clan members occupying their areas since 1990.

## **10.2 Occupations**

According to Ambroso, the Shekhal were religious sheikhs and qadis (judges) although nowadays many Shekhal have secular occupations.

## **10.3 Security and human rights situation**

According to a UN source in Nairobi dating from December 1997 the Mogadishu-based Shekhal Gendershe clan is one of the minority clans in Somalia. They are an unarmed community, which has been receiving threats in their traditional areas since 1990. They cannot defend themselves against the armed militiamen and therefore seek protection from Hawiye sub-clan members, who have been occupying their traditional home areas since 1990. Another UN source also considered that the Shekhal clan enjoys some degree of protection from the Hawiye clans.

According to the information gathered by the Netherlands Embassy in June 1999 from UNPOS Nairobi, members of the Shekhal clan and the Loboge sub-clan (if the person in question is not a political figure or has no special case) can travel freely throughout the country.

## **11. Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyn)**

### **11.1 Groups and sub-groups, geographical distribution**

The Digil and Mirifle, or Rahanweyn, seem to take a middle position between a Somali clan and a minority. They are considered as a minority group by some experts (such as the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Somalia, Ms Mona Rishmawi). By others they are considered as clans related to the major Somali clans, though considered as less 'noble'. In the



Transitional National Assembly (TNA), recently formed in Djibouti, the Digil and Mirifle have been included as one of the major Somali clan-families (with 33 sub-clans) and allotted 49 seats, distinct from the recognised "official" minorities grouped together at Arta under the title "Alliance Clans Community".

Different use is made of the names Digil, Mirifle (Merifle) and Rahanweyn. A UN source in Nairobi explained that this is a consequence of an effort made by Siad Barre to amalgamate all these clans under the one name Rahanweyn (the largest group). Originally, however, the Somali distinguished two clan-families, one called the Digil and another variously called Rahanweyn or Mirifle.

The Digil and Mirifle are related ethnically to the four main Somali clan-families in various ways. Both Somali and Digil-Mirifle trace their origins back to the same ancestor, at the highest genealogical level: the ancestor of the Digil-Mirifle, Sab, and the ancestor of the four main Somali clan-families, Somali (or Samaale), are traced back to a common ancestor Hill, who is believed to have had Arabian origins. The descendants of Sab are segmented into three families: the Digil, Mirifle (or Rahanweyn) and Tunni; the Mirifle and Tunni derive from the Digil. The Mirifle and Tunni are numerically the most important, but the Digil survive as a small independent confederacy.

The Mirifle are concentrated in the inter-riverine areas of Bay and southern Bakool, but they also form substantial minorities in Gedo, the Lower and Middle Juba and the Lower Shabelle regions. The Digil are concentrated in the Lower Shabelle region. Historically, the Digil and Mirifle arose from the intermixture of south-driving Somali with the rearguard of the Galla then occupying most of the lower reaches of the Juba. The characteristic structure of the Digil and Mirifle results from the adoption of other groups. Elements from all the other Somali clans as well as Oromo and Bantu have been absorbed in this way. These elements (individuals, families or groups) have been enabled to coalesce, thus forming mixed clans, with a founding lineage acting as a thread round which successive groups crystallise. In this way, relatively stable confederacies, bound together by reciprocal relations of aid and defence, are formed. Such unions are at first organised on the lineage principle. This, however, usually disappears in their further development. The end-point in the process of federation is the mixed village, where lineage segmentation no longer corresponds to territorial distribution. An example is the Tunni confederacy, which is formed by a number of Hawiye, Mirifle, Dir, Galla, Gobawein (Bantu), Ashraf, Ajuran and Boon groupings, with each segment containing an original Tunni lineage.

Perouse de Montclos describes how Rahanweyn (Mirifle) identity rests more on land tenure than on genealogical affiliations. The name Rahanweyn ('large crowd') evokes at once incorporation and disparity. Blurred genealogies and oral history allow all kinds of recomposition. Genealogies do not reflect so much the past but the prevailing political and numerical power, which makes it easier to 'downplay' names of smaller or extinct lineages. In Somalia, the Rahanweyn will amplify his membership to the wider Somali family, while as a refugee in Kenya, he will insist on being a victim of discrimination due to the fact that he is from a lower caste. This said and done, these groups will still be able to negotiate when the 'hour of reconciliation' arrives, because they are part of the Somali lineage system.

In the genealogical structure of the Mirifle (Rahanweyn), the offshoot of the Digil that has come to eclipse its parent stock in number and importance, there are only three orders of segmentation between the ancestor Rahanweyn and the individual sub-clans, in marked contrast to the charts of the nomadic clan-families. Sub-divisions of the Mirifle can be found, e.g. in Lewis (1994a) or Cassanelli (1995).

Lewis (1994a) describes the Tunni as a large tribe, or rather tribal confederacy. They lived at one time on the Juba river, but since the tenth century they were driven south-west and eventually settled in and around Brava. They had a mixed cattle-cultivation economy and also hunted. The Tunni Torre, a Negroid group, were federated to the Tunni of Brava as their vassals.

As described in chapter 7, the Tunni in Brava town are culturally close to the Benadiri (Reer Brava). The five lineages (*gamas*) which the Bravanese Tunni mention as sub-division of the Tunni clan, can be found in Lewis (1994a) as Daffarat, Werile, Aggiuwa, Dacktira and Goigal, with further sub-groups.

## 11.2 Language

The Mirifle speak a separate Somali dialect (called *Af-may* or *Af-maymay*), which serves as a lingua franca among the various Mirifle groups, several of whom also speak distinct local dialects, and some of their Bantu neighbours. Also the Digil speak *Af-may*, although some will speak standard Somali. Both Digil and Mirifle generally understand the standard Somali spoken elsewhere.

## 11.3 Socio-economic situation

### 11.3.1 Relationship with other groups and clans

The Digil and Mirifle are held in contempt by the nomadic Somali clans for their lowly origins, stemming from Sab as opposed to Somali, for their heterogeneous composition that includes Bantu elements, for their lack of a clear, politically significant genealogical structure, and, more important perhaps, because they are predominantly cultivators. They were shunned as marriage partners by the 'noble' Somali clans. They do have *diya* paying groups, and thus fall within this aspect of clan law. Villages could function as *diya* paying groups, even if villagers were members of different kinship-based *diya* paying groups.

In past decades, the predominant ideology of Somali nationalism tended to mute these differences. Since the collapse of the state in 1991, however, these ethnic distinctions have vigorously reasserted themselves, especially since the Mirifle (along with the Bantu and coastal populations) were the main victims of a famine and civil war imposed on them by the dominant pastoral clans.

The fertile areas inhabited by the Digil and Mirifle have long attracted other clans. In the 1980s thousands of hectares of land were appropriated from villagers without compensation. Also, an epidemic of land grabbing by well-connected Somalis began in those years.

The Digil and Mirifle did not play a major role in either the Barre government or the military

rebellion against it. But in 1991-92 they found themselves in the middle of a struggle between three heavily armed factions: the Hawiye USC, retreating government forces that sought to regroup in the Gedo region, and the Ogaden-dominated Somali Patriotic Movement. The Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle regions became major battlegrounds. The resulting anarchy resulted in a food crisis in 1992. Thousands of Mirifle died, and thousands more were displaced, mostly within the region. Digil from Lower Shabelle sought refuge in the bush or in Mogadishu.

In the 1990s the competition for rich agricultural land in the Juba and Shabelle valleys intensified. In the Shabelle region the Darod, who had grabbed land in the Barre era, were ousted in 1991-92 by Habr Gedir and Hawadle militia, who subsequently laid claim to those same districts.

Like the minority groups, Rahanweyn farmers used to have few weapons and they have no military tradition. After the UN's UNITAF operation had helped restore order in 1992 in the main population centres around Baidoa, many Mirifle clans set up local police forces and courts. In 1992 the Mirifle started to organise their own army, the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), which held the Baidoa area. In 1995 the Mirifle/Rahanweyn set up a council of elders, the Supreme Governing Council, as a self-administrative body. However, it rapidly fell apart when the SDM split into three, and Hussein Aideed's father, General Mohamed Farah Aideed, and the Habr Gedir clan took the opportunity to seize a large area of the Mirifle/Rahanweyn regions of Bay and Bakool including the town of Baidoa.

The Mirifle organised themselves militarily to fight the Habr Gedir militia. The Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) was formed, allied to the SDM, and recaptured Hoddur from pro-Aideed forces in August 1996. In June 1999 the RRA, probably backed by Ethiopia, recaptured Baidoa from Hussein Aideed's forces and drove them out of Bay and Bakool regions. In December 1999 the RRA established a local administration for Bay region.

The Digil and Mirifle support the Arta peace process. RRA Secretary General Abdullah Derow Isaaq was elected as Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly (TNA). In the peace negotiations Baidoa was mentioned as a possible temporary seat for the TNA, as long as security conditions in Mogadishu were not satisfactory. Recently, however, a split has occurred within the RRA, with some members feeling that the new president, Abdiqassim, has no interest in Baidoa. The support by the Digil and Mirifle for the peace process has been somewhat surprising. As was pointed out to the mission by a UN staff member in Nairobi, it is not clear what they stand to gain from Arta, after the RRA had just recaptured their whole territory and had started to rebuild a local administration.

### **11.3.2 Occupations**

The Digil and Mirifle are mainly cultivators, although some groups combine cultivation with pastoralism and others are mainly pastoralists (more often cattle than camels).

### **11.4 Security and human rights**

During the civil war, the Digil and Mirifle have repeatedly been victims of killings, lootings and other human rights violations by the various militias, mainly Aideed's USC.

Since 1999, when the RRA finished recapturing their main home areas, Bay and Bakool regions, the situation of the Mirifle has improved. Since that time, those parts of Bay and Bakool where the RRA has established firm control, and is making efforts to install a civil administration (e.g. Baidoa and its environs), can be qualified as zones of transition. The other parts of Bay and Bakool are considered zones of conflict. Much of the Lower Shabelle region, the traditional home area of the Digil, is considered a zone of transition.

A UN staff member informed the mission that thousands of Digil and Mirifle are at the moment in North West Somalia (Somaliland), where they are a visible minority. Most of these Digil and Mirifle fled their home area since 1995, when Aideed's forces captured Baidoa. Although these displaced persons were well received in 1997-98, they are no longer welcome. The Somaliland population has grown tired of what they see as aggressive begging by the Digil and Mirifle. In Somaliland, the Digil and Mirifle live in very poor circumstances, in slum conditions, and there is no place for them in society. They form the lowest socio-economic stratum. However, they are not systematically threatened. Sometimes a Digil or Mirifle will be arrested. The UN staff member added that Digil and Mirifle are probably also living around Bosasso, in Puntland, but he was not well informed about conditions there.

Another UN staff member interviewed in Bosasso during the Dutch mission to Puntland of November 1999 stated that Rahanweyn are present in Puntland, and that they are very poor and often live from begging.

In the (large) sample of camps included in the UN study into conditions of returnees and IDPs in northern Somalia, one camp, of 360 people, was found to house Rahanweyn IDPs.

## **12. Individuals and organisations consulted**

**Abdalla**, Hemed Said, Bajuni elder from Jomvu Camp, Mombasa

**Abdinoor**, Abobasid Sharif, Secretary General of the Asharaf Welfare Association, Nairobi

**Abu**, Mohamed Abdurahman, Tunni from Brava

**Adan**, Abdullahi Sharif, Ashraf from Qorioley, Lower Shabelle

**Ahmed**, Ahmed Kassim (Badi), Bajuni elder from Jomvu Camp, Mombasa

**Ahmed**, Hassan Sharif, Ashraf from Mogadishu

**Ali**, Ali Mahdi, Bajuni elder from Jomvu Camp, Mombasa

**Ali**, Sharif Mohammed Sharif ("Kingo"), Ashraf from Merka, Lower Shabelle

**Bakari**, Bakari Abdalla, Bajuni elder from Jomvu Camp, Mombasa

**Bashir**, Alrahid Sharif, Ashraf Businessman from Medina, Mogadishu

**Bauer**, Julien, Professor, ECOTERRA, Society for Ecology and Sound Economy, Nairobi

**Benadir elders** (Ashraf, Duruqbe, Morshe) from Mogadishu and Merka

**Bobow**, Mohamed Jeylani, Tunni from Brava

**Bryden**, Matt, Programme Co-ordinator, War-torn Societies Project (WSP), Nairobi

**Eno**, Mohamed Abdulkadir, Bantu elder, Chairman of Bantu Rehabilitation Trust, Nairobi

**Giama**, Safia, Information Officer, United Nations Co-ordination Unit for Somalia (UNCU), Nairobi

**Habib**, Abdiaziz Sharif, Ashraf from Mogadishu

**Harborne**, Bernard, Chief, United Nations Co-ordination Unit for Somalia (UNCU), Nairobi

**Hassan**, Madina Sharif, Spokeswoman, Ashraf from Merka, Lower Shabelle

**Hassan**, Sahra Sharif, Ashraf from Merka, Lower Shabelle

**Hassan**, Sheikhnuur Yusuf ("Boob"), Bantu elder, Secretary-General of Somali Bantu Refugee Committee in Kenya, Nairobi

**Hussein**, Ali Ibrahim, Bravanese from Brava

**Hussein**, Moe A., Field Co-ordination Officer, United Nations Development Programme for Somalia (UNDP-Somalia)/United Nations Co-ordination Unit for Somalia (UNCU), Nairobi

**Ibrahim**, Mohamed Sharif Adan Sharif, Ashraf from Baidoa

**Ibrahim**, Zeinab Sharif, Ashraf from Mogadishu

**Imberwa**, Munye Imberwa, Bantu elder, Chairman of Somali Bantu Refugee Committee in Kenya, Nairobi

**Jama**, Yassin Hersi, Representative of the Madhiban, Nairobi

**Long**, Wayne, Chief Security Officer, United Nations Development Programme for Somalia (UNDP-Somalia), Nairobi

**Lutato**, Kalunga, Head of Somali Operations, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Branch Office for Kenya, Nairobi

**Mohamed**, Mohamed Bakari, Bajuni elder from Jomvu Camp, Mombasa

**Mohamed**, Farah Oumari, Representative of Eyle Community, Nairobi

**Musalem**, Abdulkadir Mohamed, Bravanese from Brava

**Naji**, Ali Mohamed, Bajuni elder from Jomvu Camp, Mombasa

**Noor**, Haji Amin Mohammed, Bravanese from Brava

**Omar**, Abdulkadir Moallim, Bantu elder from Gedo region, Luugh-Ganaane District

**Osman**, Omar Sharif, Ashraf from Lower Juba

**Qullaten**, Osman Said, Tunni from Brava

**Salah**, Yusuf Abdi, Bantu-elder, Chairman of Centre for Minority Rights and Development, Nairobi

**Sheikh**, Mohamed Muhyadin, Bravanese from Brava

**Sheikh**, Mohamed Yasin, Tunni from Brava

**Stephen**, David, Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Somalia, United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), Nairobi

**Wazir**, Abdalla Mohamed, Bajuni elder from Jomvu Camp, Mombasa

**Yousuf**, Mohammed Sharif, Ashraf from Mogadishu

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## **14. Abbreviations**

BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation

CNN - Cable News Network

EU - European Union

FSAU - Food Security Assessment Unit

ID-card - Identity Card

IDP - Internally Displaced Person

IFA - Internal Flight Alternative

IGAD - Inter-Governmental Authority for Development

IRIN - Integrated Regional Information Network

MSF - Médecins Sans Frontières

NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation

OHCHR - Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

**ORSTOM - The French Scientific Research Institute for Development through Cooperation**

RRA - Rahanweyn Resistance Army

SDM - Somali Democratic Movement

SNA - Somali National Alliance

SNF - Somali National Front

SNM - Somali National Movement

SPM - Somali Patriotic Movement

SSA - Somali Salvation Army

TNA - Transitional National Assembly

TNG - Transitional National Government

UK - United Kingdom

UN - United Nations

UNCU - United Nations Co-ordination Unit

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNITAF - United Nations International Task Force

UNOPS/SRP - United Nations Office for Project Services/Somali Rehabilitation Project



UNPOS - United Nations Political Office for Somalia

USA - United States of America

USC - United Somali Congress

WSP - War-torn Societies Project

## **15. List of annexes, maps etc.**

1. Map of Somalia showing major towns and regions.
2. Terms of reference for the mission.
3. UNHCR: Genealogical table of Somali clans (November 2000).
4. Distribution of seats in the Transitional National Assembly.
5. IRIN: Kenya-Somalia: Somali refugees struck by insecurity, 24 November 2000).
6. Document written by Bajuni elders in Nairobi, 21 September 2000 (see also note 24).
7. Document written by Abdulkadir Moallim Omar, Nairobi, a Bantu elder from Luugh-Ganaane District in Gedo region, 26 September 2000.
8. Requests to the Kenyan government and to UNHCR from the Bravanese community in Nairobi
9. Ashraf Welfare Association, Nairobi, 30 July 2000.

The Somali Outcast Tribes, Nairobi, 18 September 2000 and 'Somali Minorities Demand - Shut Down the So-called Djibouti Peace Initiative for Somalia ', 7 April 2000.

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[3.1](#)

[3.2](#)

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[3.8](#)

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9. Ashraf Welfare Association, Nairobi, 30 July 2000.

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[9.2](#)

[10. The Somali Outcast Tribes, Nairobi, 18 September 2000 and 'Somali Minorities Demand - Shut Down the So-called Djibouti Peace Initiative for Somalia ', 7 April 2000.](#)

[10.1](#)

[10.2](#)

[10.3](#)

# 1. Background

A relatively large number of Somali asylum seekers in some European countries claim to belong to one of the so-called minority groups in Somalia. This is the case in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Information on the security and human rights situation as well as on the relations between these minority groups and the so-called major Somali clans in Somalia is fragmented and to some degree uncertain. This lack of information may be attributed to the large numbers of minority group members that have fled Somalia since the outbreak of the civil war and the poor security situation in their traditional homelands, making reliable information from these areas difficult to obtain. Also, there has been no detailed study of the position of minority groups undertaken since Cassanelli's report on vulnerable minorities for the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board in 1995.

Against this background, and in view of the large number of minority group members from Somalia that are refugees in Kenya, the British Home Office, the Danish Immigration Service and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to carry out a joint fact-finding mission to Nairobi. The mission was carried out from 17 - 24 September 2000. The delegation of the mission comprised Louise Anten, Co-ordinator Africa Region, Department of Asylum and Migration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands; Jens Weise Olesen, Senior Regional Adviser (Africa), Danish Immigration Service, Denmark, and Richard Pearce-Higginson, Somalia Country Officer, Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Home Office, United Kingdom (UK). The delegation's terms of reference are attached as annex 2.

The delegation wishes to express its gratitude towards those agencies, organisations and individuals that have contributed to the information presented in this report, especially representatives of Somali minority communities in Somalia and Kenya; United Nations Co-ordination Unit for Somalia (UNCU-Somalia), Nairobi; United Nations Development Programme for Somalia (UNDP-Somalia), Nairobi; United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), Nairobi; War-torn Societies Project (WSP), Nairobi/Hargeisa; and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Nairobi.

The report was finalised on 24 November 2000. Developments that took place between the end of the mission and this date have been included in the report, on the basis of UN and press reports.

## **2. Introduction to sources and methodology**

During its mission to Nairobi, the joint British, Danish and Dutch delegation held meetings with a number of representatives, elders and women of Somali minority communities, some of them living as refugees in Kenya. These meetings included the Bajuni, the Bantu, the Eyle, the Madhiban and the Tunni communities as well as various Benadir communities (among which the Ashraf and Bravanese). Representatives of these groups were identified with the assistance of United Nations (UN) agencies in Nairobi. The delegation also held meetings with representatives of UN agencies and embassy staff of the countries concerned as well as with independent observers. A list of persons consulted may be found at section 12.

It should be noted that the sections on the Shekhal and the Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyn) are based partly on written historical and anthropological sources. The delegation to Nairobi did not meet with representatives of the Shekhal or Digil and Mirifle clans.

This report includes information gathered not only from interviews and meetings in Nairobi in September 2000 but also information obtained during earlier Danish and Nordic fact-finding missions to Somalia and to Nairobi, a Dutch mission to Somalia and Nairobi, from the British Home Office and from a meeting that a member of the delegation held with UNHCR, Branch Office for Kenya, on 28 September 2000.

The testimonies from individuals and spokespersons of Somali minority groups included in this report must be considered in the actual and historical context of the time in which they underwent their experiences. Many members of minority groups in Somalia experienced extreme situations during the civil war in their home country and are thus deeply affected by their experiences. Some suffered personally from such severe physical human rights violations and/or witnessed such violations that it was very difficult for these persons to relate their stories to the delegation without being painfully affected by their own memories and some of the questions asked by the delegation.

The civil war in Somalia was to a large extent a clan-based war, a very violent and destructive war in which the various population groups and clans have accused each other of committing physical violence and abuses, including murder, rape, abduction, looting etc. Beyond any doubt, the minority populations, especially in central and southern Somalia, have suffered severe losses in human as well as material terms. Because it can be difficult to identify impartial sources of information among members of the Somali diaspora, and because of the risk of one-sidedness and possible exaggerations, the delegation has included other sources in its report in addition to the testimonies of the representatives of the Somali minority groups.

The report also includes information from a number of written sources. Among these are documents, reports, books etc. from UN agencies, news agencies, humanitarian Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and researchers on Somalia.

The delegation learned that in some cases it is very difficult to obtain definitive answers to questions on minority groups regarding their sub-groups, their affiliations and other relations, including the incidence of intermarriage, with Somali clans, whether one puts these questions to members of the minority groups themselves or to members of Somali clans. Such information is sensitive and neither of the two sides is very willing to admit being either despised or an oppressor, or be vulnerable before stronger groups in a position of power. Also, statements about one's affiliations are in part cultural and political statements, in the sense that they declare one's identity and political standpoint.

Furthermore, as the French researcher Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos explains, the war, the persecution, the exodus of groups to e.g. Kenya and the resettlement programmes for Somali refugees in Kenya, precipitated the process of identity construction. In Mombasa, where many refugees gathered, the logic of humanitarian aid, as well as idleness, the concentration of refugees in small, relatively homogeneous camps, and finally resettlement criteria all helped towards a reconstruction of identities around the concept of minority status. Since resettlement in the West is limited, very strict selection criteria were developed by Western countries to favour the most threatened people. In this context, minority status was equated to discrimination and therefore the need for resettlement. Consequently, refugees made significant historical changes in the establishment of a 'minority position'. For example, descendants of Bantu slaves, for whom a resettlement was planned in the land of their ancestors in Tanzania, preferred to be called Mushunguli rather than Gosha, the name they were given in Somalia. Also, the mixed race traders of the coastal ports decided to regroup under the generic term 'Benadir' that designates greater Mogadishu. As a result, those indigenous to the area succeeded in calling themselves 'Benadiri' even if they were not of mixed blood at all. This reconstruction of identity does not in any way alter the fact that minorities would, for a number of reasons, have problems on returning to Somalia.

Perouse de Montclos notes that the criteria used by Westerners to sort out candidates for resettlement were equally faulty, confusing a community's identity with territoriality. Brava, for example, was chosen to define traders of Arab or Indian origin who inhabited the port. However, on looking closer at Brava we discover communities with very diverse backgrounds despite numerous instances of intermarriage. On the one hand there are immigrants of Arab origin, while on the other hand there are the Somali of the Brava surroundings, whose minority status is more doubtful because they are part of the Tunni lineage of the Digil.

Perouse de Montclos concludes that the concept of minority is quite ambiguous and that its manipulation by refugees hardly clarifies it. All these minorities form a third of the Somali population (when the Digil/Mirifle are included). It is the civil war that created a sense of 'political solidarity' or 'common minority consciousness', assimilated with that of a victim. The minority notion is thus taken with a conflict dimension, outside of any demographical contingencies. The degree of discrimination overrides the number, be it a question of social class (the low caste *sab*), professional categories (Bajuni fishermen) or foreign elements (the traders of Arab origin).

The delegation learned that in some cases minority groups living as refugees in Kenya have developed a very strong sense of common political solidarity and identity, which may not have been so pronounced when these people were living in Somalia before the civil war of the 1990s. Members of certain minority groups are ready to identify themselves with groups or sub-groups with which they may not have had such a close relationship when they were living in Somalia. Some refugees would even label themselves by terms that were never in use before the war. According to UN sources in Nairobi the term 'Benadiri' was not in common use before the war, but today a number of minority populations living along the southern Somali coast are ready to identify themselves as Benadiri, and they will use the label for the purpose of being recognised as belonging to a minority group.

In the Human Development Report Somalia (1998) the authors draw attention to the fluidity of Somali clan identity, which is often poorly understood by outsiders. Firstly, each Somali can trace back his or her genealogy over thirty generations, giving Somalis membership in many sub-clans on their family tree. Which level in one's lineage is mobilised as one's "clan" depends entirely on the issue at hand. For example, in the past decade of stateless conflict, broad clan conflict between the Darod and Hawiye clan-families has over time devolved into much lower levels of clan identity. Secondly, clan links can be shifted and rediscovered according to the situation at hand. Clans migrating out of their home area will often take on the identity of the dominant clan (*shegad* status). If the situation dictates, they will rediscover their old lineage. Maternal clan links often provide vital flexibility for individuals conducting business or seeking security across clan lines. Thus, while the Somali clan system is usually portrayed as a fixed family tree, it is a tree on which a good deal of grafting takes place.

UNHCR-Nairobi recently prepared an overview of Somali clans and groups, with their areas of residence. UNHCR stresses that the overview is not a definitive document and that it should be taken mainly as an orientation tool. The document is annexed to this mission report (annex 3). As can be seen, the UNHCR overview generally corresponds with the findings of the mission, although there are slight differences (which will be specified in the chapters on the minority groups of this report).

It would seem that in reality, genealogically speaking, many of the minority groups could be anywhere on a scale of genealogical affiliation (through intermarriages), running from complete separateness to complete assimilation, and that what they say about their affiliations is as much a political statement as a historical or genealogical fact.

Names of minority groups are not always consistently used by the various persons interviewed by the delegation, and by various authors. In the first part of the chapters of this report dedicated to the various minority groups an attempt is made to clarify which names are in use for which groups.

A number of representatives from the various minority groups and international organisations requested that they should remain unidentified in this report. Their requests have been respected. The identity of all persons consulted during the mission is however known to the delegation.

The joint delegation to Nairobi did not visit Somalia on this occasion as the political and security situation in parts of Somalia is deeply affected by the present tense relations between



various politically minded clan-based groups and administrations. This situation is to a large degree related to the peace-conference that took place in Arta, Djibouti and the establishment in August 2000 of a Somali "Parliament" in Arta, the so-called Transitional National Assembly (TNA), which is now in the process of establishing itself in Mogadishu.

The current political developments and the overall security situation in Somalia will be presented in more detail in the following section of the report. More detailed information on the security and human rights situation of the minority groups in Somalia covered in this report will be found in the sections covering particular minority groups below. These sections also contain information on the minority groups' and sub-groups' geographical distribution in Somalia, language, socio-economic situation and relationship to other population groups and clans, and, in some cases, information on the situation of Somali minority refugees in Kenya.

In the report, care is taken to present the views of the various spokespersons in a transparent way. Unless otherwise indicated, all statements within a paragraph are to be attributed to the source mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph.

## ***3. Overall political developments and the security situation in Somalia***

### **3.1 Arta peace process in Djibouti**

For the purpose of being updated on recent political developments and the security situation in Somalia, the delegation met with David Stephen, Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia, UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS); Bernard Harborne, Chief, UN Co-ordination Unit for Somalia (UNCU); Wayne Long, Chief Security Officer, UN Development Programme for Somalia (UNDP-Somalia) and Matt Bryden, Co-ordinator, War-torn Societies Project (WSP), all of whom informed the delegation of developments following from the Arta peace conference held in Djibouti. Please note that some of the details of the recent political developments in Somalia have been filled out with news reports from BBC and CNN.

A peace conference chaired by Djibouti's President Ismail Omar Guelleh opened in May 2000 at Arta, Djibouti with the backing of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) grouping of states, the UN, the European Union (EU) and the League of Arab States. This was the 13<sup>th</sup> major peace effort for Somalia since the collapse of central government in 1991, and, significantly, the first peace initiative that set out to work around civil society rather than the armed clan-factions.

Nearly 2,000 delegates, including clan elders, religious leaders, businessmen and intellectuals, attended the Arta conference, with the aim of drafting a power-sharing arrangement and a constitution to see Somalia through a three-year transitional period. Some leaders of armed clan-factions attended, most notably Ali Mahdi of Mogadishu's Abgal USC/SSA faction. Absent from the conference were the authorities of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in the north-west and the Puntland State of Somalia in the north-east, and Mogadishu "warlords" Hussein Aideed, Musa Sude, Osman Ato, Mohamed Qanyare and Hussein Bod. David Stephen informed the delegation that a formula to include the clan-faction leaders in the peace process could not be agreed at Arta but efforts continue, led at present by the Yemeni President, to find a way for them to be able to participate in the new institutions.

### **3.2 Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and new President**

In August 2000 the Arta delegates elected 172 members of a 245-member provisional parliament for Somalia, the so-called Transitional National Assembly (TNA), for a three-year

period. The TNA is structured along clan lines. There are 49 seats for each of the main Somali clan-families, the Dir (including the Isaaq), Hawiye, Darod and Digil-Mirifle (Rahanweyn), plus 29 seats reserved for members of the minority groups, referred to at Arta as the "Alliance Clans Community". The seats allocated to the main clan-families are divided out amongst the various clans and sub-clans, with five seats for each clan-family reserved for women. President Guelleh of Djibouti was mandated to select twenty members of the TNA, to correct any possible imbalances in the assembly's composition. Annex 4 shows the division of seats among the various clans and groups.

The TNA elected Abdiqassim Salad Hassan as President of Somalia for a three-year transitional period from among 24 candidates. Abdiqassim's election received public backing from the UN, EU and League of Arab States. Abdiqassim, a Hawiye of the Habr Gedir sub-clan Ayr, was Minister of the Interior and Deputy Prime Minister under Siad Barre. He has received the support of business interests, Ali Mahdi (who had stood against him for the presidency) and the Islamic Shari'a courts, some of which have pledged the support of their militias to his new authority to enable it to establish itself in Mogadishu. Abdallah Derow Isaak, Secretary-General of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), was elected as Speaker of the TNA.

In October 2000, Abdiqassim appointed as Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galayadh, a businessman and prominent member of the northern Dulbahante clan of the Darod. Abdiqassim asked Galayadh to form a "government of national reconciliation and reconstruction". Galayadh served briefly as Industry Minister under Siad Barre. However, Abdiqassim's administration has yet to establish a permanent base inside Somalia. Neither has he held any discussions with the authorities in Somaliland and Puntland, which stayed away from the Arta conference and have refused to recognise his authority or status as President, or solved the problem of how to include leaders of armed clan-factions that have so far opposed the Arta peace initiative. Abdiqassim has begun to consolidate his position internationally with a round of foreign visits, including to UN headquarters.

Abdiqassim made his first visit to Somalia in his new capacity as interim President when he visited Baidoa in early September 2000. Thousands of people attended a rally in Baidoa to welcome him. He made a surprise visit to Mogadishu later in September 2000 and met with no resistance to his visit from the clan-faction leaders that had threatened to oppose any such visit to the capital. Four of the armed clan-faction leaders were in Yemen for talks with the Yemeni government at the time of Abdiqassim's visit to Mogadishu.

25 of the seats in the TNA are reserved for women. This represents a major breakthrough in women's rights and is the first time that women have been guaranteed parliamentary representation in Somalia. Abdiqassim has spoken of the important position of women, who constitute over half the population of Somalia, and has stated his intention of including women in his government.

There are also 29 seats in the TNA reserved for members of the minority groups, including five seats reserved for women from the minorities. The UN regards the position and treatment of women and minorities as very important. David Stephen stressed that the UN will, to a large extent, measure the success of the new institutions created by the Arta conference by how well

they deal with issues surrounding women and minorities. David Stephen informed the delegation that Abdiqassim has some family connections with the Benadiri and that he has appointed a former Somali Ambassador to India, Mohammed Osman Omar, who is a Reer Hamar, as his chef de cabinet.

David Stephen informed the delegation that the transitional charter agreed at Arta provides for a human rights commission and a land commission. He believes that if the Somaliland administration is ever to participate in the new structures established at Arta it will want the issue of human rights abuses committed in the north-west in the late 1980s and early 1990s by the Siad Barre regime placed high on the agenda of any commission. David Stephen informed the delegation that the TNA includes two members that Somaliland regards as major human rights violators, General Morgan and General Gani. Gani has already taken his seat at Arta. Morgan did not attend the Arta conference but was nominated by his clan for a TNA seat.

All representatives of the UN agencies emphasised that continued Rahanweyn (Digil-Mirifle) support for the new structures established at Arta will be crucial. The TNA may establish itself in Somalia at Baidoa, controlled by the RRA, if an early move to Mogadishu cannot take place for security reasons. Continued Rahanweyn support for Abdiqassim and the TNA is likely to depend largely on progress on the issue of land. Hawiye militias occupied large tracts of Rahanweyn land during the civil war and Rahanweyn delegates at Arta insisted that the land issue be given a high priority and that the creation of a land commission was incorporated in the national charter. Hawiye delegates at Arta expressed their willingness to resolve land problems but made no specific commitments to return occupied land. The RRA is presently divided between those supporting Rahanweyn participation in the Arta process, as favoured by traditional Rahanweyn elders, and those, including prominent RRA leaders, who oppose it.

All representatives of the UN agencies stressed that one of Abdiqassim's earliest priorities must be to establish an effective police force in Mogadishu and demobilise the existing clan-based militias in the city (see also Section 3.3.5).

Somaliland and Puntland remain outside the Arta process and neither administration is recognised under the Arta agreements as a legitimate authority. Although the transitional charter agreed at Arta allows for federalism, it does so on the basis of the 18 administrative regions established under Siad Barre's government. Seats are allocated in the TNA for the clans and minorities that inhabit the territories controlled by the Somaliland and Puntland authorities.

### **3.2.1 Position of North West Somalia (Somaliland)**

Although President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal's self-declared Somaliland administration stayed away from Arta, there was nevertheless strong representation by delegates from the Dulbahante, Warsangeli, Issa, Gadabursi and some Isaaq clans, though not the Habr Awal or Habr Yunis. David Stephen believes that there is more openness in Somaliland, and Puntland, towards the Arta process than the authorities are prepared to concede, and the public have been well-informed about developments at Arta through television and radio.

Wayne Long considered that Egal's administration has shown increasing signs of paranoia towards the developments at Arta. Habeas Corpus has been suspended and civil rights curtailed, with new powers being given to the police and military to detain people. There is

reported to be a wanted list circulating in Hargeisa of those who attended the Arta conference. Also, David Stephen informed the delegation, the Somaliland authorities have begun to issue "Somaliland" passports, a measure that they have previously refrained from.

While much of the Somaliland authorities' actions and statements over Arta may be viewed as rhetoric, in September 2000, a Dulbahante member of the new TNA and former member of the Somaliland parliament, Garaad Abshir Salah, was arrested on his return to Somaliland from Djibouti and sentenced to seven years in gaol for treason. His arrest was seen by many as a gesture by President Egal to demonstrate that he is still in charge in Somaliland. Some 60 to 80 delegates from the Somaliland area attended the Arta conference and only Garaad has been arrested to date. In early October 2000, Garaad was pardoned by Egal and released from prison. Opinion in Somaliland over the Arta process is divided and in late August 2000 thousands of people in Somaliland staged demonstrations against the Arta conference and Abdiqassim. David Stephen stated that there is strong opposition to the Djibouti peace process and the Transitional National Government (TNG) from pro-Somaliland movements such as the "Red Flag Group".

The Somaliland, and Puntland, authorities have accused Abdiqassim of being an Islamic fundamentalist. David Stephen considered that although Abdiqassim is very religious, he should not be regarded as a fundamentalist and it may be the intention of the Somaliland and Puntland authorities to discredit him in the eyes of the West, and Ethiopia, which traditionally has concerns about militant Islam in the region.

### **3.2.2 Position of North East Somalia (Puntland)**

The Puntland administration was initially willing to participate in the Arta conference, but most of its delegation withdrew early in the proceedings. However, a few members of the delegation remained at the conference, led by Hassan Abshir, who was Puntland's Minister for Home Affairs. Abshir became the chairman of the Arta conference. Puntland's President Abdullahi Yusuf saw Abshir's continued participation in the conference as a challenge to his authority. Yusuf has stated that he will only talk with Abdiqassim if he withdraws his claim to be President of all Somalia, makes various amendments in Puntland's favour to the transitional charter drawn up at Arta and de-recognises the delegates from Puntland who remained at Arta.

A large number of the delegates from the north-east that remained at the Arta conference have been able to return to Puntland without arrest, although this may possibly be because they have supporters backed by militia to defend them against the Puntland authorities if necessary. There have been limited skirmishes around Galkayo between supporters and opponents of the Arta conference but these have been contained so far. It was reported in September 2000 that several commanders in Puntland had been dismissed for failing to arrest people returning from the Arta conference.

Wayne Long considered it likely that Abdiqassim would appoint a Prime Minister from the Darod clans to balance the interests of the main Somali clan-families. Abdullahi Yusuf had been suggested as a possible Prime Minister, despite his hostile public stance towards the Arta conference. Another possible Darod contender for the post was Hassan Abshir. Both Yusuf and Abshir are Majerteen but from different sub-clans. There was thus scope for a serious split in

Puntland within the Majerteen clan. In October 2000 Abdiqassim appointed a former industry minister under Siad Barre, Ali Khalif Galayadh, a Darod from the Dulbahante clan, to be Prime Minister. Potential remains, however, for a border conflict south of Galkayo, where Hawiye clans, who have generally supported the Arta process, populate the area bordering Puntland.

### **3.2.3 Prospects for a central authority in Somalia**

All representatives of the UN agencies considered that it is much too early to predict whether or not Abdiqassim will be successful in establishing a central government for Somalia with any meaningful authority. Much will depend on whether he is able to establish his authority in Mogadishu at an early date, and whether the authorities in Somaliland and Puntland can be brought into the process. A place in the peace process also needs to be found for the leaders of armed clan-factions, although all the representatives of the UN agencies stressed that the power and influence of the so-called "warlords" has diminished noticeably in the past two years, and the Arta peace process is important because it has placed great importance on the role of civil society. Nevertheless, all UN sources consulted by the delegation strongly underlined the need to take a "wait and see" approach to the political developments in Somalia.

David Stephen considered that, in the short term, Abdiqassim's main aim will be to establish an administration with real authority in southern and central Somalia, based possibly initially in Baidoa but moving at an early date to Mogadishu, with Somaliland and Puntland remaining outside the Arta process for the time being but to be included at a later date. Both Somaliland and Puntland have indicated that they will not negotiate seriously with Abdiqassim until he has pacified the south and established his authority there.

David Stephen outlined to the delegation what he considered to be the best case - worst case scenarios for the Arta process in coming months. The best case scenario is one in which Abdiqassim establishes a civil authority in Mogadishu, pacifying the "warlords" and bringing stability to southern and central Somalia. Somaliland and Puntland will, realistically, remain outside the Arta process for the foreseeable future. The worst case scenario would see Abdiqassim and the TNG failing to establish control in Mogadishu, with southern and central Somalia remaining in a state of turmoil, but also seeing the stability of northern Somaliland and Puntland threatened at the same time.

## **3.3 Security Situation**

### **3.3.1 General**

A UN source informed the delegation that at the moment there is no large-scale violence in Somalia, only highly localised incidents. The source indicated though that tensions exist in certain areas arising from the developments at Arta. In Galkayo, Puntland, for example, Majerteen clan supporters of Puntland President Abdullahi Yusuf are strongly opposed to the Arta process whereas the Hawiye clan Habr Gedir south of Galkayo is in favour. There is also some potential for tension or conflict in the disputed Darod-populated Sool and Sanaag regions of eastern Somaliland, claimed by Puntland, if Puntland were to join the Arta process in the future but Somaliland remained outside. Mogadishu, the prospective seat of the Transitional

National Government (TNG), with the majority of the warlords against the new government, is a potential tension area and continues to see sporadic violence. The Baidoa area could also see tensions, as the RRA and the Rahanweyn clan elders are split over support for the Arta process and the TNG.

According to the UN Somalia Monitor, October 2000 edition Somalia continues to be divided by a combination of widespread endorsement of the TNG well as widespread tension relating to the peace process. There are persistent but still unconfirmed reports that there is opposition support for an alliance of regional authorities consisting of Somaliland, Puntland, a yet unformed "Jubaland" and a yet unformed "Hawiyeland". Allegedly, this alliance would have both a political as well as military component.

The UN Somalia Monitor adds that a four-man delegation from the Marehan-based Somali National Front (SNF) central committee has returned from consultations in Ethiopia, and has joined the RRA and General Morgan's Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) for negotiations in Baidoa.

Since the peace conference in Arta, Djibouti, the relationship between the Ethiopian government and the interim government of Somalia has become somewhat strained. The IRIN Update on the Horn of Africa reported on 15 and 16 November 2000 that President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan of Somalia is visiting Ethiopia on 16 November 2000. He is expected to meet Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to discuss the relationship between the two countries. The Ethiopian government postponed the trip. Somali government sources have said that Abdiqassim is expected to request the Ethiopian government to help establish stability in Somalia, and to seek assurances that Ethiopia would not support Somali factions opposed to his new government. Diplomatic sources said Ethiopia would want a commitment from the new Somali government that Somalia would not be used as a base for attacks on Ethiopia by armed groups opposed to the Ethiopian government. The relations between the new Somali government and the Ethiopian government have been strained by the presence of Ethiopian troops in Gedo region in south-western Somalia, and in the South-Central regions of Bay and Bakool, diplomatic sources told IRIN. Ethiopia has also been accused of supporting faction leaders opposed to the new government in Somalia. According to CNN (19 November 2000), Somali Foreign Minister Ismail Hurreh Buba said talks in Addis Ababa with Ethiopian Government officials had "cleared all suspicions" between the two Horn of Africa states.

According to the IRIN Update on the Horn of Africa (16 November 2000), many of the Mogadishu-based faction leaders [opposed to the TNG] are currently in Yemen at the invitation of President Ali Abdullah Salih. Somali interim President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan is also expected to visit Yemen soon. President Salih has been trying to mediate between the faction leaders and the new government, but this is the first attempt to bring the two sides together for direct talks.

Bernard Harborne informed the delegation that UN access in southern Somalia is presently limited to Bay, Bakool and Gedo regions. The UN hopes to be able to resume operations in Belet Weyne, Hiran region, soon. Even if the TNG is able to establish itself in Mogadishu in the near future, the UN agencies do not envisage being able to re-open their offices in Mogadishu immediately.

### **3.3.2 North West Somalia (Somaliland) and North East Somalia (Puntland)**

The security situation in and between Somaliland and Puntland remains good and no major conflict is expected between the two authorities over the disputed Sanaag and Sool regions in eastern Somaliland, although this might change if Puntland were to enter the Arta process without Somaliland. Bernard Harborne stressed that the UN continues to operate freely in both Somaliland and Puntland and work with the administrations there and will continue to do so, whatever developments arise from the Arta process in central and southern Somalia. However, tensions lie beneath the surface in both territories and there is considerable opposition to the position taken by the Somaliland and Puntland authorities to the Arta conference.

According to the IRIN Update on the Horn of Africa (15 November 2000) a demonstration in Hargeisa, Somaliland, on 11 November 2000 resulted in two deaths as a crowd of people were protesting against the arrest of Sultan Mohamed Abdulkadir of the Idagale sub-clan of the Isaaq. Abdulkadir was arrested on his return from Djibouti, where he attended the Somali peace conference. He is an elected member of Somalia's TNA. The source added that "the Somaliland authorities are strongly opposed to the Djibouti process and have arrested people who attended the conference". More than 60 people were arrested following the demonstration. On 21 November 2000 the same source reported that Somaliland's President Egal had pardoned Mohamed Abdulkadir and released him from prison. Decrees have been issued by Egal pardoning those who participated in the Djibouti talks, on condition that they renounce the Djibouti process. According to IRIN the BBC has reported that those arrested in connection with the demonstration on 11 November 2000 have all been pardoned and released.

### **3.3.3 Hawiye clans in central Somalia (Galgaduud, Hiran & the Shabelle regions)**

David Stephen informed the delegation that, while pleased that the President selected by the TNA is a Hawiye, the Hawiye clans nevertheless remain at odds with each other. Wayne Long advised that there are on-going disputes within the Hawiye down to "sub-sub-sub-clan" level. There have been major clashes in the territory between Jowhar and Belet Weyne between the Hawadle and Gaaljaal clans. In Mogadishu most Abgal sub-clans are fighting each other, the Habr Gedir sub-clan Sa'ad is split in two and the Murosade occasionally clash with the Habr Gedir sub-clan Suleiman and the Habr Gedir sub-clan Ayr. The Galgaduud region is, however, calm.

Generally, rival Hawiye groups are seeking to bolster their positions ahead of any lasting settlement that may follow from the Arta peace process, although at present most of the Hawiye armed factions, other than Ali Mahdi's Abgal-based USC/SSA, have been resolutely opposed to Arta and Abdiqassim.

Kalunga Lutato, Head of Somali Operations, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Branch Office for Kenya, considered Hiran region to be part of the Central and Southern Somalia "problem area" because of the clashes that have occurred there between rival Hawiye clans; Hiran region contains pockets of insecurity. He said that UNHCR does not consider Hiran region sufficiently secure for "promoted returns", which take place only to the areas north of Galkayo, i.e. to Somaliland and Puntland. South of Galkayo UNHCR only supports "facilitated returns" on an individual basis, under which those who express the wish to return



are given basic assistance and are fully informed of the security situation and the risks inherent in return.

Wayne Long informed the delegation that clashes in Hiran region have occurred between the Hawiye clans Hawadle and Gaaljaal in the Belet Weyne area. There is no immediate prospect of reconciliation between the Hawiye clans in Hiran. Bernard Harborne did, however, inform the delegation that the UN hoped to be able to re-establish its presence in Belet Weyne soon. Most recently the UN has reported that a peace agreement between the conflicting parties has been concluded and that the agreement seems to hold. According to the UN Somalia Monitor, October 2000, Belet Weyne and the immediate area remain quiet and peaceful. The Governor and elders have committed themselves to support the TNG. They have the support of what appears to be most Somali residents of the Hiran region. The peace agreement between the Hawadle and the Gaaljaal continues to hold.

Wayne Long furthermore explained that a three-sided power struggle is taking place in the Lower Shabelle regions, where the rich agricultural lands have been much fought over in recent years. Habr Gedir occupiers, who have held much of the area since the mid-1990s, have exploited indigenous clans and minorities. Much of Aideed's funding comes from banana plantations in the Shabelle regions. The Shari'a court militias that have emerged as a powerful force in the past two years are a third element in the struggle for power in the Shabelle regions. The court militias are usually Habr Gedir-based but are in direct conflict with the clan-based militia of Aideed and there have also been clashes between different court militias, even though militia members have come from the same clan.

### **3.3.4 Bay and Bakool Regions**

All representatives of the UN agencies informed the delegation that there are still some divisions within the RRA over how much support to give to Abdiqassim's new administration. Originally there were plans to base the TNG in Baidoa, at least initially before a move to Mogadishu.

According to a UN source the very recent history of conflict with the Hawiye, particularly Hussein Aideed's Habr Gedir militia, has left some Rahanweyn leaders reluctant to sacrifice recent gains in favour of a government led by a Hawiye. Ethiopian forces remain in Bay and Bakool regions backing the RRA.

The Baidoa area could see tensions, as the Rahanweyn elders and the RRA are split on the matter of support for the TNG. The Rahanweyn elders support the TNG but the RRA leadership is against it. According to the UN Somalia Monitor, Baidoa continues to be politically and militarily tense. On 4 November 2000 the RRA arrested 17 traditional Rahanweyn leaders who support the TNG. Over the following weekend, this led to two armed confrontations between the RRA and militia controlled by Rahanweyn elders, resulting in two deaths. Several Rahanweyn elders are reported to be on the run in the bush. Although he remains opposed to the TNG, RRA number two Sheikh Aden has reportedly strongly criticised the military leader of the RRA, Hasan Muhammad Nur 'Shatigaduud', over this action.

IRIN Update on the Horn of Africa reports on 16 November 2000 that confusion affecting loyalties and decision-making within the RRA in Baidoa has led to a deterioration in security.

Sources in Baidoa told IRIN that reported sackings of local officials were reflective of the "indecision" of Hasan Muhammad Nur 'Shatigaduud'. According to IRIN's source, the Governor of Bay region, Muhammad Ali Adan, has been dismissed as well as the RRA liaison officer and the commander of the militia.

Hasan Muhammad Nur 'Shatigaduud' announced his opposition to the TNG after initially being elected a TNA member at the Arta peace conference. He travelled to New York with the new Somali President, but later returned to Baidoa, withdrew his support, and arrested those who attended the Arta elections for the TNA. Sources in Baidoa told IRIN that insecurity in the town had increased with militia "getting out of hand" and shooting around the town. Roadblocks had sprung up near the town.

### **3.3.5 Mogadishu (Benadir Region)**

Armed clashes and banditry have continued in Mogadishu. All the representatives of UN agencies that met with the delegation stressed that one of Abdiqassim's earliest priorities will be to establish an effective police force in Mogadishu and demobilise the existing clan-based militias in the city, essential if his administration is to be able to relocate there from Arta.

David Stephen and Wayne Long informed the delegation that Abdiqassim has appointed a security committee under General Mohamed Nur Galaal, a Habr Gedir, and General Jil'ao, an Abgal who is close to Ali Mahdi, to oversee the establishment of a new police force. The important task of demobilising the Hawiye militia is therefore in the hands of a professional Habr Gedir-Abgal partnership. General Galaal was a member of the former national police force, a respected body, and is not considered clan-minded.

A recruitment drive for at least 4,000 officers for a new Mogadishu police force began in September 2000. Faction leaders including Hussein Aideed, Musa Sude and Osman Ali Ato reacted by threatening to prevent the deployment of any new police force in territory that they control. There is strong business backing for the new police force and the Chairman of the South Mogadishu Shari'a court declared his support for it. Some Shari'a courts, however, have declared their unwillingness to have their militias incorporated into the new force because they oppose the inclusion of members of the "warlord" militias in the same force. An attack later in September 2000 by Aideed's forces in an area of Mogadishu's Bermuda district controlled by Ali Mahdi was seen as a setback to Abdiqassim's plans for restoring order to the capital.

Two supporters of the TNG have been killed in Mogadishu. General Yusuf Talan was killed on 18 October 2000 shortly after he had been appointed as head of the committee on disarmament. Hasan Ahmed Elmi, a member of the TNA, was killed on 12 November 2000. In both cases no-one claimed responsibility for the murder.

According to the UN Somalia Monitor, October 2000, Mogadishu is quiet, but politically and militarily tense. Random banditry continues. Opposition forces remain in control in key areas, including Villa Somalia - the seat of the government - and there is still risk to guests of the government. The TNG Defence Minister Abdullah Baqor Musa "King Kong" has called for former Somali Army members to assemble at bases near Mogadishu for duty. By mid-November 2000 the UN had received reports to the effect that 10,000 men had responded to the call.

### **3.3.6 Gedo region**

Wayne Long informed the delegation that Gedo region is calm and is one of the quieter regions in southern Somalia. It is also agriculturally productive. The security situation at present allows UN staff to move freely in the area without escort and it is possible to drive from Mandera in Kenya via Luuq as far as Baidoa. Ethiopian forces may be found in territory up to 100 km inside Somalia and they effectively keep the peace in the area where the borders of Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya meet, mainly in around the towns of Luuq, Dulo and Belet Hawe. While Ethiopia is not in direct control of this territory, its forces will intervene if the security situation deteriorates there. The Marehan-based Somali National Front (SNF) faction has district chiefs in the north of Gedo but its position is somewhat weaker in southern Gedo, where Islamic fundamentalist influence remains. From a purely security point of view, Marehan and even Bantu could be repatriated in safety to Gedo.

According to the UN Somalia Monitor the Ethiopian forces were still in Gedo region in October 2000. Their combined strength is estimated to be approximately 300 troops and they are based in Belet Hawe, Luuq and Dulo. Reports indicate that they have stepped up patrolling recently in terms of both size and intensity, but the Gedo region remains quiet.

### **3.3.7 Kismayo and the far south**

Wayne Long informed the delegation that Kismayo and the area south to the border with Kenya remain in a chaotic state and are very unsafe. Many people have fled Kismayo city. Clashes between Marehan and Ogaden forces, and in-fighting between rival Marehan clans, continue along the southern border with Kenya. The far south of Somalia is also prone to Islamic fundamentalist activity.

## 4. Introduction to the minority groups in Somalia

### 4.1 Historical background

Several representatives of the minority groups stressed that most of the so-called minority groups in fact constitute the original population groups of Somalia, who were driven to the fringes of Somalia when the major Somali clans expanded southward. Some of these groups consider the civil war of the 1990s and its aftermath as a next, and for some groups final, phase in this process of driving the original population groups from Somalia.

Historical claims and grievances play an important role in current political debates in Somalia. Moreover, interpretation of history is itself a contentious political issue. Descriptions of the historical backgrounds of Somali minority groups and clans are based only partly on historical facts, while another part is based on myths that serve to define the identity and/or political allegiance of the group or clan. This explains why there may exist different versions of the history of Somalia, according to the different actors at different times on the Somalia scene.

In the tenth or eleventh centuries, Somali clans pushed into the eastern Horn of Africa, first northward from southern Ethiopia, and then southward into the inter-riverine regions. At the time Oromo and other pastoral tribes as well as hunter-gatherer groups, such as the Eyle, inhabited the Somali interior. *Bantu* communities farmed along the river valleys. Along the coast, several ancient trading cities had been established since the ninth century by a mix of Arab, Persian and other communities who developed their own ethnic identities as *Benadiri*. The *Bajuni*, a Swahili fishing people, also lived on the southern coast.

In the inter-riverine regions between the Juba and Shabelle rivers, the Digil-Rahanweyn clan, composed primarily of other clans absorbed into the lineage as they settled, adopted a sedentary, agro-pastoral lifestyle.

The southward expansion of the Somali clans accelerated again in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, when clans from the central and north-eastern regions, probably responding to population pressures in their marginal, arid lands, crossed the Juba river and migrated all the way into northern Kenya. At the same time, Somali populations along the Benadir coast imported slaves from East Africa to provide labour for a rising slave-based grain export economy along the lower Shabelle river. Descendants of those slaves, along with remnants of the original Bantu farming populations, constitute the Jarer (Jereer) or Bantu minorities that populate agricultural villages in much of the Shabelle and Juba river valleys.

This history of, often violent, migration left several important legacies to the Somalia of Siad

Barre. First, it produced a dominant Somali culture as well as universal adherence to Islam. Yet, significant diversity existed beneath the surface of what appeared a highly homogeneous society. The ancient coastal populations retained their distinct ethnic identities outside the Somali lineage. Bantu communities, though usually affiliated with Somali clans, were considered a low-status ethnic group and continued to endure racial prejudice. The more settled, agro-pastoral Rahanweyn clans of the inter-riverine areas were significantly different in culture, political organisation and language from their nomadic cousins. Siad Barre's political ideology of Somali nationalism and equality tended to mute these differences and draw members of minority groups into co-operation with the regime. Since the collapse of the state in 1991, however, these ethnic distinctions have vigorously reasserted themselves. The Rahanweyn, Bantu and coastal populations were the main victims of both a famine and a civil war imposed on them by the dominant pastoral clans. Large numbers of these groups subsequently fled the country. In the past twenty years the position of these groups, who traditionally are not armed and who fall outside the Somali clan law of blood compensation, has remained precarious, especially in the conflict areas.

## **4.2 Present situation of minority groups in Somalia**

During the civil war the minority groups of Somalia were among the most vulnerable and victimised populations in the country. These groups did not have any militia as most major Somali clans did. Generally members of the various minority groups were and still are unarmed and they were very often victims of the killings, lootings, rapes, abductions, exclusions, displacements and other forms of aggression committed by members of the major Somali clan-based militias. This was and still is the case in parts of central and southern Somalia.

Some of the minority groups sided with, or have been forced to side with, various militias during the civil war years and some also sided with, or have been accused of having sided with, the regime of Somalia's former dictator Siad Barre. When war anarchy broke out in central and southern Somalia these minority groups faced severe retribution and acts of revenge from the militias that had been fighting the Siad Barre regime. According to Cassanelli some of these minority groups were even subject to waves of invasions by successive militias (Cassanelli, 1995, p. 7).

Dr Adam Abdelmoula, Human Rights Officer, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Nairobi, informed the Danish Immigration Service in August 2000 that there are four main human rights concerns in Somalia, namely the status of the minorities, the plight of the displaced, the status of women and the situation of civil society groups under the control of the "warlords".

The Somali minority populations are not evenly distributed throughout Somalia. There is a concentration of minority groups in the central and southern parts of Somalia, especially in urban centres along the coastline and along the two main rivers, Shabelle and Juba. In the urban centres of Mogadishu, Merka, Brava, Afgoye and Kismayo one may find the remains of what used to be functioning minority communities with their own cultural identity. Also, along the two rivers a large Bantu population still live as agriculturalists, although they have been under heavy pressure from the major Somali clans to hand over their agricultural land to

members of these clans. Inland in Somalia one may find other minority populations including various religious groups such as the Ashraf, and also the Midgan groups who have special occupational skills.

Kalunga Lutato, Head of Somali Operations, UNHCR-Nairobi, informed a member of the delegation that although members of minority groups in Somalia are, at the present time, generally not individually targeted by members of the major Somali clans or their militias, under certain conditions they might be. This is typically the case when a former positive relation or alliance between a minority group and a major Somali clan is subject to a change as a result of a shift in the local power balance between major Somali clans and their militias.

Such changes of relations between major clans and minority groups still occur in Somalia. A recent example of this took place in June 1999 when a so-called "alliance", or understanding, between the Bajuni minority group in southern Somalia and General Morgan's Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) militia broke down with the defeat of the SPM forces and the conquest of Kismayo by an unusual alliance of the Aideed-controlled Somali National Alliance (SNA) militia and the Marehan-based Somali National Front (SNF) militia. The Bajuni communities in Kismayo and on the Bajuni islands suffered from serious suppression and repeated looting by the allied SNA/SNF forces. Kalunga Lutato explained that some of the Bajuni fled all the way to Bosasso in North East Somalia (Puntland) while those that stayed behind sent an appeal dated 26 September 2000 to the UNHCR office in Nairobi for assistance, stating that their islands and property were being looted repeatedly by the Somali militias.

Kalunga Lutato explained that minority groups are especially vulnerable to fluctuations in the local power balance, as they are mostly unarmed and totally dependent for their protection on a major Somali clan-militia. If that protection disappears they are at the mercy of their new "masters". This situation applies, for example, to a number of the Bantu communities along the Shabelle River, especially those in Lower Shabelle region.

Another aspect of vulnerability among the minority populations in Somalia is that there is no national government with institutions to protect these populations against the militias and individual Somalis. Kalunga Lutato gave an example of such vulnerability among the Bravanese. The Bravanese did not normally intermarry with members of the main Somali clans or other groups and consequently their own distinct ethnicity was fairly well preserved. They were, in a way, an isolated and distinct people and their property, and their women, were beyond the reach of members of the Somali clans. When the state collapsed in 1991 and the Bravanese lost their "protection" from the central government they soon became targets for various militias that raged through the coastal areas of central and southern Somalia. The militias especially targeted Bravanese women and many were raped or forced into marriage with non-Bravanese Somalis. The Bravanese women were seen as "attractive" to the Somali militias in the sense that before the collapse of government they were "inaccessible" but when the government fell they were easy victims.

Kalunga Lutato stressed that in order to deal with asylum claims from members of minority groups in Somalia it is important to understand what kind of persecution a minority group has experienced during the war. It is important to know what has happened to them in Somalia. Groups such as the Bantu who have lost their property and land are unlikely to be able to

return to Somalia in the foreseeable future. That is also why the UNHCR is in the process of resettling Bantu refugees currently in Kenya in other countries such as the United States. Should the situation in Somalia become "normalised" and the threats against members of the minority groups be stopped some of the "minority" refugees should be able to return home. However, a settlement of the whole question of private ownership of property in Somalia, especially houses and land, will be crucial for such a normalisation to take place.

Wayne Long, Chief Security Officer, UNDP-Somalia, considered that the minorities in Somalia are generally not in control of their own lives. Even in northern Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland) the dominant Isaaq and Majerteen clans effectively determine the position of the minorities. Small groups of Midgan (Gaboye) are living in both Somaliland and Puntland but they have little influence with the authorities on matters concerning their own communities. In Somaliland the minorities have a small representation in the Parliament, but in real terms their influence is extremely limited.

Wayne Long emphasised that minorities can rarely challenge the dominant Somali clan militias on a military basis, as they have no military capability of their own. One exception to this is the Bimaal, who he described as a "neo-Somali" group, part of the Dir clan-family but of mixed Arab ancestry, who have no organised militia but are able to assemble small armed groups to challenge Habr Gedir dominance. Also, some Bantu communities along the Shabelle river, who have been continually losing their traditional lands and properties to encroaching Somali clans, have been able to assemble small defensive groups against predatory Somali clan militias.

The transitional charter agreed at the Arta peace conference in Djibouti provides for the establishment of a land commission. However, Wayne Long estimated that it might take a very long time before the land issue is resolved in Somalia, maybe even as long as 50 years. He added that a fact to take into consideration in regard to the land issue is that many of the present "soldiers" in the militias are mostly from the rural areas and many were nomads.

According to Wayne Long, Bantu working on plantations in the south live in a situation akin to slavery. Bantu have no bargaining power against the main Somali clans, particularly the Hawiye in Lower Shabelle and the Darod in Lower Juba. In most southern and central areas there is not even a vague pretence of rights or representation for minorities, with the exception of a few isolated areas where the power of Somali clan militias and the Shari'a courts is limited, such as Qorioley and Brava. In Brava, Habr Gedir control, established in the mid-1990s, weakens at times. In the past two to three months much of Aideed's militia force has moved back towards Mogadishu, in anticipation of a power struggle in the capital in the wake of developments at Arta. At times such as this, when militia power diminishes, the Bravanese are able to resume some degree of control over their lives. Some local authority is able to assert itself, providing it is not seen as a direct threat to Aideed's overall position. Bravanese may even be able to regain property taken by Habr Gedir occupiers although such regained property is always liable to be retaken when militia control reasserts itself.

Some Bajuni were resettled on their traditional islands south of Kismayo by UNHCR two years ago, but Wayne Long informed the delegation that returnees have not fared well. Somalis from dominant clans have harassed returnees and the area is also prone to Islamic

fundamentalist activity. Bajuni returnees have little control over their lives on the islands and it has been reported that dominant Somali clans even control their water supply. The delegation held a meeting with elders from the Bajuni clan who stressed that the position of returnees to the islands was hopeless and many had made their way back to Kenya.

A UN source in Nairobi estimated that in the present situation there are no longer any generic threats to any of the minority groups in Somalia. But the delegation was also told that the Reer Hamar community of Mogadishu and the Bravanese community of Brava have almost ceased to exist in Somalia. They have been dispersed, number a few thousand at the most along the southern coast, and have nothing to go back to. The same source added that the new government (the TNG established at the Arta peace conference in Djibouti) would be seen not as a government of the minorities but as a government of the victors.

A UN source informed the delegation that while Midgan (also referred to as Gaboye in northern Somalia) suffered during the civil war, they are now safe in Somaliland and Puntland. Some Gaboye work for UN projects in Somaliland. Their position is similar in southern and central Somalia. Midgan from the south might be able to relocate to the north without being threatened, although they might find themselves in conflict with northern Midgan (Gaboye) for the same jobs.

Finally, several sources pointed to the latest political developments in Somalia and emphasised that for the first time in Somali history the minority populations of Somalia are representing themselves in a national parliamentary assembly (the TNA) although the assembly is not yet established firmly in Somalia. During the Djibouti conference the minority communities were allotted 29 seats in the TNA. A few of the minority communities such as the Shekhal have been included in the Somali clan with which they are attached or affiliated. The Shekhal is included in with the Hawiye clan-family's TNA seat allocation. But most of the minority communities are being represented in the TNA through their own group, the so-called "Alliance Clans Community", which has 29 seats in the assembly.

### **4.3 Somali minority refugees in Kenya**

Several representatives of the minority groups interviewed drew the delegation's attention to the present difficult situation of their groups in Kenya, since the closure of the coastal camps for Somali minorities in 1997 (e.g. the Bajuni, the Bantu and the Benadiri, see also chapters 5.5, 6.5 and 7.5).

Regarding the closure of the coastal refugee camps in Kenya in which a number of minority groups had been staying, Kalunga Lutato stated that the closing of these camps came about for a combination of reasons. In 1994 the Kenyan Government decided that the Somali refugees should leave the so-called designated camp areas near Mombasa. A large proportion of so-called minority refugees from Somalia stayed in these coastal camps. The Government found no justification for the camps to be located in the populated areas near Mombasa. The Government then designated the Dadaab refugee camp as a major place of refuge for all Somali refugees. Those that had problems in the Dadaab camps were later moved to Kakuma.

According to Perouse de Montclos the Kenyan Government policy towards refugees is to keep them in camps away from the main urban, economic and tourist centres of the country.



Furthermore they are kept in a state of dependence that is supposed to compel them to return to their homeland as soon as possible.

Kalunga Lutato explained that Somali refugees who have left their refugee camp in Kenya are no longer supported by the UNHCR. This is part of the agreement between the UNHCR and the Kenyan Government. Somali (and any other) refugees can only be assisted in the so-called designated areas, i.e. the recognised refugee camps. However, once a refugee has left the camp he or she is still under the protection of the UNHCR and is still recognised as a refugee in Kenya.

Kalunga Lutato added that according to the knowledge of the UNHCR no Somali citizen - whether a person from a minority group or a person from one of the major Somali clans - recognised as a refugee in Kenya has been deported to Somalia. He was not able, however, to exclude fully the possibility that this has ever happened.

The UNHCR has agreed with the Kenyan Government that Somali asylum applicants (and all other asylum applicants) should be provided with an ID card that states that they have a pending refugee case at the UNHCR in Kenya. But Kalunga Lutato acknowledged that it is a problem that Kenya does not register refugees.

A recent IRIN report on the security situation of Somali refugees in the Kenyan Dadaab camps is attached to this report as annex 5.

## 5. Bajuni

The delegation met with a group of elders from the Bajuni community in Nairobi. All had left the Bajuni islands in the early 1990s and had spent time in the Jomvu UNHCR camp in Mombasa before it was closed in 1997 (see also annex 6). One of the elders had returned to the Bajuni islands in the late 1990s but had since come back to Kenya. The elders are now in Nairobi as they chose not to relocate to the Kakuma camp when Jomvu closed.

### 5.1 Groups and sub-groups, geographical distribution

The Bajuni elders described the Bajuni as a united people that are not divided into sub-groups. Their community was scattered across the Bajuni islands south of Kismayo, in the city of Kismayo itself and in coastal settlements south of Kismayo to Raskamboni and the border with Kenya. Lee Cassanelli refers to small Bajuni communities in Brava and Mogadishu in addition to the population in Kismayo and the islands.

The elders stated that Kismayo was the original home of the Bajuni people. The name Kismayo translates into English as "top of the well". The Bajuni can trace their origins in Kismayo back to the thirteenth century. Some Bajuni moved to the remote islands and south along the coast towards the border with Kenya when the main Somali clans moved into the Kismayo area in the nineteenth century, although some remained in the Majengo district of Kismayo. Cassanelli comments that most anthropologists believe the Bajuni represent a mixture of Arab, Bantu, Somali and possibly Malay backgrounds.

According to the elders the Bajuni population was distributed in the following locations, running south from Kismayo to the border with Kenya:

- Kismayo (mainly in the Majengo district of the city)
- Nchoni - a coastal settlement
- Fuma Iyu Na Tini - an island
- Koyama - an island
- Chovaye - an island
- Istanbul - a coastal settlement
- Chula - the most populated island
- Ndoa - an island
- Kudai - an island (location of a police station)

- Burkavo - a town
- Raskamboni - a town (location of a former Somali navy base)

According to Perouse de Montclos the Bajuni are locally called *tiku*, and they are essentially found on the islands of Koyama, Ngumi, Chovayi or Chula and in the city of Kismayo, of which they claim paternity.

The elders described how the communities on the islands maintained close links with each other and with Bajuni communities along the coast and in Kismayo. Bajuni from the islands would usually have spent a part of the year in Kismayo, where it was essential to travel for trading fish, purchasing essential commodities, medical treatment and any official business with government bodies.

The elders estimated that before the civil war the total number of Bajuni was some 11,000, although they were not exactly sure of the number. Cassanelli estimated the number of Bajuni at perhaps 3,000 to 4,000.

With the collapse of central government in 1991 and the ensuing clan-based civil war many Bajuni fled the islands and coastal settlements and moved south to Kenya. Some Bajuni remained on the islands and even in Kismayo but during the civil war it was not possible for the Bajuni that had left for Kenya to maintain communication with those that had remained in Somalia.

## 5.2 Language

According to the elders most Bajuni speak some Somali, although the main language spoken by the Bajuni is Kibajuni, a dialect related to Swahili. The Bajuni elders advised the delegation that younger Bajuni, who have lived mainly in exile, alienated from mainstream Somali society, may have only a very limited knowledge of Somali but they stressed that they should know at least some key words in Somali as their family elders would have taught them. Bernard Harborne, Chief of the UN Co-ordination Unit for Somalia, with whom the delegation met, also stated that most Bajuni are able to speak some Somali in addition to Kibajuni.

The Bajuni elders informed the delegation that, although their language, Kibajuni, is related to Swahili, their language is very different to the Swahili dialect spoken in the areas of Kenya immediately below the Kenya-Somalia border, including the islands that continue from the Somali border down along the coast towards Mombasa, although there are some common words.

## 5.3 Socio-economic situation

### 5.3.1 Relationship with other groups and clans

The Bajuni elders considered that the Bajuni had traditionally held a low status in Somalia and were regarded as inferior by the Somali clans. The Bajuni had enjoyed very few educational or employment opportunities and most had survived as fishermen.

Perouse de Montclos considers the Bajuni as a community apart from all other Somali

populations. They do not lay claim to being Somali, Bantu or Swahili and they may even have Indonesian or Yemenite origins. Perouse de Montclos explains that even before independence the Bajuni felt marginalised and they formed a short-lived political movement, called the Fiqarini Youth. Since then the region of the Bajuni has been the scene of serious fighting between the Hawiye and the Darod clan militias. The Bajuni were on good terms with the Darod, but were accused of treachery when they refused to fight against the Hawiye. Perouse de Montclos adds that while the Bajuni organised the Darod exodus to Kenya, they were then blamed for enriching themselves and sinking refugee ships that were refused entry by the Kenyan authorities.

The Bajuni elders explained that under the Siad Barre administration Somalis had been told not to use clan names. The Bajuni had been told to refer to themselves not as Bajuni but as "jazira", meaning islanders. Despite the official policy of Siad Barre opposing clanism the term jazira enabled clan Somalis to identify the Bajuni as non-Somali. The elders explained that it was difficult at that time for Bajuni to acquire passports or seamen's certificates and other official documents and that they were discriminated against in dealings with government institutions.

The Bajuni elders made it clear that the Bajuni do not consider themselves to be a Benadiri people, although they did acknowledge that they had some links with the Bravanese people who live further along the coast past Kismayo towards Mogadishu. Trading links existed between the Bajuni and the Bravanese before the civil war. The Bajuni traded fish for various commodities with the Bravanese. One member of the Bajuni group that met with the delegation stated that his sister is married to a Bravanese man, but the Bajuni elders emphasised that such examples of intermarriage came about through the traditional trading links between the Bajuni and the Bravanese rather than from any particular kinship bond.

The UNHCR genealogical table of Somali clans and groups (annex 3) shows the Bajuni as a Bantu sub-clan. The delegation did not, however, receive information from any other source that indicated that this was the case.

The Bajuni elders stated that the Bajuni have no close links with the people in Kenya who live immediately below the Somalia-Kenya border on the coast and islands. The islanders in Kenya did assist the Bajuni when they left Somalia in large numbers in the early 1990s, before they travelled on to camps in Mombasa, but links with the islanders in Kenya have not continued since the Bajuni moved into the camps.

### **5.3.2 Occupations**

The elders informed the delegation that the principal occupation of the Bajuni was fishing in the waters around their islands in small boats. Fish were traded in coastal towns, mainly in Kismayo, although the Bajuni enjoyed trading links with the Bravanese further along the coast from Kismayo towards Mogadishu. There are a number of usually uninhabited islands in the chain of islands that run south from Kismayo to the border with Kenya. It was usual for the fishermen to remain for part of the year in small camps on some of these islands, where fish would be dried ready for trading.

Some Bajuni women worked, mainly gathering shellfish on the islands. They would not

accompany the men on the fishing boats or stay with them in the seasonal fishing camps on the uninhabited islands.

The Bajuni do not fish the waters south of the Somalia-Kenya border as to have done so would have incurred hostility from the local fishermen there and from the Kenyan Navy, which patrols the waters along the border.

Those Bajuni that had returned to the islands when the Jomvu UNHCR camp was closed in 1997 had been unable to assume their former occupations as fishermen, as the group of elders explained. Their property had been taken and they could not reclaim it from clan Somalis who occupied it. Returnees had been robbed of everything they possessed when they reached the islands and even those who had managed to resume fishing had had their nets cut and boats taken from them. In order to survive on the islands some Bajuni had attempted small-scale farming, but are always at the mercy of the Somali clans that still occupy the islands.

#### **5.4 Security and human rights situation**

The Bajuni elders informed the delegation that in the late 1980s, as Siad Barre's rule weakened, the Bajuni began to suffer more at the hands of Somali clans. Groups of Somalis mounted looting raids on the Bajuni islands. As Barre's administration collapsed in 1990 and 1991 the Bajuni were attacked by organised Somali clan militias, who wanted to force the Bajuni off the islands, particularly the Ogadeni SPM from Raskamboni and, later, Aideed's USC/SNA forces. Attacks became more severe and rape of Bajuni women was common. Bajuni property in Kismayo was occupied by the Marehan and mainly by the Majerteen on the islands. As the situation deteriorated in the civil war many Bajuni left Somalia for Kenya, the majority having left during 1992, by which time their position had become untenable.

The Bajuni elders stressed very strongly that they considered themselves unable to return to Somalia. Somali clans still occupy the islands and Kismayo remains in a state of near anarchy. Although there have been no reports of Bajuni returnees being killed, returnees have been unable to recover their property and cannot support themselves economically. The elder who had returned to the Bajuni islands when the Jomvu camp had closed in 1997 described his experiences on reaching home. He had been beaten and forced to work for no pay, only food, for clan Somalis who still occupy the islands. After two months he decided to return to Kenya, even though he knew that he would not receive any support from UNHCR as he had left the camps.

Wayne Long, Chief Security Officer, UNDP-Somalia, confirmed that the position of Bajuni returnees to the islands was very poor and that it was very hard for them to maintain themselves in the face of harassment from occupying Somali clans. He understands that Somali clans even control Bajuni water supplies on the islands.

Kalunga Lutato, Head of Somali Operations, UNHCR-Nairobi, informed a member of the delegation on 28 September 2000 that with the fall of Kismayo in June 1999 to allied SNA/SNF forces a Bajuni-SPM "alliance" was destroyed and Bajuni property on the islands was looted by SNA/SNF militias, forcing many Bajuni to flee. Some Bajuni made their way to Bosaso in Puntland. Those Bajuni that remain on the islands are still suffering as the SNA/SNF forces that took Kismayo regularly attack the islands, looting property and boats. He

added that two days earlier UNHCR had received an appeal from the Bajuni still on the islands stating that the islands were now occupied and controlled by Somali militias.

Wayne Long informed the delegation that the security situation in the far south of Somalia is chaotic and very unsafe, with clashes continuing between rival Somali clan militias. The area is also prone to Islamic fundamentalist activity. Regarding Kismayo, he described the situation there since the city's capture by SNA/SNF forces as "hell".

## 5.5 Bajuni refugees in Kenya

The Bajuni elders informed the delegation that most Bajuni who fled Somalia in 1992 had initially travelled to Mombasa and were accommodated there or in the Marafa camp near Malindi. From 1993 they were accommodated at their own request in their own camp at Jomvu. In 1997 the Kenyan Government asked UNHCR to close Jomvu camp. The Bajuni elders stated that UNHCR, at the time, considered that conditions in the Bajuni islands were sufficiently good for the Bajuni to be able to return there. UNHCR therefore gave the Bajuni in Jomvu the choice of relocation to the Kakuma camp, inland in the Rift Valley, or returning to the Bajuni islands in Somalia. UNHCR encouraged Bajuni elders to return to the islands, as this would then encourage other Bajuni to follow.

Kalunga Lutato explained that Jomvu camp was closed for a combination of reasons. Firstly, the Kenyan government decided that Somali refugees should leave the designated areas along the coast as there was no justification for camps to be sited in populated areas, such as around Mombasa. The Kenyan government designated the Dadaab refugee camp as the major place of refuge for Somalis. Those that had problems there were later moved to Kakuma camp. A second consideration was that up to May-June 1999 the areas of origin in Somalia of some minorities, such as the Bajuni, were seen by UNHCR as being safe for returns. A large majority of Bajuni were therefore repatriated to the Bajuni islands. Kalunga Lutato stated that UNHCR was sorry that some Bajuni had not opted for repatriation as the closure of the camps on the coast meant that some Bajuni had to transfer to Kakuma camp in north-western Kenya, an inland area far away from the sea and the normal Bajuni environment. UNHCR had believed that the Bajuni would only stay in Kakuma for a temporary period but in June 1999 the allied forces of the SNF and Aideed's SNA took over Kismayo and expelled General Morgan's SPM forces, as a result of which UNHCR decided that further returns to the Bajuni islands were not possible.

According to the Bajuni elders some 2,500 Bajuni returned to the islands in Somalia from 1997 onwards but received no assistance other than the cost of their journey home. Those Bajuni that remained in Kenya were unhappy at the prospect of relocation to Kakuma camp. Being a coastal people they would have preferred to remain in Jomvu on the coast. The Bajuni elders stated that their position in Kenya was very poor, as UNHCR would only provide support to Bajuni who moved to Kakuma camp. The elders that met with the delegation were living in Nairobi and were reliant on donations from sympathetic religious groups and individuals.

Bernard Harborne informed the delegation that UNHCR ended the repatriation of Bajuni in 1999 after Kismayo changed hands and the security situation deteriorated in the far south of Somalia.



## 6. Bantu

The delegation met with a group of Bantu elders in Nairobi. These elders explained that normally a Somali of Bantu as well as of non-Bantu origin will refer to a Bantu as a "Jarer", which indicates that the person has strong curly hair. According to Perouse de Montclos the Bantus are also called *habash* (meaning servants) by the Somali and *shanqila* by the Ethiopian Oromo along the River Shabelle.

The American anthropologist Catherine Besteman regards the term Gosha as referring to the geographical area in which the Bantu live in the Juba Valley area. Gosha is classed as "dense jungle" and denotes the forested banks of the Juba river in Southern Somalia, i.e. the area between Kismayo and the town of Saakow. She makes a distinction between the "Gosha" or Bantu populations of the Juba Valley and the other Bantu farmers of the Shabelle Valley. She claims that the farmers of the Shabelle Valley have a distinct history and a somewhat different position in Somali society. The majority of the riverine farmers of the Juba Valley are descendants of slaves acquired by Somalis in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

According to Besteman it has been estimated that around 50,000 slaves were absorbed into the riverine areas between 1800 and 1890. During this period of expanded agricultural production in the Shabelle Valley, the more remote and forested Juba Valley remained largely uninhabited until the 1840s when the first fugitive slaves from the Shabelle Valley arrived and settled along the river. They were followed by a constant and increasing number of runaway slaves from the Shabelle Valley. Around the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century between 30,000 and 40,000 former slaves had settled in villages along the Juba river. These settlements were initially established along the lines of East African ethnic affiliations: Yao in one village, Nyasa in another, etc. Even today some villages in the Lower Juba area continue to retain a sense of ethnic distinctiveness, especially those settled by Mushunguli.

By the late 19<sup>th</sup> century settlement patterns had begun to change as affiliations with Somali clans emerged as an important force in shaping village identity. This process took place as former slaves entering the area after about 1890 began to settle in communities of people who had been enslaved to the same Somali clan. Many people that arrived in the Juba Valley around the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century had been enslaved as children or had been born into slavery and thus held only tenuous connections to their original ethnic groups. For them, Somali clan affiliation provided a degree of social organisation and identity. Affiliation with Somali clans was strengthened by the influx of so-called pastoral slaves, for example Oromo pastoralists. Somalis captured Oromo, especially women and children, during raids and wars and they became slaves or servants. Intermarriage between the Oromo and the descendants of the slaves



in the Juba Valley occurred. Later, so-called "*reer* Shabelle" immigrants began filtering into the valley, starting in the late 1920s and continuing into the 1960s. Their history is obscure, but they speak Somali, practise Islam and are closely affiliated with the Somali Ajuraan clan in their home area of Kalafu on the Shabelle River across the border in Ethiopia. Many *reer* Shabelle settled in Ajuraan-affiliated villages in the mid-valley area.

Besteman concludes from her historical sketch that it demonstrates the varied background of the people who settled the Juba Valley. These people are referred to in various terms. The derogatory term *adoon* (meaning slave) is still used to describe this population, but the more neutral term *Gosha* has become more prevalent as an inclusive identifier.

Perouse de Montclos explains that refugee status has altered the collective identity of the Gosha. The name Gosha has now been refused or left behind by the Bantu refugees in Kenya. It is considered pejorative because it refers to the "sleeping sickness" of the tsetse fly, i.e. idleness. They instead prefer to be called "Mushunguli" after one of the founders of fugitive slave communities along the Juba River.

The term *jareer* means "hard (or kinky) hair" and literally denotes hair texture and other physical characteristics such as particular bone structures and facial features, which are negatively valued by Somalis. Gosha are said to be bulkier while so-called "pure" Somalis are said to have longer, more slender fingers. But most significantly according to Besteman, the people who are *jareer* are considered more "African", as distinct from Somalis, who are considered more "Arabic". In opposition to the term *jareer* is either the term *jileec* (or *jileyc*), meaning "soft" or, more commonly, *bilis* (which is the opposite of *adoon* or "slave"). Besteman notes that Oromo descendants are not considered *jareer*, but this distinction is blurred by the fact that Oromo have intermarried with *jareer*, the descendants of the slaves.

According to Besteman the term *jareer* has its greatest significance in the cultural values embedded in being *jareer* (or "African"). It is a term that refers to history, that of non-Somali pagan slave origins, a history devalued in Somali culture and ideology. This has the effect in social terms that carrying a *jareer* identity is a denigrated status within the Somali social structure. On this basis Besteman concludes that the people of the Gosha, grouped together as *jareer*, share a lower status within Somali society.

The Bantu elders with whom the delegation met urged that the Bantu population in Somalia should not be considered as a minority population in Somalia, because, they argued, the Bantu constitute a majority in a number of regions in Somalia.

According to Perouse de Montclos the Bantu of southern Somalia represent a minority whose marginality is more easily seen. They represent less than 2% of the inhabitants of the country. Perouse describes the Bantu as made up of the descendants of slaves and Negroid groups present before the Somali migration. They are generally despised. While some succeeded in making themselves respected and in working on an equal footing with their neighbours, they do not belong to Somali lineages and are considered to be second class citizens.

## 6.1 Groups and sub-groups, geographical distribution

The Bantu elders estimated that between 30 and 40% of the population in Somalia are Bantu,

but they acknowledged that no reliable statistics exist. A UN agency in Nairobi could not confirm these figures, but considered the estimate to be a slight exaggeration while at the same time they confirmed that no reliable statistics exist concerning the figures of the various population groups in Somalia. The same agency confirmed however that the Bantu population constitutes a majority of the population in a number of districts along the two main rivers in Somalia.

According to Perouse de Montclos (1997) the Bantu population in Somalia includes nearly one hundred thousand Swahili-speaking Goshas that are sometimes called *dalgolet* ("forest people" in Somali), *molema* (or *mlima*, "mountain people" in broken Swahili), *watoro* ("runaway slaves" in Oromo) or *oji* (from the Italian word *oggi*, "today", because these Bantu were said not to think beyond the present day).

According to the Bantu elders the Bantu mainly occupy the territory between the two main rivers in Somalia, the Shabelle and the Juba, the so-called inter-riverine area of Somalia. The area covers eight regions in southern and central Somalia. The elders stated that in the regions of Middle- and Lower Shabelle, Middle- and Lower Juba, Bay, Benadir and former Upper Juba (parts of which are now in Gedo region) the Bantu population is still today actually a majority.

The Bantu elders stated that so-called Negroid (black-skinned) Benadiri are considered to belong to the Bantu population and are called "Zanj", which means black or land of the black. The Zanj intermarry with the Bantu but the other, so-called 'light-skinned', Benadir population does not intermarry with the Bantu. The Zanj are slaves of the light-skinned Benadiri.

Perouse de Montclos considers the so-called Zendj (Zanj?) as a Negroid group of pre-Somali settlers. They were referred to by Arab travellers and Swahili as Kashour ("fugitives") and Wa-Nyika ("bush people") respectively. Some were later chased away or deported out of Somalia, but others remained in Somalia as farmers, hunters, fishermen, and artisans. They live between the Shabelle and Juba Rivers in the "green" part of Somalia, especially Jalalaksi, Kurtunware, Sablale, Dujuma, Garbahare and Jowhar districts.

The term "Bantu" covers a large number of sub-groups but these groups all consider themselves as belonging to one large group, the Jarer. However, according to the Bantu elders, some Bantu groups have been "brainwashed" to such an extent that they identify themselves with the non-Bantu clans with which they have been attached for a long time.

According to the Bantu elders the Bantu population is made up of a number of lineages, some of which live in certain areas and some of which are mixed and/or have resettled in other places in Somalia. Only a few groups are distinguished by their location, such as the Mushunguli, almost all of whom live in Lower Juba region. There are a number of well-known Bantu groups that are not attached and have not been swallowed up by the non-Bantu Somali clans. All of these Bantu groups are referred to as lineage-groups:

- Shabelle
- Shiidle
- Kabole
- Mushunguli
- Gabaweyn (Garbaweyn)

- Eyle (Eile)
- Makane

There is another group of less well-known Bantu-lineages, most of which are living in the Lower and Middle Juba areas:

- Manyasa
- Miyau
- Majindo
- Makua
- Mlima
- Pokomo
- Manyika

The Bantu elders explained that many Bantu groups would readily identify themselves with the non-Bantu clan that they are attached to and a Bantu from such a group will say, for example, that he is a Hawadle or an Abgal etc. Such a person considers his identity as totally incorporated into the non-Bantu clan with which he is affiliated. The above-mentioned second group of less well-known Bantu lineages originally came from one of the first-mentioned more well-known groups but have lost their identity to other non-Bantu groups. Migration and intermarriage can also result in a situation where a Bantu will not identify himself as belonging to one of the Bantu groups.

According to Somali sources quoted by IRIN those Bantu that have assimilated themselves with the indigenous clans they live with are known as '*sheegato*', which means they are not bloodline clan members, but adopted.

The UNHCR overview distinguishes three so-called "Bantu groups": Mushunguli, Swahili and Bajuni. The Eyle are considered as a Mirifle sub-clan and the Gabawayn (Garbaweyn) as a separate minority group (see annex 3). Perouse de Montclos considers the Mushunguli and the Eyle (Eile) as Bantu groups. During its mission to Gedo region the Danish Immigration Service was informed that the Gabaweyn is a Bantu group.

A UN agency in Nairobi stated that the group identity of the Bantu population in Somalia is stronger than ever before. A person of Bantu origin will no longer automatically identify himself with one of the major Somali clans or sub-clans as the group identity of the Bantu has generally been strengthened during the civil war.

## 6.2 Language

The Bantu elders stated that a non-Bantu that has lived among the Bantu in Somalia would very often speak the same Somali dialect as the Bantu in his area. They stated that this was a result of what they described as the "cultural genocide" that the Bantu have experienced in Somalia.

Some Bantu groups have maintained their own Bantu dialect or language while others have completely lost their dialects. The Mushunguli of the Lower Juba still have their own dialect

called "kiziguua" and the Mushunguli call themselves "waziguua". Any other Somali will call them Mushunguli. According to Perouse de Montclos the Zigua are of Tanzanian origin and they claim to be the first to have arrived in the Kismayo hinterland where they settled along ethnic lines in order to preserve their culture.

Perouse de Montclos notes that only a small proportion of the Mushunguli spoke a Bantu language while in Somalia (although three quarters of those that sought refuge in Kenya wanted to "return" to Tanzania).

Quoting Somali political sources, IRIN reported on 23 November 2000 that most of the current Bantu population in the Juba valley was originally from Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique. Some of the Bantu in southern Somalia have kept their traditions and speak the language of their ancestors.

## 6.3 Socio-economic situation

### 6.3.1 Relationship with other groups and clans

Perouse de Montclos writes that the so-called Negroids (Bantu) are made up of heterogeneous communities that are relatively widespread. At independence there was a Shidle Party but no political movement was able to unite the Bantu from Somalia. Most of these communities are in fact linked to a Somali lineage but with a more or less inferior status. Those of the Shabelle River thus acknowledge the authority of Hawiye clans (the Shidle are associated with the Mobilen, the Kabole with the Molcan, the Makanne with the Badi-Addo, the Rer Issa and the Shebelle with the Ajuran). Those of the Juba River, the Gobawein, work for the Gasar Gudda of Luuq, a Rahanweyn lineage that is seen by the other Somali clans as a low Sab caste, but is considered by the Rahanweyn as being 'noble'. Along the Juba River, one also finds hunting, farming and fishing communities such as the Ribí and the Boni. The Boni, or Bon, escaped the Oromo and now pay tribute to the Somali. Also other groups along the Juba and Shabelle Rivers are despised. The Eile (Eyle) (see chapter 8) of the Bur Eibi Hills, for example, have a name that, etymologically, comes from *ei*, their hunting dog. It is important to understand that all these names are appellations and not tribes, since the Somali deny the Bantu any genealogy that would legitimise their presence in the South of the country. The Helai of Baidoa thus claim to be a homonymous Rahanweyn lineage, settled at Bur Acaba; this relationship is obviously denied by the latter.

It should be noted that the Bantu elders in Nairobi described the Bantu as the most vulnerable and most seriously affected population in Somalia. They stated that, in contrast to other so-called minority groups such as the Benadiri and Madhiban, the Bantu have no close ties to other Somalis. While the Benadiri often intermarry with other Somalis this never happens between the Bantu and other Somalis. The Bantu are afraid to speak freely in Somalia and are the only group that is totally excluded and marginalised in political, social and economic terms. They claimed that Bantu identity is being suppressed because the 'Cushistic Somalis' want to deny the original ownership of Somalia by the Bantu, who are the true indigenous people and original inhabitants of Somalia.

Former governments in Somalia employed several Benadiri and Madhiban on a high level, but

a Bantu has never held a government post as manager or as a Director-General.

The Bantu elders explained that the Siad Barre regime handed over land from Bantu to members of the Darod clans, especially in the Lower Shabelle, Middle and Lower Juba and Gedo regions, where a large number of Bantu were driven from their land. Some ended up as regular slaves on their former land, whereas some became beggars or tried to seek alternative occupations, which was difficult as they were farmers with no other skills. Some Bantu were also forcibly conscripted into the army from 1973 until the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. Large areas of Bantu land were confiscated by the Siad Barre regime and given to non-Bantu Somalis under agricultural development projects supported by foreign donors. Bantu never benefited from such development projects. Even a project where the government exempted imported agricultural equipment from taxation did not benefit the Bantu as the agricultural equipment was bought by Somalis close to the government and then sold to other non-Bantu landowners. The so-called Cushistic or Jileec Somalis have, according to the Bantu elders, established a deliberate policy of suppression and impoverishment of people of Bantu origin in Somalia. This policy was established already during the colonial period and was continued by successive governments of independent Somalia. The independent governments never handed over land to the Bantu and their policy was to keep the identity of the Bantu hidden from the outside world. The government policy was that all land belongs to the so-called "protector", meaning a dominant Somali actor.

The Bantu elders stated that the Bantu in Somalia and in exile in Kenya are not satisfied with the outcome of the Arta peace conference. They stated that the conference did not allocate a proportional number of seats in the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) to the Bantu population. 29 seats were allocated to the so-called "minority groups" (or "Alliance Clans Community", as they were referred to at Arta). When consideration was given to the division of seats among the minority groups the Bantu delegates declared that they wanted 15 seats. However, the Benadir group offered the Bantu only nine seats even though, according to the Bantu elders, the Bantu are considered to be the "majority of the minority". The situation deteriorated further as the so-called Mediating Committee headed by Dr. Rajis, a Benadir, was, according to the Bantu elders, partial and the Bantu were finally allocated only six TNA seats. The Bantu elders stated that these six seats are all occupied by what they referred to as "infamous" Bantu and the Bantu elite and intellectuals were never invited to participate in the Arta conference.

### **6.3.2 Occupations**

The Bantu communities in Somalia are typically agriculturalists, farmers or labourers on farms and plantations in the area between the Shabelle and Juba rivers in central and southern Somalia. A representative of a UN agency in Nairobi informed the delegation that the Bantu or Jareer population in Somalia know different levels of integration (or "Somalisation"), especially those living along the Shabelle River in central Somalia. Some Bantu are employed as plantation labourers and are almost in a situation of slavery. They are the only workforce available and they have no bargaining power against the main Somali clans, the Hawiye along the Shabelle River in the Lower Shabelle region and the Darod in Lower Juba. The source had no detailed information on the situation of the Bantu population in Lower Juba, southern Somalia. The Bantu are generally a resourceful people, and in North West Somalia

(Somaliland) they are working as construction workers and as watchmen. In the North West and in North East Somalia (Puntland) their position is that of an "under-clan". They are safe throughout northern Somalia and in certain cases they could even marry very poor members of one of the major Somali clans.

#### **6.4 Security and human rights situation**

The Bantu elders explained that the Bantu are unarmed and are victims of serious human rights violations. They argued that human rights violations against the Bantu population in Somalia are of such a scale that they cannot be compared to the human rights violations against other, non-Bantu, populations in Somalia. They stated that there is an important difference in addressing human rights and addressing minority rights in Somalia because the Bantu population should not be regarded as a minority group.

The Bantu elders considered Somalia as a nation to be more racist than South Africa during its apartheid period. They feel they have no assurance from any future government in Somalia that the rights of the Bantu will be protected and they have no trust in a future government. They claimed that freedom of expression does not exist for the Bantu in Somalia and their voice is not being heard. Prouse de Montclos comes to a similar conclusion when he makes a distinction between the Bantu and the so-called Sab castes (the Digil, mainly the Tunni and the Rahanweyn). The camel-herding clans of northern Somalia despise the latter, but they are still part of the Somali lineage system and they will still be able to negotiate "when the hour of reconciliation arrives in Somalia". Minorities, who are not part of the lineage system, the Bantu and the 'half castes' "argue that they will never benefit from any compensation mediation procedures amongst the Somali clans".

Reporting on the planned resettlement of Somali Bantu in the United States, IRIN (23 November 2000) quotes humanitarian sources as saying that the minority Somali Bantu are "treated like second class citizens" by Somalis. Insecurity and the civil war in Somalia over the last decade made the group even more vulnerable, according to the source.

Enclosed as annex 7 is a document written for the delegation by Abdulkadir Moallim Omar, a Bantu elder from Luugh-Ganaane District in Gedo region who was interviewed by the delegation in Nairobi. The document details the origins of the Bantu peoples in Somalia, their history and their present situation in Somalia as well as their situation as refugees in Kenya.

Regarding the situation of the Bantu in Somalia, Omar writes that:

"when rivalries began with the overthrow of the military dictatorship, the Bantus became the worst hit. The Bantus' homes and farms and animals were taken over by the different militias not to mention money and other wealth. Some of them were forced to work for the militias that took their land. They worked in conditions not better than slaves. In certain areas the Bantu women cannot go down to the river to fetch water; they have either to pay for the water or they are denied the water or raped at gunpoint. There is a silent policy of ethnic cleansing in Somalia against the Bantu that the rest of the world is turning a deaf ear to."

Omar claims that the Bantu at the farms in both the Shabelle and the Lower Juba regions of Somalia are "forced to work at these farms at gunpoint over 24 hours without food and water

most of the time. There are lots of examples of men, women and children who fainted because of hunger, thirst, and fatigue, who when they came to, were accused of pretence and shot dead as a warning to the others not to try to emulate them. Reports reaching us from Somalia claim that hundreds of Bantu young men were abducted by militias and taken to the Central regions of Mudug and Nugaal to look after the camels, when some of them tried to escape they were caught and burnt alive in front of the others. Most of them had to be bought back by their relatives - only a few managed to escape alive and reach home safely. It is commonplace in Mogadishu to take a Bantu man, woman, or family hostage and demand for ransom. Hardly any day passes without having, seeing or hearing a Bantu being killed in Mogadishu."

A UN agency informed the delegation that the Bantu population along the river Shabelle in the lower parts of Hiran region and the upper parts of Middle Shabelle region has been pushed towards the river banks to such an extent that today the Bantu live literally on the river bank itself.

A UN agency in Nairobi described the land issue in Somalia as "dynamite". They pointed out that while the Bantu population has so far been a loser in the land issue, they have never before been represented in a Somali Parliament, as they are now in the TNA. The Bantu population therefore now has more political influence than ever before in modern Somali history. Also, as a result of the civil war in Somalia a large number of Bantu fled the country and are now living in a diaspora in Kenya and in other countries. This has had the side effect that today the Bantu are better educated than ever before.

During the Dutch mission of November 1999 to Hargeisa and Puntland, an NGO source informed the mission that quite a few Bantu went to northern Somalia, especially Bosasso, where they often found work as construction workers. There had been some trouble with indigenous Puntland construction workers because the Bantu brought down wage levels. A UN source confirmed to the mission that large groups of Bantu worked in Puntland, mostly in construction. A second UN source and the Puntland authorities confirmed the presence of Bantu in Puntland. According to Somali sources quoted by IRIN (23 November 2000), Somali Bantu are almost exclusively found in the South, but many scattered during the civil war to parts of the North, where they work on buildings and take on odd jobs.

The UNCU/FSAU report on IDPs in northern Somalia mentions Bantu as one of the groups among the IDPs in northern Somalia.

## **6.5 Bantu refugees in Kenya and abroad**

The Bantu elders were of the opinion that most of the Somali refugees in Europe and America are of non-minority origin and some of them participated in human rights violations in Somalia before they left their home country. They stated that the Bantu have no economic means to travel to the EU and apply for asylum; consequently there are no Bantu seeking asylum in Europe. The Bantu in Kenya have been offered resettlement in the USA and more than 10,000 Bantu in Kenya will be resettled during 2000 and 2001. European countries have also offered resettlement of the Bantu from Kenya, but the elders stated that it is a serious problem that during negotiations between UNHCR and the receiving countries no Bantu representatives have been consulted. This has resulted in a situation that many of the resettled Bantu are not

really Bantu, but belong to other Somali groups of non-Bantu origin. The elders claimed that this has taken place in New Zealand, Australia, Europe and the USA.

The Bantu elders informed the delegation that Bantu refugees initially stayed in UNHCR refugee camps along the Kenyan coast. Today the Bantu are only to be found in the Dadaab camps (3 camps) in Kenya's North Eastern Province and in one camp in Kakuma near Turkana. About 15,000 Bantu are registered in these camps. Very difficult humanitarian and security conditions in the camps have made many Bantu leave the camps and settle in Nairobi, Mombasa and other urban centres in Kenya. These persons are no longer under the protection of the UNHCR and they are vulnerable to harassment from the Kenyan police and risk being deported to Somalia against their will. According to the Bantu elders the London-based Minority Rights Group has reported such incidents. It is not only the Bantu that have these problems in Kenya but all Somalis that do not belong to the major Somali clans.

The Bantu elders made it clear that they will not return to Somalia before they are convinced that they will have a just government with a fair Bantu representation in the Parliament. However, the elders stated, no Bantu believes that justice will come to Somalia and that the Bantu will ever be considered as equal citizens in Somalia; so long as policies in Somalia are made by non-Bantu Somalis there will never be justice for the Bantu. For this reason, the Bantu community appeals to be accepted as refugees abroad. The Bantu elders argued that the United Nations and other international organisations have an obligation to consult the Bantu population to a much higher degree than it is the case today. They believe that the present UN system relates to a large degree only to those who have the power in Somalia and overlooks the suppressed. They feel that if a new government is formed in Somalia the Bantu will face even larger problems than before because international donors and organisations will deal with the government rather than with the minority groups. They believe that the reason why the US Government has accepted to Bantu for resettlement in the USA is exactly because they have realised that the Bantu refugees will never be able to return to Somalia. The Bantu elders believe that UNHCR will not accept this fact because UNHCR will then lose its strong position in Kenya and Somalia. The elders stated that UNHCR executives enjoy good relations with the Somali warlords and elders who are in control of areas where UNHCR has operations. The elders claimed that UNHCR gives consultation fees to the warlords and the elders in such areas in order to operate there, especially in south-western Somalia. Programmes intended to facilitate the repatriation of refugees have ended up in the hands of people connected with the warlords.

See also annex 7 in which Abdulkadir Mallim Omar states that the situation of the Bantu in the refugee camps in Kenya is no better than their situation in Somalia. He writes that the Bantu in the refugee camps, especially in the camps at Dadaab, Ifo and Hagar-Dheer, are being directly or indirectly intimidated. According to Omar the Bantu in the refugee camps in Kenya claim that Somalis from the main clans are posing as Bantu in order to qualify for resettlement.



## 7. Benadir

### 7.1 Groups and sub-groups, geographical distribution

The delegation met in Nairobi with three groups of Benadiri: a group of Benadiri elders from Mogadishu and Merka (belonging to the Ashraf, Duruqbe and Morshe sub-clans), a group of Ashraf elders from Mogadishu, Merka and Qorioley, and a group of Benadiri from Brava, the so-called Bravanese (or Barawan).

From discussions with these groups it transpired that the term Benadiri is used by these groups to indicate the coastal population of Somalia roughly between Mogadishu and Kismayo, who share an urban culture and who are of mixed origin (Persian/Portuguese/Arabian/Swahili/Somali), separate from the major Somali clans. The groups with whom the delegation met advised that the Bajuni, who live in Kismayo and on the coast and islands further southwards, are not considered to be a Benadiri people. Bajuni elders with whom the delegation met (see section 5 of this report) confirmed this to be the case.

According to Perouse de Montclos, the name Benadiri does not correspond to any well defined sociological reality. In the context of resettlement programmes for Somali refugees in Kenya, the Somali refugee traders of the coastal ports decided to regroup under the generic term 'Benadir', which designates greater Mogadishu. Those indigenous to this area succeeded in calling themselves 'Benadiri'.

Perouse de Montclos adds that the term Benadiri, as a community, did not fully appear before the 1990 civil war (N.B. This is also in accordance with other, UN, sources). In the spoken language, 'Benadiri' implies a cloth, 'alindi, hand woven by artisans in the city and distinguished by variously coloured stripes. Etymologically it comes from a Persian word 'bandar', which signifies 'harbour'. In the strictest sense of the word it applies to the traders who were the first inhabitants of Mogadishu but have always been seen as foreigners by the Somalis: the Bandhabow, the Morshe-Iskashato, the Abdisamad, the Sadiq Gedi, the Bafadal, the Amudi, the Duruqo, the rer Shikh, the rer Manyo, the Gudmane in Hamar Weyne district and the rer Faqi in Shingani district.'

Other sources use the names Reer Hamar or Reer Brava. Reer Hamar means people from Mogadishu (Hamar Weyne), but some sources (such as the elders interviewed by the delegation) use it to include the whole coastal population of mixed origin. Reer Brava means people from Brava, and is generally used only to indicate people from Brava of mixed origin.

Please note that the UNHCR genealogical table of Somali clans mentions the Barawan

(Bravanese), Asharaf and Reer Hamar as separate groups, without including them in the list of Minority Groups (see annex 3).

The delegation gained the impression, by comparing information from the discussions with the groups of elders it met with in Nairobi with information gathered in an earlier Danish mission and with information gathered earlier from informants by the Netherlands Embassy in Nairobi, that not all Benadiri would know all the sub-groups, and that there exist many more sub-groups than the ones mentioned by the elders in Nairobi. It also appears that sub-groups mentioned as living in one town or city quarter may have spread to other coastal towns, and sometimes to inland towns like Baidoa.

The Benadiri elders stressed that Benadiri do not put as much weight on genealogical descent as do the Somali clans. They do not count back many generations although Benadiri life is nonetheless clan-based. Each group or clan, in theory at least, traces its origins to a single male ancestor. The Benadiri elders distinguished:

- four Hamar groups:

- Qalmashube
- Dhabar Weyne
- Shanshiya
- Morshe (Moorshe)

After some discussion they added that the Bandhawaw and Reer Faqi also belonged in this category.

- five Shangani groups, e.g.:

- Amudi
- Baa Fadal
- Reer Sheich
- Abakarow

- twelve 'caps' (sub-groups) in Merka, e.g.:

- Shukereere
- Ahmed Nur
- Reer Maanyo
- Ali'iyo Mohamed
- Duruqbe
- Gameedle

- and the Ashraf.

The elders explained that before the civil war the Benadiri in Mogadishu used to live only in the quarters of Hamar Weyne, Shingani and Bondere. Now Benadiri live in all quarters of Mogadishu.

Another sub-division is made between 'light-skinned' ('gibil ad') and 'black-skinned' ('gibil madow') Benadiri.

Benadiri intermarry, but the elders stated that 'light-skinned' Benadiri do not marry 'black-skinned' Benadiri like Moorshe or Dhabar Weyne.

The delegation also held a meeting with representatives of the Ashraf (Asharaf, Asheraf, Sharifians) community in Nairobi including elders and women. They were all refugees from the coastal areas of Somalia. The Ashraf elders interviewed by the delegation readily identified themselves as Benadiri. The Ashraf elders made it clear that only one Ashraf group (or clan) exists in Somalia. However, this group is further sub-divided on the lines of their male ancestors. The Ashraf of Bay and Gedo regions (Baidoa, Hoddur, Bardera) are the same group as the Ashraf in the coastal areas. One sub-group of the Ashraf called Ashraf Sarman lives mainly in Hoddur (Bakool region), Bay region, Bardera (Gedo region) and Mogadishu. Other sub-groups called Mohammed Sharif, Sharif Ali and Sharif Ahmed live mainly in Kismayo, Merka, Bardera, Jalalaqsi, Jowhar and Mogadishu.

An NGO informant explained on an earlier occasion to the Netherlands Embassy in Nairobi that there are various sub-groups of the Ashraf, including the Sarman who reside in Bay region. According to this source, the Ashraf Sarman have the same skin colour as Somalis, while the Ashraf in Merka have light skin.

The Ashraf elders sub-divided the Ashraf in the following way:

- Hussein:

- Reesharif Magbuul
- Sharif Ahmed
- Sharif Baalawi

- Hassan:

- Mohammed Sharif
- Sharif Ali
- Sharif Ahmed
- Ashraf Sarman.

The Ashraf elders trace their origin to the Prophet Mohamed, whose daughter Fatima had two sons with Ali, named Hassan and Hussein. Any member of the Ashraf community belongs to one of these two lines of descent, from Hassan or Hussein, and any Ashraf (both females and males from the age of two) is able to identify her- or himself as belonging to one of these two lines. The Prophet Mohamed conferred the title "Sharif" upon Hassan and Hussein. Since that time, all their descendants have the name Sharif as part of their name, added to the personal name and the father's, and sometimes the grandfather's, name. From this comes the name of the group, Ashraf being the plural of Sharif. Ali had children by other wives after the death of Fatima, but they were not "Sharif".

The Ashraf elders indicated that the Ashraf are living in southern and central Somalia, especially in urban locations like Bardera, Kismayo, Baidoa, Hoddur, Merka, Brava and

Mogadishu. In Mogadishu the largest concentration of Ashraf was to be found in the Shingani district, but they also lived in Hamar Weyne. Ashraf used to live also in Ethiopia. Some Ashraf from Ethiopia became exiled in Somalia at the time of the Ogaden war in 1977. These Ashraf came from Ogaden, Oromia, Dire Dawa and Harar in Ethiopia and some of them fled Somalia in 1991-92. Those remaining in Somalia reside with other Ashraf.

UN sources confirmed that Ashraf communities are also to be found in the Ogaden district of Ethiopia.

The elders from Brava told the delegation that they consisted of two sub-groups: the Bravanese and the Tunni. Both groups are from Brava and they share to a large extent the same culture. They intermarry between their groups. However, the Bravanese consider themselves Benadiri, while the Tunni do not. The Bravanese are of Persian/Arab/Portuguese/Spanish origin. According to the Bravanese elders the Tunni belong to the Digil clan-family. They are originally from the region of Brava. However, the elders gave the delegation a copy of a letter, written by the Baravani elders in Nairobi to a number of organisations (including UNHCR, the US Immigration Department and Amnesty International) on their situation in Kenya, in which the Tunni are mentioned with the Bravanese as part of the Baravani community (see annex 8).

The UNHCR overview classifies the Tunni with the Digil (annex 3).

The Bravanese sub-divided themselves into:

- Bida
- Hatimi
- Ashraf

The Tunni explained that they are sub-divided into the Tunni Torre plus five *gamas* (sub-groups):

- Da'afarad
- Goygal
- Daqtiro
- Hayo
- Werile

Perouse de Montclos notes that some of the Tunni Torre of the hinterland claim a relationship with the Ajuran, the Gaaljaal and the Gurreh of the Hawiye clan family, while others claim a relationship with the Helai and the Hadam of the Rahanweyn clan-family. In concrete terms, they are the vassals of the Tunni Digil of the Brava Coast.

According to Perouse de Montclos, 'Reer Brava' designates a territorial community. The confusion between territory and clan or ancestral identity brought about the grouping of a much larger body of people than one would have expected from a minority group of traders of foreign origin. Historically, in Brava (like in Merka) the Arabs from Zanzibar allied with the Tunni, a Digil clan, in order to counter the Hawiye from the hinterland. Brava was the scene of numerous battles, against the Portuguese, Omanis, British, Egyptians, Italians and Somali of the interior (Rahanweyn and Dir), many of them establishing lineage. As a consequence, the

ances in the city were completely 'mixed up'. Although the common hardships and tragedies experienced during and after the 1990 civil war certainly reinforced the sentiment of an identity and uniqueness, on closer inspection we discover communities with very diverse backgrounds despite numerous instances of intermarriage. On the one hand there are immigrants of Arab origin, while on the other hand there are the Somali of the Brava surroundings, whose minority status is more doubtful because they are part of the Tunni lineage of the Digil.

## 7.2 Language

According to the Benadir community in Nairobi the Benadir populations in Somalia generally speak a dialect that is different from the dialect of the major Somali clans. Even within this dialect there are sub-dialects: the dialect spoken by the Benadiri of Mogadishu is called *Af-Reer Hamar*, that spoken by the Benadiri of Merka is called *Af-Merka*, and the dialect spoken by the Benadiri in Brava and further south is called *Af-Brava*. The Af-Brava dialect is not understood by the other Benadiri. An informant of the Netherlands Embassy stated earlier that the Ashraf in Bay area speak the Rahanweyn dialect.

Most of the Benadiri, including the women, are able to speak and understand the Somali language.

## 7.3 Socio-economic situation

### 7.3.1 Relationship with other groups and clans

The Benadiri elders told the delegation that the Benadiri who are still in Somalia have no protection from any clan; on the contrary, they live under occupation by Somali clans and militias. In available reports on the situation of the Benadiri before the war, no indications have been found that Benadiri stood in a relation of clientship or protection to main Somali clans.

According to UN and NGO sources consulted earlier by the Netherlands Embassy, the Benadiri look down upon pastoralists and keep to their own identity.

Intermarriage between Benadiri and the Somali clans was rare and not generally accepted.

The Ashraf elders explained that the Ashraf have no particular affiliation with any of the major Somali clans. They stated that they used to have good relations with all other clans in Somalia. They were considered a highly respected clan of devout religious members. They travelled widely throughout Somalia as religious teachers and were well received by other clans. Under the Siad Barre regime the Ashraf did not as a group face any security or human rights problems in Somalia. Intermarriage between members of the Ashraf community in Somalia and members of the major Somali clans was rare, according to the Ashraf community in Nairobi, although some intermarriage occurred with the Hawiye (while during the last ten years forced marriages took place with Hawiye and even Majerteen). Marriage takes places almost exclusively within the Ashraf community itself. A relatively large number of the representatives of the Ashraf community in Nairobi with which the delegation met were related to each other.

### 7.3.2 Occupations

The Benadiri elders stated that the Benadiri were an urban and educated people, who worked almost exclusively in commercial occupations. The elders mentioned business, fishery, construction, metal work, carpentry, tailoring, weaving and gold smithing as the occupational sectors of the Benadiri. They also mentioned that some Benadiri were medical doctors, engineers or economists. Benadiri women might sell snacks or handicrafts.

The Bravanese and Tunni elders said their people were also commercially orientated or working as craftsmen.

The Ashraf elders explained that the Ashraf are a religious people. They were traditionally considered a highly respected clan whose members travelled throughout Somalia as religious teachers. Before the civil war a relatively large number of Ashraf received education in Somalia, and during the Siad Barre administration a number of Ashraf were employed as civil servants in the administration while others were businesspeople and therefore travelled frequently throughout the country.

Benadiri mostly were self-employed and had a reluctance to working for someone else. They have great entrepreneurial talents.

### 7.4 Security and human rights

All three groups of Benadiri elders stated that during the civil war in 1991 and 1992 the Benadiri suffered seriously. Lacking any tradition of warfare and any militia, they were often attacked and targeted by looters, who considered them to be very rich, owing to their trade. Cassanelli (1995) claims that many southern minorities were accused by Somali militias of helping to sustain the Barre government in its later years. The Ashraf, however, stated that they were not persecuted because of any perceived close links with Siad Barre.

During its mission to Mogadishu in 1997 the Danish Immigration Service learned from the Dr. Ismail Jum'ale Human Rights Organisation and from representatives of the Reer Hamar community in Mogadishu that the Reer Hamar are considered a wealthy business community by members of the Somali clans and the militias. Because of this, and because the Reer Hamar are unarmed, their homes were repeatedly looted. The same sources estimated that more than 70% of the Reer Hamar population in Mogadishu fled the country during the civil war. In January 1999 the War-torn Societies Project (WSP) in Nairobi and other UN agencies informed the Danish Immigration Service that the Benadiri community was still facing serious human rights violations in Mogadishu, and that members of this community would probably never be able to return in safety to Mogadishu.

The Ashraf elders stated that there are several reasons why members of the Ashraf community have fled Somalia. To some degree members of the Ashraf are considered as 'strangers' in Somalia by the major Somali clans. The Ashraf claim to originate in Arabia and are called "Arabs" by other Somalis. They are considered to be a weak, unarmed religious group with no social or legal rights.

Many Benadiri women were raped or forced into marriage, as the Benadiri elders confirmed to

the delegation. The Ashraf elders stated that their identity as a specific ethnic group has been weakened since the war, as Ashraf women have been abducted, raped or forced into marriage with members of other Somali clans.

Kalunga Lutato explained that the Bravanese would not normally intermarry with members of the main Somali clans or other groups and consequently their own distinct ethnicity was fairly well preserved. They were, in a way, an isolated and distinct people and their property, and their women, were beyond the reach of members of the Somali clans. When the state collapsed and the Bravanese lost their "protection" from the central government they soon became targets for various militias that raged through the coastal areas of central and southern Somalia. The militias especially targeted Bravanese women and many were raped or forced into marriage with non-Bravanese Somalis. The Bravanese women were seen as "attractive" in the sense that before the collapse of government they were "inaccessible" but when the government fell they were easy victims.

The Benadiri have all lost property in Somalia during the war. The majority of Benadiri fled the country, mainly to Kenya. Members of Somali clan militias took the majority of Benadiri homes.

The Benadiri elders stated that there are still Benadiri in Mogadishu and Merka today, although they could not say how many. Those who are still living in Somalia have seen their houses taken by members of Somali clan militias, although sometimes the owners could stay in one room of their house.

The Benadiri elders were fairly sure that none of the Benadiri that fled to Kenya had since returned to Somalia. They described the situation of the Benadiri that remained in Mogadishu and Merka as difficult, as they cannot rebuild their businesses in the presence of the militias, for fear that their resources would again be taken. The elders stated that a few Benadiri had relocated to Bosasso in Puntland, either to seek work there or to move on from there to Yemen, although none of the elders had personal knowledge of any person now in Bosasso, or Hargeisa.

The Bravanese and Tunni elders said that although in the civil war Brava was most affected, the majority of Bravanese remained in the town. They stated that today about 70% of the Bravanese still live in Brava, living under the occupation of Aideed's Habr Gedir USC faction. They described how, although their houses have generally been occupied by militias members, some Bravanese have been allowed to remain living in one room of their house. The Bravanese could not claim back their properties without the risk of being killed.

Wayne Long, Chief Security Officer, UNDP-Somalia, explained that in Brava, Habr Gedir control, established in the mid-1990s, weakens at times. In the past two to three months much of Aideed's militia force has moved back towards Mogadishu, in anticipation of a power struggle in the capital in the wake of developments at Arta. At times such as this, when militia power diminishes, the Bravanese are able to resume some degree of control over their lives. Some local authority is able to assert itself, providing it is not seen as a direct threat to Aideed's overall position. Bravanese may even be able to regain property taken by Habr Gedir occupiers although such regained property is always liable to be retaken when militia control reasserts itself.

While the Ashraf elders estimated that most Ashraf have left Somalia as refugees, an unknown number still remain in Somalia, the ones that lacked any means with which to leave, and some are still leaving the country. Those who are left behind inside Somalia are living at the mercy of the other Somali clans. They have no protection from any other clan as the Ashraf are not related or allied in any way to any of the major Somali clans. As a religious group the Ashraf do not have an armed militia as many other clans have. They do not consider themselves safe in any part of Somalia, as they do not have a traditional home area of their own that they control. They are an urban population with no larger traditional residential area. Today they are at risk of being looted, raped and even killed by members of other Somali clans and militias.

The Ashraf are a religious clan but they are not supporters of armed Islamic fundamentalist groups such as Al-Ittihad; on the contrary, they fear Al-Ittihad. For this reason the Ashraf prefer not to relocate within Somalia to Puntland, where Al-Ittihad has had some influence in recent years.

An earlier Dutch mission to Somaliland and Puntland in November 1999 found that Reer Hamar and Reer Brava have resettled in Puntland, in small (but unknown) numbers. They live in IDP camps. In general they are not persecuted there and their safety is not at risk, although they suffer discrimination and their socio-economic position is precarious.

In a recent UN study Ashraf are mentioned as one of the clans among the IDPs in northern Somalia.

## **7.5 Benadir refugees in Kenya and abroad**

The three groups of Benadiri elders called the delegation's attention to the position of the Benadiri in Kenya, since they fled Somalia. Most Benadiri were at first received in refugee camps close to Mombasa, like Saint Anne's refugee camp, Hatimy camp, Jomvu camp and Banadir camp. In 1992 these camps were recognised by UNHCR as transit camps and inhabitants were registered by the UNHCR and were to all effect considered refugees. But by the end of 1997 these coastal refugee camps were closed down and the inhabitants were compelled to choose between staying in their camp in Mombasa but no longer being considered as refugees by UNHCR, or relocation to Kakuma camp in the hinterland of Kenya. Most of the inhabitants of the coastal refugee camps opted to stay where they were, being aware of the risks they would face in Kakuma camp where members of the major Somali clans formed the majority of inhabitants. Some relocated to Kakuma camp on the promise that they would soon be resettled to the USA, but since the resettlement process was so slow, 90% of them are now back in Mombasa. Several cases have been recorded of Bravanese living in Kakuma who were subjected to murder, abduction, humiliation and threat.

At present there are about 2,500 Bravanese living in the coastal area of Kenya. In 1999, 97 Bravanese were arrested and taken to the Mombasa Police Station. Afterwards they were sentenced to pay a fine.

The Bravanese have repeatedly appealed to the Kenyan government and UNHCR to find a durable solution to their problems in Kenya.

UNHCR confirmed that the coastal camps had been closed by the Kenyan government because



of their proximity to populated areas such as Mombasa. The agency also confirmed that refugees who have left the camps are no longer supported by UNHCR. However, refugees who have left the camps do not lose UNHCR's protection, they are still accepted as refugees. Refugees in Kenya are not living under the threat of being deported to Somalia.

The Bravanese elders in Nairobi gave the delegation copies of several of their requests to the Kenyan government and UNHCR (see annex 8).

The Ashraf elders estimated that about 250 Ashraf families are now living in Kenya. Of these about 100 families are living in Nairobi. An unknown number has been resettled in the USA together with other Benadiris. Members of the Ashraf community in Somalia are still leaving the country as refugees. The Ashraf community in Kenya is in contact with the Ashraf community in Somalia by telephone and other ways of communication.

According to the Ashraf elders in Nairobi, Ashraf refugees remaining in Kenya do not receive any assistance from UNHCR or any other UN agency. They have found it very difficult to make a living in Kenya. Some of the refugees have been employed as unskilled workers, such as housecleaning while others are petty traders. They receive some economic assistance from their relatives living abroad (see annex 9).

## 8. Eyle

### 8.1 Groups and sub-groups, geographical distribution

According to Mr Fara Oumari Mohamud, a representative of the Eyle (Eile) community in Nairobi, the Eyle centuries ago had their own kingdom, ruled by King Gedi Ababo, around the hill Bur Eyle close to Bur Hakaba (Bay region). The Eyle were hunters and agro-pastoralists. They believe themselves to be of Falasha (or Jewish) origin before they were Islamised. They were treated by the main Somali clans as religious outcasts.

Fara Oumari Mohamud said that before the war there were some one thousand Eyle families living scattered throughout southern Somalia up to and including the Hiran region, but the majority lived in two districts, Bulo Burte in Hiran region, and Bur Hakaba in Bay region. These remain today the principal areas where the Eyle live in Somalia. Presently, there are approximately two to three hundred Eyle families in Somalia.

The information provided by Fara Oumari Mohamud can be supplemented from other sources.

Lewis (1994a) considers the Eile (Eyle) of Bur Eibe as a Negroid people, living in the area between the two rivers. They cultivate during the rains and hunt in the dry season (with dogs, considered dirty creatures by the 'noble' Somali). Both the Hawiye and the Digil despise them, and there seems good reason to regard them as a pre-Cushistic aboriginal population. They comprise three primary sections, one of which appears to be related to a dynasty of chiefs that ruled the Bur region at some time. Smaller Eile groups are found at Dafet, on the lower and mid-Shabelle, and among the Shidle.

Mohamed Diriye Abdullahi adds that in the 1960s and 1970s the Eyle had some hunting and farming communities in the vicinity of Mount Eyle (Bur Eyle, Bur Eibe), some 60 km south of Baidoa. Their numbers have been constantly in decline since the 1960s due to assimilation with the Rahanweyn and Bantu agricultural communities or through migration to large towns such as Mogadishu where they found employment as butchers. In Mogadishu, before the civil war, the Eyle occupied a large squatter camp beside the grounds of the National University, to the consternation of the university officials who demanded their eviction. The civil war has scattered the few communities that the Eyle had. Abdullahi considers the Eyle an endangered community that would have difficulty in reconstituting its former settlements around the plains of Mount Eyle.

Fara Oumari Mohamud explained that in 1992, in Mogadishu, he gathered members of eight minority groups to create an NGO, in order to appeal for help to the international community.

The NGO implemented a number of projects with donor aid, but in 1998 the members of the executive committee were targeted by Aideed's USC, after which they fled to Kenya.

## **8.2 Language**

Fara Oumari Mohamud stated that the Eyle have the same language as the main Somali clans among whom they live.

## **8.3 Socio-economic situation**

### **8.3.1 Relationship with other groups and clans**

Fara Oumari Mohamud informed the delegation that the Eyle were treated as slaves by the main Somali clans. They had no protection from any clan and their relationships with the clans in their home areas (Rahanweyn, Hawadle) were not good. Also for religious reasons, they were treated as outcasts. There are no physical differences between the Eyle and the surrounding Somali clans. There was no intermarriage between the Eyle and the major Somali clans. There were no Eyle in government institutions, and there are no Eyle involved in the Arta peace process at the present time. Eyle could intermarry with some Benadiri and with Tumaal, but not with Yibir.

Lewis (1994a) describes the Eyle as clients of the Rahanweyn clans, while Abdullahi (1998) mentions the assimilation of Eyle with Bantu and Rahanweyn communities.

The Bantu elders interviewed by the mission consider the Eyle to be a Bantu lineage group (see chapter 6.1).

The UNHCR overview classifies the Eyle as a Mirifle clan (see annex 3). Perouse de Montclos (1997) considers the Eyle (Eyle) of the Bur Eibi Hills to be a Bantu group.

### **8.3.2 Occupations**

The Eyle are hunters and agro-pastoralists. According to Lewis (1994a) they also make pottery, and their home area is one of the centres of pottery making. Abdullahi mentions that in Mogadishu the Eyle found employment as butchers.

## **8.4 Security and human rights**

During the civil war many Eyle fled Somalia for Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen. Fara Oumari Mohamud knew of no Eyle who had fled to the northern part of Somalia.

At the present time there are some two to three hundred Eyle families remaining in Somalia, mainly in the districts of Bulo Burte in Hiran region and Bur Hakaba in Bay region. They are still in a weak position, as they do not bear arms. They cultivate and suffer from the drought that reigns in southern Somalia. Hunting is difficult these days, according to Fara Oumari Mohamud.

There are no indications from other sources that the Eyle are at present targeted by the main Somali clans. Insofar as they live in unstable areas, they could become victims of armed

conflicts.

No Eyle have been included as members of the Transitional National Assembly.

## 9. Midgan, Tumul, Yibir (sab)

### 9.1 Groups and sub-groups, geographical distribution, origins

In traditional Somali society a number of 'occupational castes' lived scattered in a client status among the majority of 'noble' Somali clans. Various names are used for these groups, and their use is not always consistent.

The northern Somali pastoral society distinguishes three occupational castes, the Midgan, Tumul (also called Tum Tum, Tumaal, Tomal) and Yibir (also called Yibro, Hebrew), referred to collectively as *sab* (which means low-caste). These names are also used by the southern Darod. Another collective term used for these groups in northern Somalia is Gaboye (Geboyo), but Gaboye is also used as another name for the Midgan only. A third collective name used for the three groups is *Baidari*. The terms Midgan, Gaboye and *sab* are derogatory terms.

According to Perouse de Montclos the word *sab* refers to professional castes without territorial, genealogical or ethnic foundation, less than 1% of the country's population. Three quarters of them are shoemakers or barbers who carry out circumcision: they are called 'untouchables', Midgan, and try to impose a new name since the beginning of the war, the 'harmless' Madhiban. Less than a quarter are Tumul blacksmiths. One also finds a handful of Yibir hunters, said to have magic power, and some weavers called Yahhar in the south (according to the name of the shuttle of their weaving loom).

The UNHCR overview distinguishes within the minority groups the Geboyo, Yibro, Yaharo, Tomal and Madhiban (see annex 3).

In the inter-riverine area of southern Somalia, occupational caste groups were scattered through the clan system, but the words Midgan and Yibir used to be unknown, while Tumaal was simply the name of the occupation of smith and not of a descent group. Here, the occupational castes were collectively known as *boon* or *gum*. But again, by others, Boon and Midgan were used interchangeably.

The delegation met with Mr Yassin Hersi Jama, a representative of the Madhiban, who had lived in Mogadishu from 1980 onwards and in Nairobi from 1990 onwards. He used the term Midgan as a collective term covering the sub-groups Madhiban, Musa Dheryo, Tumul, Yahar, Yibir and Jaje. Written sources mention these same sub-groups among the occupational castes, with the exception of the Jaje.

A UN source in Nairobi considered the Midgan, Yibir and Tumul to be separate groups, while

she considered that 'Midgan' is a derogatory term for Madhiban. She informed the delegation that the Yibir are called Yaher in the southern part of Somalia.

Another staff member of a UN organisation informed the delegation that the Midgan, Tumul and Yibir live to this day scattered all over Somalia, but especially in the central and northern areas.

In this report, Midgan, Tumul and Yibir will be considered as three separate occupational castes; the Midgan will be considered to have two sub-groups, the Madhiban and the Musa Dheryo (or Musa Dheere).

The origins of these occupational castes are vague. They are probably related agnatically to the mainstream Somalis, but also ethnically much intermixed, and patrilineally segmented, like the mainstream Somalis. But they are considered by other Somalis to have become impure ('haraam'). The origins of their perceived impurity are not clear. It may have to do with their hunting activities, in which animals are killed in contrast to the Shari'a precepts on slaughtering. Also, the menial jobs to which they are confined are considered impure (see section 9.3.2). Yassin Hersi Jama indicated that the Madhiban originally come from the central area (Mudug and Nugal regions).

The Yibir (or Hebrew) are said to have Jewish origins but have been Muslims for centuries and know nothing about Judaism.

## **9.2 Language**

Lewis (1994a) notes that the Midgan, Tumul and Yibir speak the Somali language of the clan to which they are attached. The Midgan and Yibir also have a special, secret dialect that the major Somali clans would not understand.

## **9.3 Socio-economic situation**

### **9.3.1 Relationship with other groups and clans**

According to Yassin Hersi Jama, the Madhiban do not intermarry with the main Somali clans. When, centuries ago, they moved from their original areas of Nugal and Mudug into the northern parts of Somalia, they needed protection and entered into client-patron relationships with the major Somali clans. Since then they have held no territory of their own. Many Madhiban used to tell strangers that they belonged to the Somali clan that was their patron clan. They did this partly because they did not want to be seen as vulnerable.

Before the civil war the position of the Madhiban in various parts of Somalia was not strong. Yassin Hersi Jama gave the example of Hargeisa in Somaliland, where Madhiban were restricted to certain jobs like barber or cleaner. For women, he stated that the only job open was prostitution. Madhiban were not able to study, unless a patron from the main Somali clans would allow them. At the time there were some 60,000 Midgan in Hargeisa.

Yassin Hersi Jama informed the delegation that during the civil war the Madhiban suffered greatly. He stated that in Mogadishu in 1990 the Hawiye wanted to kill the Madhiban and

many consequently fled the city. In North East Somalia (Puntland) the Madhiban had a client-patron relationship with the dominant Majerteen clan of the Darod and also fought for the Majerteen. Their position was not, however, very strong. They could be killed easily, since no *diya* had to be paid when a Madhiban was killed, according to Yassin Hersi Jama. In Hargeisa, the Isaaq chased the Madhiban in 1994 to Puntland and Ethiopia.

These findings can largely be substantiated and generalised from written sources. According to Lewis (1994a), the *sab* (indicating the Midgan, Tumul and Yibir) are attached to 'noble' Somalia tribes through patronage and perform specific duties, in return for which they are paid and allowed to remain in the territory of the tribe of attachment. The *sab* attached to a 'noble' tribe identify themselves with it in relation to other tribes. They have no recognised genealogy of their own. They are not land owning groups. Conventional paths to upward social mobility are not open to them. They are excluded from the councils of elders. They have no right to claim compensation for murder from 'noble' Somali except through the patron to whom they are attached, and the (lower) compensation is paid to the patron (N.B. this is in contradiction with Yassin Hersi Jama's statement that for the killing of a Madhiban no *diya* is paid). They cannot contract legitimate marriage with Somalis.

According to Perouse de Montclos, *sab* castes cannot demand reparations from a Somali in case of murder, unless they do it through their master.

The *sab* have a reputation for witchcraft and magic. The Midgan's poisoned hunting arrows are feared. The Yibirs are despised by all Somalis, who never speak to them if they can avoid doing so, and are feared for their skills in witchcraft. Whenever a son is born to a 'noble' Somali, and at marriages, a Yibir has the right to a gift in return for an amulet and blessing.

Although the position of the *sab* had many points in common with the position of slaves in Somali society, their position was nevertheless distinct. The *sab* were a ritually impure group of people segregated from the Somalis by general prohibitions, e.g. to eat together or to marry. Although they owned no land, they were nonetheless distinct communities with their own customs. Their adoption by 'noble' Somalis implied a voluntary contract, while ownership of slaves entailed absolute rights of possession. The *sab* have the right to move from 'noble' family to family at will.

Lewis' findings mostly date from well before the Siad Barre era. Even then, he noted that restrictions placed on the *sab* were gradually disappearing. In 1960 the Somali government, in its drive to replace tribal particularism by national solidarity, passed legislation officially abolishing the status of client and upholding the right of every Somali citizen to live and work where he chose, irrespective of his particular clan or lineage affiliation. Siad Barre, in his policy of modernisation and abolition of tribalism, or 'clanism', tried to emancipate the minorities and some members of the occupational castes, especially Midgan and Yibir, held important offices during his regime, including in the military. As a result the occupational castes supported Siad Barre and they were accordingly expelled after his downfall. In Somaliland, their role in the conflict between Barre and the Isaaq-based Somali National Movement (SNM) earned them the hostility of the SNM rebels, and of the Isaaq as a group. Also, whereas other former adversaries in this area have reconciled, the Midgan, Tumul and Yibir have not been party to any peace agreement. They have found recovery after the war

especially difficult and consider themselves as being discriminated against, in spite of the one seat they obtained in the Somaliland parliament.

### **9.3.2 Occupations**

The Midgan, Tumal and Yibir are called occupational castes because they traditionally perform specialised occupational services. The Midgan women also performed female circumcision and acted as midwives to the dominant Somali clans.

The Tumal are traditionally blacksmiths, making spears, knives, arrowheads, swords, as well as prophylactic amulets and charms. The Yibir and Midgan are traditionally both hunters and leather-workers, making ornaments, straps, amulets, prayer-mats and saddles. They hunted with bows and arrows poisoned with an extract obtained from a species of euphorbia. Both groups were feared for their witchcraft and magic. Some Musa Dheryo were basket-makers, and attached to the Rahanweyn or to the Isaaq clan Habr Awal. The occupational castes traditionally could not own cattle or horses or 'noble' possessions.

In the last few decades many Midgan, Tumal and Yibir have migrated to the cities, where they have been employed by politicians from more powerful clans as drivers, bodyguards and spies. As described above, Siad Barre elevated several Midgan to important positions in the Ministries of Defence and Education. With no independent clan base or status of their own, such appointees could be trusted to carry out orders. Other clans also employed Tumal, Midgan and Yibir families. To this day their work opportunities are mainly confined to menial jobs such as hairdressing, blacksmithing, metalworking, tanning, shoemaking, pottery and craftsmanship in general. Some Madhiban rose to higher positions, e.g. as artists.

### **9.4 Security and human rights situation**

The Midgan, Tumal and Yibir traditionally lived in the areas of the four main nomadic clan families of Darod, Isaaq, Dir and Hawiye in northern and central Somalia. In the last few decades many of them migrated to the cities.

During the civil war that followed Barre's downfall in 1991 the occupational castes were in general not specifically targeted, although as groups without natural clan allies, they were sometimes attacked with impunity. Moreover, particular individuals and families who had visibly supported the Barre regime were vulnerable to targeted retaliation. For example, Abgal militiamen of the USC executed several Yibir who had formerly been their clients. In its waning days, the Barre regime reportedly armed many Yibir and sent them to the local market to kill Abgal clansmen in retaliation for Abgal rebellion against the government. After Abgal forces succeeded in helping to oust Barre, they turned on their former Yibir clients and massacred them. Having broken with their former Abgal patrons, the Yibir then had no-one to turn to for protection.

Somaliland provides a further example. During the war, members of the Midgan, Tumal and Yibir enlisted in government military service and were assigned to a special unit. Their role in the conflict earned them the hostility of the SNM rebels, and of the Isaaq clans in general. Many fled in fear of retaliation to Ethiopia and Puntland. In recent years they have started to come back, and returnees have been able to reclaim some of the land and property taken from



them during the civil war. In 1998, for example, some two thousand Midgan, Tumul and Yibir returned to Somalia from Ethiopia, mostly to Hargeisa.

Midgan, Tumul and Yibir today live scattered all over Somalia, but mostly in northern areas. There is little specific information available on their human rights and security situations. There are no indications that the security of Midgan, Tumul and Yibir is at risk from targeted actions by other clans. At the same time, indications are that their relationships with the major Somali clans have not improved much from traditional times, and that they are still discriminated against in the social and economic spheres. In some instances Madhiban have married into the Majerteen clan.

In the Djibouti peace initiative, Mr. Hersi (aged 68 years), who has been the elected leader of the Yibir for 22 years, was asked to speak at one of the opening sessions of the peace conference. He noted that the Yibir had suffered terribly during the war but wanted badly to forgive and move on. Part of the bad treatment, he conceded, was due to the support of many Yibir for the dictator Siad Barre. But part of it was simply that they are one of the low castes of Somalis, and particularly that they are believed to be ethnic Jews, in a strongly Muslim country. He stated that the Yibir were never given their rights. For many years the Yibir were denied education. They perform work that is considered menial, such as metalworking and shoemaking. Traditionally many earned money through the belief, stretching back perhaps centuries, that it is lucky to give the Yibir a small amount of money when a son is born or at a marriage.

Yassin Hersi Jama declared himself to be against the Djibouti peace initiative, and against the representatives of the Madhiban in the Transitional National Assembly, as he considered that those who chose to be in the power structure of the oppressor could never be the true representatives of the Madhiban (see annex 10).

In Somaliland, Midgan, Tumul and Yibir found recovery from the civil war especially difficult. They feel that they are under-represented politically, with one seat in the Somaliland parliament. Economically they still find themselves mostly in menial jobs, and do not feel sufficiently secure to conduct any business as other clans could confiscate their possessions.

A UN report on the conditions of returnees and IDPs in north-west and north-east Somalia found that in Puntland approximately 10,000 Madhiban from Mogadishu and Bay and Bakool regions live in camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The report also found that IDPs from the South were generally worse off than town residents, but that the problems of the returnees were also quite severe. Both IDPs and returnees face severe problems in terms of integration within the depressed local economy. The IDPs around Bosasso face great risks in terms of sanitation and health. The meagre shelter available is vulnerable to fires. The Madhiban IDPs are especially vulnerable to spontaneous and forced relocations, and IDPs cited the insecurity of land tenure and ownership as their primary concern.

## 10. Shekhal

### 10.1 Sub-groups, geographical distribution, relationship with other clans

The Shekhal clan has been described in various terms such as Sheikhal, Sheikal, Shekhal Lobogi, Shekhal Gendershe or Shekhash.

One source considers them as a minority group, though other sources consider them as associated to the Hawiye, as a sub-clan of the Hawiye or even as a separate clan-family:

Guido Ambroso writes that the Shekhal is a priestly lineage with segments present both in central and southern Somalia as well as eastern Ethiopia. In Somalia they are known as Shekhal and in Ethiopia as Shekhash. The Shekhal claim direct descent from a religious Arab lineage even if some genealogists consider them as part of the Hawiye.

Information gathered by the Netherlands Embassy in June 1999 from UNPOS Nairobi, shows that the Shekhal are associated with the Hawiye. In general, Shekhal clan members have no specific area or zone of residency in the country. They are scattered in different districts and regions of the country. One can find Shekhal (as a family) in Mogadishu, Belet Weyne, Jowhar, Middle and Lower Juba and Gedo. The Shekhal Loboge is a sub-clan of the Shekhal, who have their traditional homeland in Ethiopia (Zone V, the Ogaden).

According to a UN source in Nairobi members of the Shekhal clan are living among the other Somali clans, especially among the Hawiye clans Habr Gedir and Abgal. The Shekhal clan comprises two sub-clans, which are the Martile and the Aw Qudub. The Shekhal sub-clan Martile, meaning "guest", is a member of the so-called Hirab (Herab) alliance, which is an alliance of all Abgal and Habr Gedir clans and the Martile sub-clan. The source said that the Sheikhal should not be considered as a Benadiri clan. It was remarked that the Shekhal Martile clan occupies three seats in the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) established at the peace conference held in Djibouti. These three seats are included in the 49 seats that the Hawiye clan-family and its allies were allocated in the TNA. See annex 4.

Wayne Long, UNDP-Somalia understood that the Shekhal should not be considered as a minority group, but as a Hawiye clan that seceded from the Hawiye five to ten years ago and no longer considers itself as Hawiye.

The recent UNHCR overview considers the Shekhal as a separate group, with four sub-groups: Lobogay (Lobogi), Aw Qudub, Gendershe and Aw Hassan.

The sub-group of Rer Aw Hassan is most likely a minority population according to a UN

source in Nairobi. This group is represented in the TNA by two seats within the minority grouping called "Alliance Clans Community". The term Aw before a clan-name means 'chief' and indicates that the clan in question is a respected religious clan. The UN source had no information as to the geographical distribution of the Rer Aw Hassan population in Somalia, or from where they may have originated.

Lewis (1994a) considered the Sheikal Lobogi as a sub-clan of the Hawiye. They are a priestly group or section scattered among the Hawiye clans generally, but sometimes appearing as autonomous sections in some clans, as for instance in the Herab clan of the Hawiye. Lewis (1982) mentions that the largest clan of the Sheikhal is the Reer Fiqi Omar, whose most important lineage, the Reer Sheikh Aw Gutub, lives in the Ogaden.

Ambroso adds that another priestly clan called the Sharifians (or Ashraf) is similar to the Shekhal. Both the Shekhal and the Sharifians are said to have acquired a certain degree of political prominence during Siad Barre's regime.

According to a UN source in Nairobi the Shekhal Gendershe clan of Mogadishu inhabits the "Gendershe" village that borders on the Medina District of South Mogadishu.

A UN source in Nairobi indicated in December 1997 that the Mogadishu-based Shekhal Gendershe clan is one of the minority clans in Somalia, who seek protection from Hawiye sub-clan members occupying their areas since 1990.

## **10.2 Occupations**

According to Ambroso, the Shekhal were religious sheikhs and qadis (judges) although nowadays many Shekhal have secular occupations.

## **10.3 Security and human rights situation**

According to a UN source in Nairobi dating from December 1997 the Mogadishu-based Shekhal Gendershe clan is one of the minority clans in Somalia. They are an unarmed community, which has been receiving threats in their traditional areas since 1990. They cannot defend themselves against the armed militiamen and therefore seek protection from Hawiye sub-clan members, who have been occupying their traditional home areas since 1990. Another UN source also considered that the Shekhal clan enjoys some degree of protection from the Hawiye clans.

According to the information gathered by the Netherlands Embassy in June 1999 from UNPOS Nairobi, members of the Shekhal clan and the Loboge sub-clan (if the person in question is not a political figure or has no special case) can travel freely throughout the country.

# 11. Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyn)

## 11.1 Groups and sub-groups, geographical distribution

The Digil and Mirifle, or Rahanweyn, seem to take a middle position between a Somali clan and a minority. They are considered as a minority group by some experts (such as the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Somalia, Ms Mona Rishmawi). By others they are considered as clans related to the major Somali clans, though considered as less 'noble'. In the Transitional National Assembly (TNA), recently formed in Djibouti, the Digil and Mirifle have been included as one of the major Somali clan-families (with 33 sub-clans) and allotted 49 seats, distinct from the recognised "official" minorities grouped together at Arta under the title "Alliance Clans Community".

Different use is made of the names Digil, Mirifle (Merifle) and Rahanweyn. A UN source in Nairobi explained that this is a consequence of an effort made by Siad Barre to amalgamate all these clans under the one name Rahanweyn (the largest group). Originally, however, the Somali distinguished two clan-families, one called the Digil and another variously called Rahanweyn or Mirifle.

The Digil and Mirifle are related ethnically to the four main Somali clan-families in various ways. Both Somali and Digil-Mirifle trace their origins back to the same ancestor, at the highest genealogical level: the ancestor of the Digil-Mirifle, Sab, and the ancestor of the four main Somali clan-families, Somali (or Samaale), are traced back to a common ancestor Hill, who is believed to have had Arabian origins. The descendants of Sab are segmented into three families: the Digil, Mirifle (or Rahanweyn) and Tunni; the Mirifle and Tunni derive from the Digil. The Mirifle and Tunni are numerically the most important, but the Digil survive as a small independent confederacy.

The Mirifle are concentrated in the inter-riverine areas of Bay and southern Bakool, but they also form substantial minorities in Gedo, the Lower and Middle Juba and the Lower Shabelle regions. The Digil are concentrated in the Lower Shabelle region. Historically, the Digil and Mirifle arose from the intermixture of south-driving Somali with the rearguard of the Galla then occupying most of the lower reaches of the Juba. The characteristic structure of the Digil and Mirifle results from the adoption of other groups. Elements from all the other Somali clans as well as Oromo and Bantu have been absorbed in this way. These elements (individuals, families or groups) have been enabled to coalesce, thus forming mixed clans, with a founding lineage acting as a thread round which successive groups crystallise. In this way, relatively stable confederacies, bound together by reciprocal relations of aid and defence, are formed.

Such unions are at first organised on the lineage principle. This, however, usually disappears in their further development. The end-point in the process of federation is the mixed village, where lineage segmentation no longer corresponds to territorial distribution. An example is the Tunni confederacy, which is formed by a number of Hawiye, Mirifle, Dir, Galla, Gobawein (Bantu), Ashraf, Ajuran and Boon groupings, with each segment containing an original Tunni lineage.

Perouse de Montclos describes how Rahanweyn (Mirifle) identity rests more on land tenure than on genealogical affiliations. The name Rahanweyn ('large crowd') evokes at once incorporation and disparity. Blurred genealogies and oral history allow all kinds of recomposition. Genealogies do not reflect so much the past but the prevailing political and numerical power, which makes it easier to 'downplay' names of smaller or extinct lineages. In Somalia, the Rahanweyn will amplify his membership to the wider Somali family, while as a refugee in Kenya, he will insist on being a victim of discrimination due to the fact that he is from a lower caste. This said and done, these groups will still be able to negotiate when the 'hour of reconciliation' arrives, because they are part of the Somali lineage system.

In the genealogical structure of the Mirifle (Rahanweyn), the offshoot of the Digil that has come to eclipse its parent stock in number and importance, there are only three orders of segmentation between the ancestor Rahanweyn and the individual sub-clans, in marked contrast to the charts of the nomadic clan-families. Sub-divisions of the Mirifle can be found, e.g. in Lewis (1994a) or Cassanelli (1995).

Lewis (1994a) describes the Tunni as a large tribe, or rather tribal confederacy. They lived at one time on the Juba river, but since the tenth century they were driven south-west and eventually settled in and around Brava. They had a mixed cattle-cultivation economy and also hunted. The Tunni Torre, a Negroid group, were federated to the Tunni of Brava as their vassals.

As described in chapter 7, the Tunni in Brava town are culturally close to the Benadiri (Reer Brava). The five lineages (*gamas*) which the Bravanese Tunni mention as sub-division of the Tunni clan, can be found in Lewis (1994a) as Daffarat, Werile, Aggiuwa, Dacktira and Goigal, with further sub-groups.

## 11.2 Language

The Mirifle speak a separate Somali dialect (called *Af-may* or *Af-maymay*), which serves as a lingua franca among the various Mirifle groups, several of whom also speak distinct local dialects, and some of their Bantu neighbours. Also the Digil speak *Af-may*, although some will speak standard Somali. Both Digil and Mirifle generally understand the standard Somali spoken elsewhere.

## 11.3 Socio-economic situation

### 11.3.1 Relationship with other groups and clans

The Digil and Mirifle are held in contempt by the nomadic Somali clans for their lowly origins, stemming from Sab as opposed to Somali, for their heterogeneous composition that includes

Bantu elements, for their lack of a clear, politically significant genealogical structure, and, more important perhaps, because they are predominantly cultivators. They were shunned as marriage partners by the 'noble' Somali clans. They do have *diya* paying groups, and thus fall within this aspect of clan law. Villages could function as *diya* paying groups, even if villagers were members of different kinship-based *diya* paying groups.

In past decades, the predominant ideology of Somali nationalism tended to mute these differences. Since the collapse of the state in 1991, however, these ethnic distinctions have vigorously reasserted themselves, especially since the Mirifle (along with the Bantu and coastal populations) were the main victims of a famine and civil war imposed on them by the dominant pastoral clans.

The fertile areas inhabited by the Digil and Mirifle have long attracted other clans. In the 1980s thousands of hectares of land were appropriated from villagers without compensation. Also, an epidemic of land grabbing by well-connected Somalis began in those years.

The Digil and Mirifle did not play a major role in either the Barre government or the military rebellion against it. But in 1991-92 they found themselves in the middle of a struggle between three heavily armed factions: the Hawiye USC, retreating government forces that sought to regroup in the Gedo region, and the Ogaden-dominated Somali Patriotic Movement. The Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle regions became major battlegrounds. The resulting anarchy resulted in a food crisis in 1992. Thousands of Mirifle died, and thousands more were displaced, mostly within the region. Digil from Lower Shabelle sought refuge in the bush or in Mogadishu.

In the 1990s the competition for rich agricultural land in the Juba and Shabelle valleys intensified. In the Shabelle region the Darod, who had grabbed land in the Barre era, were ousted in 1991-92 by Habr Gedir and Hawadle militia, who subsequently laid claim to those same districts.

Like the minority groups, Rahanweyn farmers used to have few weapons and they have no military tradition. After the UN's UNITAF operation had helped restore order in 1992 in the main population centres around Baidoa, many Mirifle clans set up local police forces and courts. In 1992 the Mirifle started to organise their own army, the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), which held the Baidoa area. In 1995 the Mirifle/Rahanweyn set up a council of elders, the Supreme Governing Council, as a self-administrative body. However, it rapidly fell apart when the SDM split into three, and Hussein Aideed's father, General Mohamed Farah Aideed, and the Habr Gedir clan took the opportunity to seize a large area of the Mirifle/Rahanweyn regions of Bay and Bakool including the town of Baidoa.

The Mirifle organised themselves militarily to fight the Habr Gedir militia. The Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) was formed, allied to the SDM, and recaptured Hoddur from pro-Aideed forces in August 1996. In June 1999 the RRA, probably backed by Ethiopia, recaptured Baidoa from Hussein Aideed's forces and drove them out of Bay and Bakool regions. In December 1999 the RRA established a local administration for Bay region.

The Digil and Mirifle support the Arta peace process. RRA Secretary General Abdullah Derow Isaaq was elected as Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly (TNA). In the peace

negotiations Baidoa was mentioned as a possible temporary seat for the TNA, as long as security conditions in Mogadishu were not satisfactory. Recently, however, a split has occurred within the RRA, with some members feeling that the new president, Abdiqassim, has no interest in Baidoa. The support by the Digil and Mirifle for the peace process has been somewhat surprising. As was pointed out to the mission by a UN staff member in Nairobi, it is not clear what they stand to gain from Arta, after the RRA had just recaptured their whole territory and had started to rebuild a local administration.

### **11.3.2 Occupations**

The Digil and Mirifle are mainly cultivators, although some groups combine cultivation with pastoralism and others are mainly pastoralists (more often cattle than camels).

### **11.4 Security and human rights**

During the civil war, the Digil and Mirifle have repeatedly been victims of killings, lootings and other human rights violations by the various militias, mainly Aideed's USC.

Since 1999, when the RRA finished recapturing their main home areas, Bay and Bakool regions, the situation of the Mirifle has improved. Since that time, those parts of Bay and Bakool where the RRA has established firm control, and is making efforts to install a civil administration (e.g. Baidoa and its environs), can be qualified as zones of transition. The other parts of Bay and Bakool are considered zones of conflict. Much of the Lower Shabelle region, the traditional home area of the Digil, is considered a zone of transition.

A UN staff member informed the mission that thousands of Digil and Mirifle are at the moment in North West Somalia (Somaliland), where they are a visible minority. Most of these Digil and Mirifle fled their home area since 1995, when Aideed's forces captured Baidoa. Although these displaced persons were well received in 1997-98, they are no longer welcome. The Somaliland population has grown tired of what they see as aggressive begging by the Digil and Mirifle. In Somaliland, the Digil and Mirifle live in very poor circumstances, in slum conditions, and there is no place for them in society. They form the lowest socio-economic stratum. However, they are not systematically threatened. Sometimes a Digil or Mirifle will be arrested. The UN staff member added that Digil and Mirifle are probably also living around Bosasso, in Puntland, but he was not well informed about conditions there.

Another UN staff member interviewed in Bosasso during the Dutch mission to Puntland of November 1999 stated that Rahanweyn are present in Puntland, and that they are very poor and often live from begging.

In the (large) sample of camps included in the UN study into conditions of returnees and IDPs in northern Somalia, one camp, of 360 people, was found to house Rahanweyn IDPs.

## **12. Individuals and organisations consulted**

**Abdalla**, Hemed Said, Bajuni elder from Jomvu Camp, Mombasa

**Abdinoor**, Abobasid Sharif, Secretary General of the Asharaf Welfare Association, Nairobi

**Abu**, Mohamed Abdurahman, Tunni from Brava

**Adan**, Abdullahi Sharif, Ashraf from Qorioley, Lower Shabelle

**Ahmed**, Ahmed Kassim (Badi), Bajuni elder from Jomvu Camp, Mombasa

**Ahmed**, Hassan Sharif, Ashraf from Mogadishu

**Ali**, Ali Mahdi, Bajuni elder from Jomvu Camp, Mombasa

**Ali**, Sharif Mohammed Sharif ("Kingo"), Ashraf from Merka, Lower Shabelle

**Bakari**, Bakari Abdalla, Bajuni elder from Jomvu Camp, Mombasa

**Bashir**, Alrahid Sharif, Ashraf Businessman from Medina, Mogadishu

**Bauer**, Julien, Professor, ECOTERRA, Society for Ecology and Sound Economy, Nairobi

**Benadir elders** (Ashraf, Duruqbe, Morshe) from Mogadishu and Merka

**Bobow**, Mohamed Jeylani, Tunni from Brava

**Bryden**, Matt, Programme Co-ordinator, War-torn Societies Project (WSP), Nairobi

**Eno**, Mohamed Abdulkadir, Bantu elder, Chairman of Bantu Rehabilitation Trust, Nairobi

**Giama**, Safia, Information Officer, United Nations Co-ordination Unit for Somalia (UNCU), Nairobi

**Habib**, Abdiaziz Sharif, Ashraf from Mogadishu

**Harborne**, Bernard, Chief, United Nations Co-ordination Unit for Somalia (UNCU), Nairobi

**Hassan**, Madina Sharif, Spokeswoman, Ashraf from Merka, Lower Shabelle

**Hassan**, Sahra Sharif, Ashraf from Merka, Lower Shabelle

**Hassan**, Sheikhnuur Yusuf ("Boob"), Bantu elder, Secretary-General of Somali Bantu Refugee



Committee in Kenya, Nairobi

**Hussein**, Ali Ibrahim, Bravanese from Brava

**Hussein**, Moe A., Field Co-ordination Officer, United Nations Development Programme for Somalia (UNDP-Somalia)/United Nations Co-ordination Unit for Somalia (UNCU), Nairobi

**Ibrahim**, Mohamed Sharif Adan Sharif, Ashraf from Baidoa

**Ibrahim**, Zeinab Sharif, Ashraf from Mogadishu

**Imberwa**, Munye Imberwa, Bantu elder, Chairman of Somali Bantu Refugee Committee in Kenya, Nairobi

**Jama**, Yassin Hersi, Representative of the Madhiban, Nairobi

**Long**, Wayne, Chief Security Officer, United Nations Development Programme for Somalia (UNDP-Somalia), Nairobi

**Lutato**, Kalunga, Head of Somali Operations, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Branch Office for Kenya, Nairobi

**Mohamed**, Mohamed Bakari, Bajuni elder from Jomvu Camp, Mombasa

**Mohamed**, Farah Oumari, Representative of Eyle Community, Nairobi

**Musalem**, Abdulkadir Mohamed, Bravanese from Brava

**Naji**, Ali Mohamed, Bajuni elder from Jomvu Camp, Mombasa

**Noor**, Haji Amin Mohammed, Bravanese from Brava

**Omar**, Abdulkadir Moallim, Bantu elder from Gedo region, Luugh-Ganaane District

**Osman**, Omar Sharif, Ashraf from Lower Juba

**Qullaten**, Osman Said, Tunni from Brava

**Salah**, Yusuf Abdi, Bantu-elder, Chairman of Centre for Minority Rights and Development, Nairobi

**Sheikh**, Mohamed Muhyadin, Bravanese from Brava

**Sheikh**, Mohamed Yasin, Tunni from Brava

**Stephen**, David, Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Somalia, United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), Nairobi

**Wazir**, Abdalla Mohamed, Bajuni elder from Jomvu Camp, Mombasa

**Yousuf**, Mohammed Sharif, Ashraf from Mogadishu



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## 14. Abbreviations

BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation

CNN - Cable News Network

EU - European Union

FSAU - Food Security Assessment Unit

ID-card - Identity Card

IDP - Internally Displaced Person

IFA - Internal Flight Alternative

IGAD - Inter-Governmental Authority for Development

IRIN - Integrated Regional Information Network

MSF - Médecins Sans Frontières

NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation

OHCHR - Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

**ORSTOM - The French Scientific Research Institute for Development through Cooperation**

RRA - Rahanweyn Resistance Army

SDM - Somali Democratic Movement

SNA - Somali National Alliance

SNF - Somali National Front

SNM - Somali National Movement

SPM - Somali Patriotic Movement

SSA - Somali Salvation Army

TNA - Transitional National Assembly

#### 14. Abbreviations

TNG - Transitional National Government

UK - United Kingdom

UN - United Nations

UNCU - United Nations Co-ordination Unit

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNITAF - United Nations International Task Force

UNOPS/SRP - United Nations Office for Project Services/Somali Rehabilitation Project

UNPOS - United Nations Political Office for Somalia

USA - United States of America

USC - United Somali Congress

WSP - War-torn Societies Project

## ***15. List of annexes, maps etc.***

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[2. Terms of reference for the mission.](#)

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[5. IRIN: Kenya-Somalia: Somali refugees struck by insecurity, 24 November 2000\).](#)

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6. Document written by Bajuni elders in Nairobi, 21 September 2000 (see also note 24).

7.Document written by Abdulkadir Moallim Omar, Nairobi, a Bantu elder from Luugh-Ganaane District in Gedo region, 26 September 2000.

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8. Requests to the Kenyan government and to UNHCR from the Bravanese community in Nairobi

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9. Ashraf Welfare Association, Nairobi, 30 July 2000.

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[10. The Somali Outcast Tribes, Nairobi, 18 September 2000 and 'Somali Minorities Demand - Shut Down the So-called Djibouti Peace Initiative for Somalia ', 7 April 2000.](#)

[10.1](#)

[10.2](#)


[10.3](#)


# Annex 1:

Annex 1:

## Report on minority groups in Somalia

### Annex 1





17 – 24 September 2000

## **Annex 2:**

Annex 2:

### **Report on minority groups in Somalia**

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#### **Annex 2**

##### **Terms of Reference**

A joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission on Somali minority groups is to take place, to Nairobi, September 17-23, 2000, by the Danish Immigration Service, the United Kingdom Home Office/ Immigration and Nationality Directorate and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ Department of Asylum and Migration.

##### **Introduction**

In contacts between officials dealing with their countries' asylum and migration policies towards Somalia, contacts that took place mostly en marge of meetings of the sub-group Somalia of the European Union (EU) High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, it became clear that many of the countries face similar questions to define and implement their asylum and return policies towards Somalis. A relatively large number of Somali asylum seekers in some European countries claim to belong to one of the so-called minority groups in Somalia. This is the case in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Information on the security and human rights situation as well as on the relations between these minority groups and the so-called major Somali clans in Somalia is fragmented and to some degree uncertain. Because of this fact, the Danish Immigration Service, the UK Home Office/Immigration and Nationality Directorate and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Department of Asylum and Migration agreed to field, as a pilot, a joint fact-finding mission on minorities in Somalia. In view of the large number of minority group members from Somalia that are refugees in Kenya, the mission is to interview experts on Somali minorities in Nairobi, Kenya.

##### **1.1.1.1 Reporting**

The mission team will prepare a joint, public report on the fact-finding mission in the English language.

##### **1.1.1.2 Time schedule**

The mission is to take place from September 17 until September 23, 2000. The report is to be finalised within two months after the mission.

##### **1.1.1.3 Composition of the mission team**

The members of the mission team are Mr Jens Weise Olesen (Danish Immigration Service). Mr

Richard Pearce-Higginson (UK Home Office/Immigration and Nationality Directorate) and Mrs Louise Anten (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Department of Asylum and Migration).

#### 1.1.1.4 Questions to be investigated

##### 1. Position of minority groups

What minority groups are generally distinguished within the Somali society? Are there other minority groups besides Benadiri, Reer Hamar, Reer Brava, Reer Merka, Ashraf, Rer Aw Hassan, Amarani, Bajuni, Sheekhal, Bantu, Gaboye, Gum, Midgan, Madhiban, Tumul, Yibir, Jaje? To what extent are the groups mentioned separate minority groups, and to what extent are

## Annex 2

### Annex 2.1:

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#### Report on minority groups in Somalia

**they part of one minority group (e.g. to what extent do Reer Hamar belong to the Benadiri)?  
What sub-groups/sub-clans exist within the different minority groups, and on what basis does one belong to a certain sub-group (genealogy, location, profession)?**

**To what extent has each minority group suffered/is still suffering from the general insecurity in conflict areas and/or from targeted violations of their human rights?**

**Is it possible to establish if members of each of the mentioned minority groups are actually living (traditionally or after having resettled) safely in Somaliland, Puntland, Southern Mudug, Galgaduud and/or Hiran?**

**To what extent do these groups suffer discrimination in relatively safe parts of Somalia? To what extent are *de facto* authorities capable of protecting the safety of these groups?**

**2. Somali clans:**

**To what extent can members of the Rahanweyn and/or Digil clan families be considered as minority groups? Are members of these clans actually living (after having resettled) safely in Somaliland, Puntland, Southern Mudug, Galgaduud and/or Hiran?**

**3. General**

**What are the political developments in Somalia, especially in relation to the Arta peace process?**

**What are developments and perspectives in the human rights and security situation in Somalia?**

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## Annex 2

### Annex 2.2:

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#### Report on minority groups in Somalia

**they part of one minority group (e.g. to what extent do Reer Hamar belong to the Benadiri)?  
What sub-groups/sub-clans exist within the different minority groups, and on what basis does one belong to a certain sub-group (genealogy, location, profession)?**

**To what extent has each minority group suffered/is still suffering from the general insecurity in conflict areas and/or from targeted violations of their human rights?**

**Is it possible to establish if members of each of the mentioned minority groups are actually living (traditionally or after having resettled) safely in Somaliland, Puntland, Southern Mudug, Galgaduud and/or Hiran?**

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**3. General**

**What are the political developments in Somalia, especially in relation to the Arta peace process?**

**What are developments and perspectives in the human rights and security situation in Somalia?**



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## Annex 3:

Annex 3:

### Report on minority groups in Somalia

#### Annex 3

#### GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF SOMALI CLANS

CLANS & SUBCLANS	RESIDENTIAL LOCATIONS (By Region)
<b>I - IRIR</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya
<b>1. -Hawiye</b> <b>2. -Harire</b> <b>3. -Ge'dere</b> <b>4. -Hobor</b> <b>5. -Gurre</b> <b>6. -Meyle</b> <b>7. -Gerrire</b> <b>8. -Meqare(Ajuran)</b> <b>9. -Hamere</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Kenya Ethiopia
<b>1 -Hawiye</b> <b>1.1 -Jambele(Hintire)</b> <b>1.2 -Haskul</b> <b>1.3 -Rarane</b> <b>1.4 -Gorgarte</b> <b>1.5 -Gugundabe</b> <b>1.6 -Karanle</b> <b>1.7 -Hawadle</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya Ethiopia Hiran, Ethiopia Ethiopia Somalia, Ethiopia Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia Somalia, Ethiopia Hiran, Ethiopia, (Gedo before civil war)
<b>1.4 - Gorgarte</b> <b>1.4.1 -Dame</b> <b>1.4.2 -Mohamed(Geboyo)</b> <b>1.4.3 -Mohamud</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia Mudug, Galgadud Mudug, Galgadud, Middle Shabelle Mudug, Galgadud, Middle Shabelle
<b>1.4.1 - Dame</b> <b>1.4.1.1-Madarki'is(Haber Gidir)</b> <b>1.4.1.2-Mudulod</b> <b>1.4.1.3-Duduble</b> <b>1.4.1.4-Mertile</b>	Mudug, Galgadud Mudug, Galgadud, Hiran Somalia, Ethiopia Galgadud Mudug
<b>1.4.1.1 - Madarki'is</b> <b>1.4.1.1.1-Sa'ad</b>	Mudug, Galgadud, Hiran Mudug

<b>1.4.1.1.2-Sarur</b> <b>1.4.1.1.3-Ayr</b> <b>1.4.1.1.4-Salaiban</b>	<b>Galgadud</b> <b>Galgadud, Hiran</b> <b>Galgadud, Mudug</b>
<b>1.4.1.2 - Mudulod</b> <b>1.4.1.2.1-Ujejen</b> <b>1.4.1.2.2-Darendole</b> <b>1.4.1.2.2.1-Hilibi</b> <b>1.4.1.2.2.2-Osman</b>	<b>Somalia, Ethiopia</b> <b>Ethiopia, Hiran</b> <b>Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, Mogadishu</b> <b>Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle</b> <b>Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, Mogadishu</b>

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# Annex 3

## Annex 3.1

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<b>1.4.1.2.2.2 - Osman</b> <b>1.4.1.2.2.2.1-Wa'dan</b> <b>1.4.1.2.2.2.2-Moblen</b> <b>1.4.1.2.2.2.3-Ilaway</b> <b>1.4.1.2.2.2.4-Abgal(Ali)</b> <b>1.4.1.2.2.2.4.1-Harti</b> <b>1.4.1.2.2.2.4.2-Wa'budan</b> <b>1.4.1.2.2.2.4.3-War'ulus</b>	Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, Mogadishu Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle Middle Shabelle, Mogadishu Middle Shabelle, Mogadishu Middle Shabelle, Mogadishu Middle Shabelle, Mogadishu
<b>1.5 -Gugundabe</b> <b>1.5.1-Jibedi</b> <b>1.5.2-Jidle</b> <b>1.5.3-Herre</b>	Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia Hiran, Middle Shabelle Middle Shabelle, Ethiopia Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia
<b>1.5.1 -Jibedi</b> <b>1.5.1.1 -Badi Ade</b> <b>1.5.1.2-Jejele</b>	Hiran, Middle Shabelle Hiran, Middle Shabelle Hiran, Ethiopia
<b>1.5.3-Herre</b> <b>1.5.3.1-Degodi</b> <b>1.5.3.2-Isse (Garjan)</b> <b>1.5.3.3-Masare</b> <b>1.5.3.4-Galje'el</b>	Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia Kenya, Ethiopia Hiran, Middle Shabelle Kenya, Ethiopia Hiran, Lower Shabelle, N/E Kenya, Ethiopia
<b>1.6-Karanle</b> <b>1.6.1-Murasade</b> <b>1.6.2-Wadere</b> <b>1.6.3-Sahawle</b> <b>1.6.4-Kadir</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia Somalia Galgadud, Ethiopia Ethiopia Galgadud, Mogadishu, Lower Shabelle
<b>1.6.1 -Murasade</b> <b>1.6.1.1-Sabti</b> <b>1.6.1.2-Fol Ulus</b>	Somalia Galgadud, Mogadishu, Lower Shabelle Galgadud, Mogadishu, Lower Shabelle
<b>1.7-Hawadle</b> <b>1.7.1-Sametalis</b> <b>1.7.1.1-Rer Ugas</b> <b>1.7.1.2-Dige</b> <b>1.7.1.3-Abdalle</b>	Hiran, Ethiopia, (Gedo before civil war) Hiran, Ethiopia, (Gedo before civil war) Hiran, Hiran, Hiran,

1.7.1.4-Abdi Yussuf	Ethiopia, ( <i>Gedo before civil war</i> )
<b>II – DIR</b>	Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya
<b>1. -Madahwayn</b> <b>2. -Isse</b> <b>3. -Medelug (Gadabursi)</b> <b>4. -Mehe</b>	Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia Somalia, Ethiopia Somalia, Ethiopia

## Annex 3

### Annex 3.2:

#### Report on minority groups in Somalia

<b>1-Medshwayne</b> 1.1-Akisho 1.2-Ali (Wardey)	Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya Ethiopia Bay, Kenya
<b>2-Isse</b> 2.1-Eleye 2.2-Holle 2.3-Walaldon	Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia Awdal, Ethiopia Djibouti, Ethiopia Ethiopia
<b>3-Medelug</b> 3.1-Mahad Asse 3.2-Makahil 3.4-Habar Afar	Somalia, Ethiopia Awdal, Ethiopia Ethiopia, Awdal Awdal, Ethiopia
<b>4-Maha</b> 4.1-Surre 4.2-Hassan	Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya Ethiopia, Gedo, Galgadud, Hiran Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya
<b>4.1-Surre</b> 4.1.1-Abdalle 4.1.2-Qubays	Ethiopia, Gedo, Galgadud, Hiran Ethiopia, Gedo, Galgadud, Hiran Ethiopia, Gedo, Hiran, Mudug
<b>4.2-Hassan</b> 4.2.1-Biyamal 4.2.2-Bajimal 4.2.3-Quranyow 4.2.4-Issak	Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya Lower Shabelle Ethiopia, Hiran Lower Shabelle, Ethiopia, Kenya Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia
<b>4.2.4 Issak</b> 4.2.4.1-Ibrahim 4.2.4.2-Mohamed (Ibran) 4.2.4.3-Tolje'lo 4.2.4.4-Musse 4.2.4.5-Arab 4.2.4.6-Ayub 4.2.4.7-Garhajis 4.2.4.8-Awal	Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia W/Galbed, Togdheer Togdheer, W/Galbed Togdheer, Sanag Togdheer, Sanag W/Galbed, Ethiopia Togdheer, W/Galbed, Ethiopia W/Galbed, Togdheer, Djibouti W/Galbed, Djibouti, Ethiopia
<b>4.2.4.4-Musse</b> 4.2.4.4.1-Abokar	Togdheer, Sanag Togdheer, Sanag

4.3.4.4.2-Samane  
4.3.4.4.3-Mohamed

Togdheer, Sanag  
W/Galbed, Ethiopia

# Annex 3

## Annex 3.3

### Report on minority groups in Somalia

<b>1-Medshwayne</b> 1.1-Akisho 1.2-Ali (Wardey)	Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya Ethiopia Bay, Kenya
<b>2-Isse</b> 2.1-Eleye 2.2-Holle 2.3-Walaldon	Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia Awdal, Ethiopia Djibouti, Ethiopia Ethiopia
<b>3-Medelug</b> 3.1-Mahad Asse 3.2-Makahil 3.4-Habar Afar	Somalia, Ethiopia Awdal, Ethiopia Ethiopia, Awdal Awdal, Ethiopia
<b>4-Maha</b> 4.1-Surre 4.2-Hassan	Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya Ethiopia, Gedo, Galgadud, Hiran Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya
<b>4.1-Surre</b> 4.1.1-Abdalle 4.1.2-Qubays	Ethiopia, Gedo, Galgadud, Hiran Ethiopia, Gedo, Galgadud, Hiran Ethiopia, Gedo, Hiran, Mudug
<b>4.2-Hassan</b> 4.2.1-Biyamal 4.2.2-Bajimal 4.2.3-Quranyow 4.2.4-Issak	Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya Lower Shabelle Ethiopia, Hiran Lower Shabelle, Ethiopia, Kenya Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia
<b>4.2.4 Issak</b> 4.2.4.1-Ibrahim 4.2.4.2-Mohamed (Ibran) 4.2.4.3-Tolje'lo 4.2.4.4-Musse 4.2.4.5-Arab 4.2.4.6-Ayub 4.2.4.7-Garhajis 4.2.4.8-Awal	Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia W/Galbed, Togdheer Togdheer, W/Galbed Togdheer, Sanag Togdheer, Sanag W/Galbed, Ethiopia Togdheer, W/Galbed, Ethiopia W/Galbed, Togdheer, Djibouti W/Galbed, Djibouti, Ethiopia
<b>4.2.4.4-Musse</b> 4.2.4.4.1-Abokar	Togdheer, Sanag Togdheer, Sanag



4.3.4.4.2-Samane  
4.3.4.4.3-Mohamed

Togdheer, Sanag  
W/Galbed, Ethiopia

## Annex 3

### Annex 3.4:

#### Report on minority groups in Somalia

4.2.4.8-Awal 4.2.4.8.1 -Issa 4.2.4.8.2 -Sa'ad 4.2.4.8.3 -Afgab 4.2.4.8.4 -Egalle 4.2.4.8.5 -Abdalle 4.2.4.8.6 -Eli	W/Galbed, Djibouti, Ethiopia W/Galbed, Togdheer W/Galbed, Djibouti, Ethiopia W/Galbed, Togdheer W/Galbed, Togdheer W/Galbed, Togdheer W/Galbed, Togdheer
<b>III – DIGIL &amp; MIRIFLE</b>	Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia
<b>DIGIL</b>	
1. -Geledi 2. -Begedi 3. -Tunni 4. -Shanta Alen 5. -Jiddo(Jarer) 6. -Garre 7. -Dabarre	Lower Shabelle Lower Shabelle Lower Shabelle, Middle Jubba Lower Shabelle Lower Shabelle, Hiran, Mogadishu, Ethiopia. Lower Shabelle, Kenya, Ethiopia, Gedo Bay, Middle Jubba
<b>MIRIFLE (Rabanweyne)</b>	
<b>Eight 8 (Known as clan name)</b> 1. -Elay 2. -Harin 3. -Leisan 4. -Haraw 5. -Disow 6. -Emid 7. -Omal 8. -Yelatle 9. -Jirron 10. -Ma'allin Wayne 11. -Garwale 12. -Rer Dumal 13. -Wanjel	Bay, Gedo Bay Bay Bay Bakol Bay Bay Bay Bay Bakol Bakol Bay Bay, Bakol Bay
<b>Nine 9 (Known as clan name)</b> 1. -Gasare Gude 2. -Gabawayn	Gedo Gedo, Ethiopia

3. -Jilible	Bakol
4. -Geledle	Bay, Middle Jubba, Gedo
5. -Hadame	Bakol
6. -Luway	Bakol, Bay
7. -Yantar	Bay
8. -Huber	Bay
9. -Eyle	Bay, Hiran

## Annex 3

### Annex 3.5:

#### Report on minority groups in Somalia

<b>IV - DAROD</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya
<b>1. -Kablalah</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya
<b>2. -Sede</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya
<b>3. -Tanade</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia
<b>4. -Isse</b>	Ethiopia, Mudug
<b>5. -Yussuf</b>	Mudug, Lower Jubba
<b>1-Kablalah</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya
<b>1.1-Kombe</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya
<b>1.2-Kumade</b>	Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia
<b>1.1-Kombe</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya
<b>1.1.1-Geri</b>	Ethiopia
<b>1.1.2-Harla</b>	Ethiopia
<b>1.1.3-Harti</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia
<b>1.1.3-Harti</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia
<b>1.1.3.1-Warsengeli</b>	Sanag, Lower Jubba
<b>1.1.3.2-Majerten</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia
<b>1.1.3.3-Dhulbahante</b>	Sol, Nugal, Togdheer
<b>1.1.3.4-Ahmed</b>	Bari
<b>1.1.3.1-Warsengeli</b>	Sanag, Lower Jubba
<b>1.1.3.1.1-Omar</b>	Sanag, Lower Jubba
<b>1.1.3.1.2-Dubays</b>	Sanag
<b>1.1.3.2-Majerten</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia
<b>1.1.3.2.1-Ali (Bi'idياهو)</b>	Ethiopia
<b>1.1.3.2.2-Mohamud</b>	Bari
<b>1.1.3.2.3-Mohamed</b>	Mudug, Nugal, Bari, Lower Jubba
<b>1.1.3.2.3-Mohamed</b>	Bari
<b>1.1.3.2.3.1-Saleiban</b>	Bari
<b>1.1.3.2.3.1.1-Ali</b>	Bari
<b>1.1.3.2.3.1.2-Ugadh</b>	Bari
<b>1.1.3.2.3.1.3-Osman</b>	Bari
<b>1.1.3.2.3.1.4-Abdirahin</b>	Bari
<b>1.1.3.2.3.1.5-Mohamud</b>	Mudug, Nugal, Bari, Lower Jubba

1.1.3.2.3.1.5- <i>Mohamud</i>	Mudug, Nugal, Bari, Lower Jubba
1.1.3.2.3.1.5.1- <i>Osman</i>	Mudug, Nugal, Bari
1.1.3.2.3.1.5.2- <i>Omar</i>	Mudug, Nugal, Bari
1.1.3.2.3.1.5.3- <i>Isse</i>	Nugal, Bari, Lower Jubba
1.1.3.2.3.1.5.4- <i>Nuh</i>	Mudug
1.1.3.3- <i>Dhulbahante</i>	Sol, Nugal, Togdheer
1.1.3.3.1- <i>Ahmed</i>	Sol, Nugal, Togdheer
1.1.3.3.2- <i>Musse</i>	Sol, Nugal, Togdheer

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Annex 3.6:

### Report on minority groups in Somalia

<b>1.2-Kumade</b> <b>1.2.1-Abdi</b> <b>1.2.2-Absame</b> <b>1.2.2.1-Bal Ad</b> <b>1.2.2.2 -Wayten</b> <b>1.2.2.3 -Jidwak</b> <b>1.2.2.4-Ogaden</b>	Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia Ethiopia Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia Ethiopia, Lower Jubba Ethiopia, Kenya Ethiopia, Somalia Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia
<b>1.2.2.3 -Jidwak</b> <b>1.2.2.3.1-Bartire</b> <b>1.2.2.3.2-Abasgul</b> <b>1.2.2.4.3-Yabareg</b>	Ethiopia, Somalia Ethiopia, Lower Jubba Ethiopia Ethiopia
<b>1.2.2.4-Ogaden</b> <b>1.2.2.4.1-Miyir Walal</b> <b>1.2.2.4.2-Makabul</b>	Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia
<b>1.2.2.4.1-Miyir Walal</b> <b>1.2.2.4.1.1 -Bahale</b> <b>1.2.2.4.1.2 -Talomuge</b>	Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia Ethiopia, Kenya
<b>1.2.2.4.1.1 -Bahale</b> <b>1.2.2.4.1.1 .1 -Ali Jedid</b> <b>1.2.2.4.1.1 .2 -Awi Yahan</b> <b>1.2.2.4.1.1 .3 -Ali Balul</b> <b>1.2.2.4.1.1 .4-Bah Geri</b> <b>1.2.2.4.1.1 .5-Zuber</b>	Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia Ethiopia Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba, Kenya, Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia, Kenya, Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba
<b>1.2.2.4.1.2 -Talomuge</b> <b>1.2.2.4.1.2.1 -Abudwak</b> <b>1.2.2.4.1.2.2 - Abdalle</b> <b>1.2.2.4.1.2.3 -Rer Mohamed</b>	Ethiopia, Kenya Kenya, Ethiopia Ethiopia, Kenya Ethiopia, Kenya
<b>1.2.2.4.2-Makabul</b> <b>1.2.2.4.2.1-Rer Sad</b> <b>1.2.2.4.2.2-Makahil</b>	Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia Ethiopia Ethiopia, Lower Jubba, Kenya
<b>2-Sede</b> <b>2.1-Fa'ayo</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya Gedo, Ethiopia, Kenya

2.2-Marehan 2.2.1-Urmidig 2.2.2-Aw Same	Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya Gedo, Kenya Gedo, Galgadud, Ethiopia, Lower & Middle Jubba
2.2.1-Urmidig 2.2.1.1-Idigsor 2.2.1.2-Ayahud 2.2.1.3-Arah Adag	Gedo, Kenya Gedo, Kenya Gedo, Kenya Gedo, Kenya
2.2.2-Aw Same 2.2.2.1-Hassan 2.2.2.2-Issak	Gedo, Galgadud, Ethiopia, Lower & Middle Jubba Gedo, Ethiopia, Lower & Middle Jubba Gedo, Galgadud, Lower & Middle Jubba, Ethiopia

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2.2.2.1-Hassan 2.2.2.1.1-Lebiyal 2.2.2.1.2-Waqmashe	Gedo, Ethiopia, Lower & Middle Jubba Gedo, Ethiopia, Lower & Middle Jubba Gedo, Ethiopia, Lower & Middle Jubba
2.2.2.2-Issak 2.2.2.2.1-Sonfure 2.2.2.2.2-Amanrer 2.2.2.2.2.1-Talhe 2.2.2.2.2.2-Wagarda'a 2.2.2.2.2.3-Hawrarsame 2.2.2.2.2.4-Radamir	Gedo, Galgadud, Lower & Middle Jubba, Ethiopia. Gedo, Kenya Gedo, Galgadud, Lower & Middle Jubba, Ethiopia Gedo, Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba, Kenya Galgadud Gedo, Ethiopia, Lower & Middle Jubba Gedo, Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba, Ethiopia
3.Tanade 3.1-Musse 3.2-Hussein 3.3-Ali	Somalia, Ethiopia Mudug, Ethiopia Mudug, Ethiopia Mudug
<b>V – SHEKHAL</b>	Somalia, Ethiopia
1. Lobogay 2. -Aw Qudub 3. -Gendershe 4. -Aw Hassan	Lower Jubba, Hiran Ethiopia Lower Shabelle Hiran
<b>VI – BARAWAN</b>	Somalia
1. -Gibil Ad 2. -Gibil Madow	Lower Shabelle Lower Shabelle
<b>VII – BANTU</b> 1. -Mushunguli 2. -Swahili 3. -Bajuni	Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba



<b>VIII - ASHARAF</b>	Religious Groups can be found in major towns
<b>IX - RER HAMAR</b>	Mogadishu
<b>X - ARABS</b>	Mogadishu, Lower Shabelle, Lower Juba, Bay

## Annex 3

Annex 3.8:

### Report on minority groups in Somalia

<i>Minority Groups</i>	<i>Residential Location By region</i>
1. -Geboyo	Mudug, Galgudud, Ethiopia, Middle Shabelle
2. -Yibro	W/ Galbeed, Togdheer, Ethiopia
3. -Yaharo	Hiran, Middle Shabelle
4. -Tomal	Bari, Mudug, Nugal, Ethiopia
5. -Madhiban	Mudug, Nugal, Bari
6. -Hawrarsame	Gedo, Ethiopia, Lower Juba, Galgudud
7.-Fiki Yakub	Gedo, Lower Juba,
8. -Jaaji	Mudug
9. -Lo'jir	Sanag
10. -Waat	Ethiopia, Kenya
11. -Bejuni	Lower Juba
12. -Mushunguli	Lower Juba, Middle Juba, Lower Shabelle
13. -Swahili	Lower Juba, Middle Juba, Lower Shabelle
14. -Gabawayn	Gedo
15. -Buunle	Ethiopia

**NB:** 1/ Latin numbers indicate Clans

2/ Arabic consecutive numbers indicate sub-clans and relationship of the sub-clan to the major clan. For example: 1. Hawiye => 1.4 Gorgarte is considered as Hawiye's fourth son who, in turn, had three children (Dame, Mohamed (Geboyo) and Mohamud) and who have since given rise to sub-clans in their own right and so on.



# Annex 4:

Annex 4:

## Report on minority groups in Somalia

### Annex 4

JIBCLAN	DEPUTY NAMES	MEN	WOMEN	TOTAL
Isak		22	2	24
adabursi		9	1	10
uthern Dir		7	1	8
Issa		6	1	7
		44	5	49
ber-Gidder	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ahmed Duale Geele (Haaf) (businessman)</li> <li>2. Abdi Hassan Awale (Qaybdiid) (emerged during the civil war period)</li> <li>3. Gen. Mohamed Nur Galaal (Imr. Army)</li> <li>4. Hassan Dhimbil Warsame (Lawyer)</li> <li>5. Prof. Mohamed Ahmed A'lin</li> <li>6. Mohamud Farah "Go'od"</li> <li>7. Ali Haji Yusuf</li> <li>8. Abdi Farah Jama "abdi-dheere"</li> </ol>	8	1	9
udlufood	<p><b>Abgaal:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ali Mahdi Mohamed</li> <li>2. Ismail Moalin-Laus Ibrahim Sheikh Jeebo</li> <li>3. Dr. Osman Haji Mohamud (Duffe)</li> <li>4. Hussein Abdi Wade</li> <li>5. Ali Ugas Abdulle</li> <li>6. Dr. Hassan-saney</li> <li>7. Abdullahi Raghe</li> </ol>	11	1	12
awadile	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Abdi Osman Farah "Duuliye Sare"</li> <li>2. Col. Omar Hashi Adan</li> <li>3. Abukar Mohamed Gure</li> <li>4. Abdillahi Ga'al Abdi</li> <li>5. Abdinasir Haji Shirwa</li> <li>6. Eimi Farah Wabi</li> <li>7. Ms. Hindiya Aifaaf</li> </ol>	6	1	7

SI	FAMILY-CLAN	G:	SOM																															
DIR																																		
HAWIYE																																		

# Annex 4

Annex 4.1:

## Report on minority groups in Somalia

BCLAN	DEPUTY NAMES	MEN	WOMEN	TOTAL
rusade'		4	1	5
ble & Faqi-shini	1. Abdulle Hirsi Awooley 2. Haji Ibrahim "Hub-Aaro" 3. Abdikarim Ahmed Farah	3	-	3
iajjael		3	-	3
heikhal (nalka)		3	-	3
di-odde		3	-	3
Jejele		2	-	2
Sifcis		1	-	1
askul		1	-	1
undhabe		-	1	1
		44	5	49
ijartan'		15	1	16
ehlehle		1	-	1
irehan'		9	1	10
rsame'	Ogadeen subclans (s/c): 3 - Mohamed Zubair s/c: Gen. Abdiwahab Makahil; Mohamoud Bashir. 1 - woman 2 - Muqabli; Gen. Bile Raffle 1 - Ms. - Elmi Gure 2 - Aulyihan: Mohamed "Xujaale" and Barre Ugea. 1 - Bah-Geri; Abdi Shakuur 1 - Tolomoge: Mohamed Anshur Jidwaaq s/c: 1 - Bartine: Abdillahi Hassan "Guulwaade" 1 - Abekuul:	12 or 7	1	8

honorary

FAMILY-CLAN		SU
HAWIYE	Mu	
	Dudul	
	G	
	SI	
	Ba	
	H	
	Gug	
DAROOD	Ma	
	Da	
	Ma	
	At	

- <sup>1</sup> additional 2 seats from Presidential
- <sup>2</sup> additional 5 seats
- <sup>3</sup> additional 2 seats

17 - 24 September 2000

# Annex 4

Annex 4.2:

## Report on minority groups in Somalia

CLAN	DEPUTY NAMES	MEN	WOMEN	TOTAL
xahante		5	1	6
sengle		3	1	4
ikase		2	-	2
rtable		2	-	2
		44	5	49
	<p>Ali Aden Mohamed (Black); Mustafa Muqtaar Guudoow; Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim Isaaq; Mohamed Ali Mohamed; Amin Mohamed Sheikh; Sayid Ahmed Sheikh Dahir; Osman Libaax Ibrahim; Mohamed Sayid Ahmed (Mayrax); Hussein Moallim Imaan; Abdiqadir Qassim Mursal, Mohamed Haji Garweyne; Ali Adan Moallim Isaaq; Sheikh Adan Moallim Isaaq; Sheikh Ali Mohamed Ibrahim, Nur Haashi Mad, Ibrahim Yarow; Sheikh Mohamed Abdi (Borile); Ibrahim Moallim Kurub; Ali Mursal Mohamed; Mohamed Mursal Boorow; Sheikh Ibrahim Mohamed Abdi; Abdillahi Deerow; Abahir Ibrahim Mohamed; Sharif Hasan Sheikh Adan; Sheikh Abdi Moallim Ahmed; Hussein Mohamed Sheikh Hussein; Salah Sheikh Osman; Prof. Salim Abdi Ibro, Abdillahi Sheikh Mohamed Nur; Sheikh Abdirahman Mohamed Osman; Isaaq Mohamed Mohamed; Moallim Mohamed Adan Mohamed; Yusuf Suldan Hasan; Abdiwaaahid Sheikh Ahmed; Saed Abdalla Omar, Ahmed Mohamed Nur</p> <p>Honorary Deputies: Hassan Mohamed Nur "Shaatiiguud"; Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nur "Madoobe"; Mohamed Ibrahim Mohamed "Xabsade"; Abdalla Deerow Isaaq; Madoobe</p>			



FAMILY-CLAN	SUB
	Dhult
	Wan
	Lei
	Am
DAROOD	
DIGIL & MIRIFLE <sup>5</sup>	

<sup>4</sup> additional 4 seats  
<sup>5</sup> 50 seats all together

# Annex 4

Annex 4.3:

## Report on minority groups in Somalia

SUBCLAN	DEPUTY NAMES	MEN	WOMEN	TOTAL
	Nurow Mohamed; Abdiqadir Abu Omar; Abdi Hijji Yaris; Sharif Mohamed Abdullahi; Fadumo Mohamed Nur; Habibo Derer; Jawahir Sheikh Barre; Hawo Mohamed Ibrahim and Asha Abdi Sheikh.	44	5	49
Jarer		5		5
Benadir		4		4
Madhiban		2		2
awhassan		2		2
Mohamed Salah (Shah)	<i>Shah</i>	2		2
Musa Dheere		2		2
Ajuuran		2		2
Yumal		2		2
Yibir		1		1
Yahar		1		1
Yemeni		1		1
		24	5	29
		156	20	176

FAMILY-CLAN																							

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# Annex 4

Annex 4.4:

## Report on minority groups in Somalia

ICLAN	DEPUTY NAMES	MEN	WOMEN	TOTAL
	Sharif Hassan Sh. Aden			
	Ahmed Mahamed Nur			
	Moalim Mahamud Aden Mahamed			
	Hussein Mahamud Sh. Hussein			
	Ali Mursal Mahamed			
	Ibrahim Moalim Kutub			
	Abduulqadir Qasim Mursal			
	Abdullahi Sh. Mahamed Nur			
in	Isaaq Mahamed Mahamud			
	Abduwaahid Sh. Ahmed			
	Ibrahim Yarow			
de	Amin Ahmed Sheikh			
yn	Osman Libaah Ibrahim			
	Dr. Mahamed Ibrahim			
	Eng. Salah Sheikh Osman			
	Mahamed Sid Ahmed (Mayran)			
	Abdullahi Aden Ahmed(black)			
	Sheikh Aden Moalim Isaaq			
	Ahmed Haji Mahamed (G/Weyne)			
g	Yusuuf Sutan Hassan			
	Abdullahi Deerow			
	Sh. Abdurahman Mahamed Osman			
	Hussein Moalim Liman			
	Prof. Salim Alio Ibrov			
	Sheikh Ahmed Abdi Boniile			
	Dr. Mahamed Ali Hamud			
	Nur Hajoi Mad			
	Ali Aden Hussein (Marguus)			
	Mustafa Muqtar Gudow			
eyne	Sheikh Aki Mohamed Ibrahim			
	Sheikh abdi Moalim Ahmed			

FAMILY-CLAN	SUE
DIGIL & MIRIFLE <sup>3</sup>	Ashraaf
	Baqadi
	Barbaare
	Dabarre
	Disow
	Eemid
	Eley
	Erdho
	Gambalax
	Garre
	Garwaale
	Gasaragu
	Gawaawe
	Giidle
	Hadamo
	Haraaw
	Harlin
	Heefmudu
	Helada
Hubeyr	
Hufeyr	
Jido	
Jibile	
Jiron	
Lisaan	
Luway	
Moxalim W	
Oonnele	

<sup>3</sup> 50 seats all together

# Annex 4

Annex 4.5:

## Report on minority groups in Somalia

SUBCLAN	DEPUTY NAMES	MEN	WOMEN	TOTAL
omaal	Mahamed Mursel Boorow			
ini	Said abdallab Omar			
ajeel	Abshir Ibrahim Mahamed			
ale	Sheekh Ibrahim Mahamed Abdi			
kar	Sid Ahmed Sheikh Dahir			
ority given	Hassan Mahammed Nur (Shaati-Guduud)			
	Sh. Aden Mahamed Nur			
	Mahamed Ibrahim Mahamed			
	abdalla Deerow Isaaq			
	Madoowa Nuunow Mahamed			
	Mahamed abdulqadir abu Omar			
	Abdi Haji Yaris			
	Sharif Mahamed Abdullahi			
		44	5	49

	Qo	Tu	We	Ya	Ya	Ph
<b>FAMILY-CLAN</b>						

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## Annex 5:

Annex 5:

### Report on minority groups in Somalia

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#### Annex 5

**Jens Weise Olesen**

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**Fra:** IRIN [irin@ocha.unon.org]  
**Sendt:** 24. november 2000 16:29  
**Til:** IRIN - English Service  
**Emne:** KENYA-SOMALIA: Somali refugees struck by insecurity [2001125]

#### KENYA-SOMALIA: Somali refugees struck by insecurity

NAIROBI, 24 November (IRIN) - Insecurity in the Kenyan Daadab refugee camps has left Somali refugees vulnerable to rape and armed attacks, but the Kenyan police lack resources to cope with the situation. In response, UNHCR has injected resources into local police stations to improve the situation for more than 126,000 refugees in Daadab, which consists of the Ifo, Daqahale and Haqadera camps, North Eastern Province.

UNHCR spokesman Newton Kanhema confirmed that US \$80,000 had been provided this year for fuel, vehicle maintenance and allowances for policemen who act as armed escorts for staff travelling to and from the camp. "Responsibility for security lies with the host government, but we have a problem if the Kenyan police do not have sufficient resources... Our operation would come to a standstill," Kanhema told IRIN. UNHCR also facilitates the mobile courts which come twice a month to the Daadab camps. Refugees charged with offences - from theft to carrying arms - are tried by the mobile courts. If they are convicted they are subject to Kenyan law. "Refugee status makes no difference once convicted," Kanhema said.

The insecurity in Daadab came into focus after the US-based Fund for Peace released a report on 14 November, saying the camp was used "by armed groups, including arms-trafficking networks, ethnic militia and bandits". Fund for Peace called the security situation in the camp "desperate", and put the charge to UNHCR. It recommended that firearms be prohibited, policing improved and stricter screening methods be instituted for refugees. UNHCR sources told IRIN that the findings could not be



confirmed  
"on the scale" presented by Fund for Peace, and the report "lacked  
figures" to back up the charges. However, the sources admitted that  
there  
had been "security incidents and banditry" in Daadab.

Kenyan police spokesman Peter Kimanthi told IRIN that there was a "very  
strong possibility" that the camps were being used to traffic arms.  
"There  
have been shooting incidents in the camps," he said, adding that there  
was  
a growing problem of small-arms trafficking in Kenya, with weapons being  
brought into urban areas like Nairobi. "It is easy for people move  
around  
with arms on that border with Somalia, because there is no control of  
weapons in Somalia," he said in a telephone interview. Movement of armed  
Somalis into Kenya was "very frequent" over a border, which is over 800

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## Annex 5

### Annex 5.1:

#### Report on minority groups in Somalia

km long and with many crossing points, said the police spokesman. Kimanathi charged that a number of people in the Dadaab camp "are not genuine refugees". He said they had come in the first place with the intention of carrying out attacks in the area. "Insecurity can be explained by the number of refugees around who are not genuine," said Kimanathi.

Kenyan police lack resources to cope with the porous border and movement of arms, Kimanathi told IRIN, although "we do our best". He said there was hope that with a central government "coming up" in Somalia, it would be possible to liaise and improve border security.

According to Kanhema, UNHCR has managed to reduce the number of rapes by providing firewood through local contractors: this is trucked into the camps. There are 126,742 refugees in Dadaab, living in a harsh, desert-savannah environment. The US had donated money to assist the project, as "a lot of women have been attacked while collecting firewood outside the camp", Kanhema explained. But only about 30 percent of firewood needs were being met in this way, and women remained vulnerable while searching for fuel, he told IRIN. UNHCR needed more funds to tackle the security problem, although incidences of rape had been reduced. This year, 72 rape cases had been reported, compared to 142 in 1998. There had been 15 killings in the camps this year, nine of which happened in January, said UNHCR.

[ENDS]

[IRIN-CEA: Tel: +254 2 622147 Fax: +254 2 622129 e-mail: irin-cea@ocha.unon.org ]

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2000

Subscriber: [jwo@udlst.dk](mailto:jwo@udlst.dk)  
Keyword: IRIN-CEA

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**17 – 24 September 2000**

## Annex 6:

Annex 6:

### **Report on minority groups in Somalia**

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#### **Annex 6**

FROM: Bajuni Elders in Nairobi

P.O. Box 16215  
NBI  
21<sup>st</sup> September, 2000

TO: American Embassy  
P.O. Box 30137  
Nairobi, Kenya

We are Bajuni Elders do hereby thanks to the American Embassy about their Invitation to us today. We are belong to minority clans of Somalia we are minor clans known as Bajuni original from Kismayo-Somalia. During the governmental and administration of Somalia we had pressure and ethnical abuse from the Somali community and we had not been given what we had in right for example education, Social work and everything that we had been able to do.

When the civil war broke-out in Somalia we met a lot of problem such as looting our properties, raping our wives and daughters in front of us without reasonable guilt and killed innocent people of us.

In 1991 we arrive here in Kenya by Sea while we were traveling between Kismayo and Mombasa such of our boots had drowned in the Sea. And a lot of people were killed. The rest of us arrived at Mombasa.

After our arrived in Mombasa coast of Kenya in 1992 we were registered by UNHCR to settle a place called Jomvu camp as we stayed for several years we are not given any kind of assistance such as education, work and laborers so as to help our selves yet others minor clans were given resettlement while us we are not pay any attention to our plight.

In 1997 we are forced to return back with out any assistance as to help our self yet their where not peace while others are taken to our camp called Kakuma and suffering.

Were posted in 1997 therefore, since we started our problems above we kindly and respectfully appealing from the American Authorities to give us resettlement and who was return back to be given major properties so as to help themselves as they given our minor

clans due consideration humanitarian ground according to our problems. Please help us kindly. Hoping your positive respond.

Yours truly,

Elders Present in Nairobi:

1. Abdalla Mohamed Wazir
2. Ahmed Kassim Ahmed (Badi)
3. Ali Mahdi Ali †
4. Mohamed Bakari Mohamed
5. Hemed Said Abdalla
6. Ali Mohamed Naji
7. Bakari Abdur Bakari

*[Handwritten signatures and scribbles]*

*[Handwritten scribbles]*

## Annex 7:

Annex 7:

Report on minority groups in Somalia

### Annex 7

26<sup>th</sup> September, 2000

JENS WEISE OLESEN  
DANISH IMMIGRATION SERVICE  
(DOCUMENTATION AND RESEARCH DIVISION)  
E-MAIL: jwo@udlst.dk

Dear Mr. Olesen,

Please receive an anecdote to our previous discussion in Nairobi.

..... there are three main ethnic groups in Somalia namely:

1. The Cushitic (Jileec)
2. The Bantu (Jareer) and,
3. The Bandiri (Gibilcad).

Except for a very few clans such as the Shanta-shanbara who trace their origins in Tanzania and who were brought to Somalia as slaves by the Omani Sultanate of the East African Coast, the rest of the Bantu are indigenous to Somalia. The Banadiri are descendants of people who arrived by boat and settled in the East African coastal towns in the early centuries. What is mainly disputed until today is the origins of the Cushitic Somalis. The American Historical linguistics trace the origins of the Cushitic Somalis to Southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya where all the Eastern Cushites trace their origins. Some historians claim that the Eastern Cushites are the offsprings of an Ahmaric princess who became a harlot by her Bantu servant-lover. From this unholy union sprang the Somalis, Oromos, Rendile, Afar, Saho, and other clans under the Galla or Oromo. The claim by some Somali clans that they are of Arab descent has its foundation purely in the religious influence. While their Oromo brethren who are mostly pagans or Christians do not claim Arab descent. Arabization as we can see goes hand-in-hand with Islamization. If you observe carefully, the Oromo who kept mostly to themselves, you will see that they have inherited physical features from both parents, which is completely different from their brethren who further inter-married with Arabs and other fair skinned peoples. And because of their physical beauty they shy away from identifying themselves with their Bantu brethren.

#### **BACKGROUND:**

The Somali Bantus are indigenous to the regions that they occupy today which lies in the Southern part of Somalia. They used to gather, hunt, and later farm the land between the two rivers from time

immemorial.

With the introduction of farming, which was the latest human invention, the Somali Bantu started forming and organizing themselves into small settled farming communities along and in between the banks of the two rivers. Here they lived peacefully and in prosperity. Their only adversary being the wild animals and for them they had the most deadly weapon at the time - the poisoned arrow. The Cushitic Somalis did not then venture into the horn of Africa from their cradle (southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya). When the first contacts between the Bantus and the Cushites begun, they were mostly peaceful, although at times there were bound to be frictions. Even in places where these frictions

## Annex 7

### Annex 7.1:

#### **Report on minority groups in Somalia**

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occurred the Bantus had the upper hand because of their superior weapon. Each Bantu fighting man had a quiver full of arrows against the throwing long spear their adversaries carried. The spearman had to hit his enemy at the first throw, any miss would render him naked and vulnerable, while the Bantu warrior could always draw a second arrow from his quiver in case of a miss. Gradually great Bantu warrior chiefdoms began appearing in Southern Somalia, the most famous of which are:

1. The Bur-Hakaba chiefdom of Gedi Babu.
2. The chiefdom of Feyle Aarow near Buur-Hakaba,
3. The chiefdom of Dubka Baabow also near Bur-Hakaba, and
4. The chiefdom of Nasiib Buundo of the Gosha near Jilib.

Such was the climate that prevailed in the horn of Africa before the Advent of Colonialism. With the Advent of colonialism the balance of power began favouring the Cushites. To subjugate the then powerful Bantu clans who owned and settle in the fertile riverine Southern part of Somalia, the Italian colonialists using their policy of divide and rule had to recruit and solicit for the support of the Cushitic Somalis. The Cushites joined ranks with the Italian colonialists, they became soldiers and interpreters. The Italians enslaved the Bantus, took their fertile farms, divided them into small clans, demoted their chiefs and appointed Cushitic chiefs over them. With the exception of a few tribes such as the Gabaaweyn, Shiidle, and Eile who somehow or the other managed to retain their sovereignty, the rest of the Bantus were turned into less than even slaves, especially those who lived in the lower Shabelle and lower Jubba regions. Those who suffered at Keli Asayle during the worst period of Italian colonization of Somalia were the Bantus. The Italians used the Bantus as a human bridge to cross this famous canal. Thousands died as a result of this brutal inhuman action. The Cushites got the upperhand in Southern Somalia during the Italian colonization. If you look at a Demographic map of Somalia and study the trends of the tribal movements, you will find that the Cushitic Somali's are still moving South-West wards and continuing to occupy new areas in Southern Somalia. Observe what is happening in Isiolo (Kenya) today, you will understand what we are talking about. The Cushitic Somali with his camel keeps on moving southwards in search of good grazing land. Any land he can reach or acquire he will lay claim to. With the dawning of independence the Italians left the Bantus in such a state of depravity that its effects are still felt today. The government that came into being was not representative of all the Somali people. It was a government of the Cushites only. The Bantus were not represented in the government or Parliament. In the military, police, or all the other forces they were not allowed to attain the rank of a General or above. Under military rule, the Bantus did not fare any better. The military took a step further in subjugating the Bantus by declaring all the remaining Bantu fertile farm lands state property.



**THE SITUATION TODAY**

When the clan rivalries begun with the overthrow of the military dictatorship, the Bantus became the worst hit. The Bantus homes and farms and animals were taken over by the different militias not to mention money and other wealth. Some of them were forced to work for the militias that took their land. They worked in conditions not better than slaves. They cannot refuse if they refuse they will either die of starvation as happened in 1991-92 whereby thousands died due to drought related starvation or killed by the militia's. In certain areas the Bantu women cannot go down to the river to fetch water, they have to either pay for the water or they are denied the water or raped at gun-point. There is a silent policy of ethnic-cleansing in Somalia against the Bantu that the rest of the world is turning a deaf ear to. In Mogadishu there are camps called internally displaced or the most vulnerable minority groups camps, those who run these camps pose as humanitarian organisations or disguise themselves as local NGO's

## Annex 7

### Annex 7.2:

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#### Report on minority groups in Somalia

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but in actual fact those who are in those camps are hostages of the owners of the camps. They are not free people. They cannot leave these camps when they wish. When leaving they have to report to the owner and negotiate their own freedom. In other words, they have to pay for or buy their freedom. When the international NGO's visit these camps and see the destitution of those in the camps and decide to help them, they have to negotiate with the owners. Whatever help they give these camps half go to the owners. 85% of these internally displaced or vulnerable people or communities are Bantus.

At the farms, especially the lower Shabelle and lower Jubba regions the Bantus are forced to work at these farms at gun-point over 24 hours without food and water most of the time. There are lots of examples of men, women, and children who fainted because of hunger, thirst, and fatigue, who when they came to, were accused of pretence and shot dead as a warning to the others not to try to emulate them. Reports reaching us from Somalia claim that hundreds of Bantu young men were abducted by militias and taken to the Central regions of Mudug and Nugaal to look after the camels, when some of them tried to escape they were caught and burnt alive in front of the others. Most of them had to be bought back by their relatives - only a few managed to escape alive and reach home safely. It is common-place in Mogadishu to take a Bantu man, woman, or family hostage and demand for ransom. Hardly a day passes without having, seeing or hearing a Bantu being killed in Mogadishu.

If the Bantu situation in Somalia is worse, it is no better in the refugee camps in Kenya. The supporting staff of the UNHCR or the international NGO's are mostly Cushitic Somalis and they mostly tend to favour their own kith and kin. The Bantus in the camps feel that they are indirectly being oppressed. They are directly or indirectly being intimidated especially the camps at Dadaap, Ifo and Hagar-dheer. When Cushitic Somalis get wind of any rumour that the Bantus will be resettled in a third country they flock to the camps with the aim of getting a Bantu refugee card through forced purchase, intimidation, or other underhanded means with the collaboration of the supporting staff. The Bantu situation at these refugee camps are pathetic. Most of their committee members are poor un-educated men who cannot speak for them or fight for their rights, they are at the mercy of the Somali UNHCR supporting staff.

ABDULKADIR M. OMAR  
P.O. BOX 44050  
NAIROBI

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**17 – 24 September 2000**

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## **Annex 8:**

Annex 8:

### **Report on minority groups in Somalia**

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**Annex 8**

# **ST. ANNES CAMP**

**MOMBASA**

*093/04/2000*

Mombasa: 29/04/2000

**To: Ministry of Home Affairs, National  
Heritage, Culture & Social Services  
National Refugee Secretariat  
Jogoo house  
Nairobi**

**Att. Mr. N. K. Waweru**

**To: Mr. Daniel Tshitungi  
Representative A. I.  
UNHCR – Branch  
P. O. Box 43801  
Nairobi**

**To: Miss. Pia Phiri  
Ass. Representative (protection)  
Nairobi**

**cc. Tsehaye Jacob  
Community Service Officer  
UNHCR – Branch Office - Nairobi**

**Dear Sirs/madam**

**Subject: Non Relocated Somali-Brawan Refugees Living in the Coastal  
Province Kenya**

We would like to outline some of the recent developments regarding the non relocated Brawans Refugees living in the Coast Province of Kenya.

St. Annes refugee camp was among the first refugee camps to be constituted in the Kenya Coast Province. It is the camp from which Hatimy Refugee Camp, Jomvu Refugee Camp and Banadir Refugee Camp later originated.

From 1992 St. Annes Camp was recognised by the UNHCR, as a transit camp. Its inhabitants were registered by the UNHCR and were at all effects considered refugees; safe guarded and maintained by the UNHCR and the other humanitarian organizations.

Although from the end of 1994, the UNHCR stopped supplying food and medical stuff to St. Annes Refugees Camp, it nevertheless involved it into its projects, example; issueing

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Annex 8.1:

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### Report on minority groups in Somalia

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Refugee Status Documents for the members of St. Annes and later monitoring and administrating the resettlement programs etc.

Following the close down of all Coastal Refugee Camps, at the end of 1997, the inhabitants of St. Annes Refugee Camp were compelled to choose between staying in their camp in Mombasa and cease to be considered refugees by the UNHCR or being almost forcefully relocated to Kakuma. This was after a notice issued by the UNHCR, to all refugees in Coast Province to, practically, chose between relocation to Kakuma Camp or cease being considered refugee.

Being aware of the risks they would face, once in Kakuma Camp, and knowing far more better than the UNHCR of the attitude of the major Somali tribes towards them, St. Annes Refugee Camp inhabitants opted to stay were they were and try to survive.

When Hatimy Camp was closed and its inhabitants, almost forcefully relocated to Kakuma, on a promise that they will be resettled to USA and that they were not going to stay in Kakuma for more than one year. So most of them agreed. But once in Kakuma the resettlement process became so slow that many returned back to Mombasa. At present there are, in Kakuma Camp, more than 900 persons still waiting to get their chance for resettlement.

Now, after 3 years from the date of closure of Hatimy Camp and from the experience gained by the Brawans who were relocated at Kakuma Camp, we are in a position to reaffirm that the same conditions which led, in 1992, to the constitution of a separate camp in Mombasa, for the Brawans still persist. Furthermore these conditions are worsened by the resettlement programms from which the major tribes see themselves not benefitting enough. They accuse the Brawans from being favoured by the donors, an allegation which has no ground and which is just an excuse the major tribes use to harrass the Brawans in particular and minority tribes in general.

Furthermore, although Brawan Refugees in Kakuma were given a separate area this did not resolve their main problems i.e. interference in their social & community affairs by the Major Somali tribes, looting, harrassing and threats to their lives. The result is that Brawans living in Kakuma are in constant fear.

Several cases are recorded in which Brawans living in Kakuma were subjected to muder, abduction, humiliation and threat (encloses 1 and 2).

In the light of these conditions it is evident that the reasons which led for the constitution of

a separate camp for Brawans, in 1992, are still there. And UNHCR should admit its mistake in not doing enough to protect the Brawans Community.

At present there are about 2500 Brawans living in the coastal Province, specially at St. Annes Refugee Camp, Mimbasa town & Malindi.

From 1997 up to last year no major event could be mentioned regarding the staying of Brawan Refugees in Mombasa. But on the 9<sup>th</sup> of August 1999, after a warning by the local Government Authorities, 97 Brawan Refugees living at St. Annes Camp were taken to Mombasa Police Central Station and arrested. Among the arrested were infants, children, women and very old people. Reason of arrest was; they were illegally staying in Mombasa.

## Annex 8

### Annex 8.2:

#### **Report on minority groups in Somalia**

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Few days later the Brawan Refugees were taken to Mombasa High Court: (Criminal (revision) Case n° 19 of 1999) were, after hearing, a ruling was issued. The sentence was a fine of Kshs. 3000/= per person or in default 2 months imprisonment and then thereafter repatriation to Somalia (enclosed n° 3). The Refugees were represented by O. A. Sherman & Co. Advocates.

The Brawan Refugees appealed and a sentence was issued, dated 16/3/2000, by the High Court at Mombasa which reaffirmed the fine of Kshs. 3000/= but regarding repatriation it stated that the "Trial Magistrate had no Jurisdiction to order repatraiation to Somalia" (enclose n° 4 ).

It has been, many times, high lighted by many internationally recognized authors\* (enclose 5 & 6), who had direct experience with the Brawans Community in Somalia and Kenya, that in the eyes of the Somali major clans the Brawans are considered foreigners and constitute the single most vulnerable social group in southern Somalia this is due to a long standing ethnic antagonism between the Somalis and the Brawans. The concept of considering a Brawans non Somali and hence not deserving any type of help still persists among the Major Somali Clans.

The present situation puts the Brawans Community in a dilemma. What should they do? To live with the Somali major clans they feel insecure and vulnerable and the same if they continue to live in Kenya without legal documents and status. The only alternative is to live in clandestine anf fear, hoping that one day their situation might improve.

Brawans being peaceful and peace loving people find it very hard, almost impossible, to tolerate the opressive conditions to which they subjected. So, all what the Brawan Refugees are humbly requesting is their right to refugee status, as indicated by the Convention Related on the Status of Refugees.

The main aim of the Brawans Refugees is to live peacefully, during their sojourn in Kenya, respecting the laws of the Kenya Government.

**On humanirtarian grounds we strongly propose and reccomand the following:**

Our proposals to the Kenya Goverment, Ministry for Home Affairs and the UNHCR are the following:



1. All Brawan Refugees in Kenya and specially in coast province (Mombasa, Kilifi and Malindi) to be granted a special case status by taking in consideration characterical incompatibility, different tradition, culture diversity, vulnerability between them and the traditionally nomadic tribes of Somalia.
2. Refugee Status by the Ministry for Home Affairs based on community protection and safeguard.
3. UNHCR should, as it is its mandate, intervene and find a durable solution for the problems Brawan Refugees are facing, both in Kakuma and Mombasa.
4. UNHCR should restart supplying food and medical stuff to the suffering refugees in Mombasa.

## Annex 8

Annex 8.3:

### Report on minority groups in Somalia

5. Taking in consideration the experiences from Kakuma both the government of Kenya, UNHCR and other chanel NGOs should not hesitate to lend a helping hand to Brawan Refugees by allowing to open a refugee camp in Mombasa suburbs.
6. Provision of Refugee Status documents to Brawan Refugees to help them seek jobs and scholarship.

We sincerely await a helping hand from the Government of Kenya, People of Kenya, UNHCR and the other humanitarian organizations.

Anticipating our thanks and good wishes to the Kenya Government, UNHCR and the other humanitarian organizations we sincerely thank you for your kind assistance, tolerance, and understanding.

Faithfully Yours

St. Annes Camp Management



\* Just to mention few

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# Annex 8

Annex 8.4:

## Report on minority groups in Somalia

REPUBLIC OF KENYA  
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA  
AT MOMBASA

CRIMINAL (REVISION) CASE NO.19 OF 1999

(From Original Conviction and Sentence in Criminal Case No.4277 of 1999 of the Chief Magistrate's Court at Mombasa - Mugambi Mbaabu, Esq., R.H.)

REPUBLIC.....PROSECUTOR

VERSUS

ABRAHAM HUSSEIN & 96 OTHERS.....ACCUSED

### REVISION ORDER

Criminal Revision No.19 of 1999 was brought to the notice of this court by application by chamber summons dated 19/8/1999 by the firm of O.A. Sherman & Co., Advocates of Mombasa acting for Abraham Hussein and 96 Others all Accused in Criminal Case No.4277 - 4294 in the Chief Magistrate's Court at Mombasa.

The complaint raised was whether the conviction and sentence were UNlawfully imposed by the trial court. The court has been told that the sentence of fine has already been paid. The order for repatriation was suspended by order of this court and has not

yet been executed.

Upon perusing the lower court record it is clear that in all cases Applicants pleaded guilty to the charge of being unlawfully in Kenya contrary to Section 13(2) c of Immigration Act. It is alleged that the Applicants were not able to comprehend the

## Annex 8

Annex 8.5:

### Report on minority groups in Somalia

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proceedings and they needed interpretation which was not given by the court. Otherwise they would not have pleaded Not Guilty. It is the observation of this court that the court which convicted these Applicants was properly constituted. The Accused persons were present in court and had opportunity to speak. No protest was raised as to the language used. Most of the Applicants pleaded in mitigation and there is nothing to show that they were prejudiced by the manner the trial was conducted. If they had been in Kenya for nine years as their advocate swears, they must have come to know the court language in Kenya. However they did not raise any protests in the lower court and there is no evidence now to support the complaints put forward by the advocates.

The court finds therefore that the proceedings were in order and the Applicants were properly convicted on their own pleas.

Regarding the order for repatriation to Somali the counsel for the Applicants was permitted to address the court on this issue under the provisions of Section 365 - proviso, C.P.C. The counsel also cited the authority of Criminal Revision No.3/2000 unreported, Adam Hassanali -vs- Republic where Justice Waki examined the powers of court under Section "26A" Penal Code and Section 13(2)(c) Immigration Act. The learned Judge said that "the learned Chief Magistrate merely recommended repatriation by the Minister

concerned with Immigration matters in the Government of Kenya.  
..... It is all the court is required to do under the law". "It  
is for his discretion to decide as to what country the non citizen

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## Annex 8

### Annex 8.6:


#### Report on minority groups in Somalia

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shall be repatriated to." I agree with the opinion of the court that the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to order repatriation to Somalia" as part of sentence.

The result is that conviction and fine sentence is upheld. The order for repatriation to Somali is hereby set aside. The same was made without legal basis.

Dated at Mombasa this 16th day of March, 2000.

  
J. KHAMINWA  
COMMISSIONER OF ASSISE



12.12

## Annex 8

Annex 8.7:

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### Report on minority groups in Somalia

**TO: MR. WAWERU,  
NATIONAL REFUGEE SECRETARIAT  
JOGOO HOUSE, NAIROBI**

**TO: MR. DANIEL TSHITUNGI  
REPRESENTATIVE A.I.  
UNHCR – BRANCH OFFICE – NAIROBI**

**TO: MS. PIA PHIRI  
ASSISTANT REPRESENTATIVE (PROTECTION)  
UNHCR – BRANCH OFFICE NAIROBI  
P.O.BOX 43801  
NAIROBI – KENYA**

**cc: TSEHAYE JACOB  
COMMUNITY SERVICES OFFICER  
UNHCR – BRANCH OFFICE – NAIROBI**

**Date. 27<sup>th</sup> March 2000**

**Dear Sir/ Madam,**

**SUB: REQUEST FOR AN URGENT SOLUTION AND RECONSIDERATION OF OUR  
BRAVANE REFUGEE LIVING IN MOMBASA BASED ON HUMANITATION ASSISTANCE.**

On behalf of the of elders Bravanese refugees and my behalf, I would like to make this request which is a matter of concern and human, because it is your organizational policy to help the refugee who were forced to flee from their home country and become refugees.

Our refugees living in Saint Annes transit camp in Mombasa were faced with a lot of atrocities and they are as follows: -

1. After the closure of refugee camps in Mombasa by the Kenyan government in 1997, our refugees who remained behind faced a lot of difficulties, specially cessation of all humanitarian assistance given by UNHCR which was based on their refusal to shift to Kakuma Refugee Camp

...refugees given by authority, which was based on their refusal to shift to Kakuma Refugee Camp. Our refugee remained in Mombasa, because of a well-founded fear of killing, insecurity, discrimination and oppression, because of our ethnical background existing in Kakuma Refugee Camp.

Some of our refugees who moved to Kakuma Refugee Camp met with a lot of difficulties including killing, robbery, oppression, intimidation, humiliation and social discrimination from other Somali community living in Kakuma who were responsible to our atrocities both in the country and in the camps. For example: - Adano Mohamed Ali belonging to our community in Kakuma was shot dead by thugs on 9/9/1999, but nothing was stolen as it was an organized killing on tribal affiliation of being from a minority clan of Bravanese.

## Annex 8

Annex 8.8:

### **Report on minority groups in Somalia**

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2. Police harassment and unwarranted arrests were faced by our refugees living in Mombasa. This is because our refugees lack authorized documents from UNHCR and the Kenya Government to allow them stay & live peacefully in Mombasa town and surrounding areas.

3. Our refugees are unable and unwilling to return to their home country. As they are from a minority group of Bravanese who bear no arms to defend themselves if they are attacked. This explains how fearful and hopeless in the situation there in Somalia and Kakuma. This shows as if our refugees are like birds on tree while the ground under them covers with a lot of water (i.e. floods) and it is not possible for them to survive because: -

A. UNHCR – stopped giving our refugees in Mombasa all humanitarian assistance.

B. Kenyan authorities are constantly telling us to leave the town, but we are not willing to do so, as it is not safe for our community.

C. Our refugees are unable and unwilling to return to their home country as there is no peace no government who protect and defend such a community.

As far as the plight of our refugees is concerned, the following personalities from the U.S congress witnessed and appealed to the international community to our aid and rescue and they are as follows: -

- |    |                      |                              |
|----|----------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. | Albert G. Bustamante | (member of the US congress). |
| 2. | Steny H. Hoyer       | (member of the US congress). |
| 3. | Martin Olar Sabo     | (member of the US congress). |
| 4. | Jaime B. Fuster      | (member of the US congress). |
| 5. | Walter E. Fauntroy   | (member of the US congress). |
| 6. | Gerry E. Studds      | (member of the US congress). |
| 7. | Morris Udall         | (member of the US congress). |
| 8. | Gerry Sikorsks       | (member of the US congress). |

Ref. Agozimba dated on April 10, 1992.


Ref. Bravanese Refugee letters from Kakuma dated on May 10, 1999 and May 26 1999 respectively.

I am therefore, kindly requesting from your honorable government and respective UNHCR officers to help and solve the problems of our refugees living in Mombasa and kindly provide them all humanitarian assistance and appropriate shelter in a safer location based on humanitarian ground.

I am looking forward to hear from you very soon.

Thanking you in advance,

Yours faithfully,



Amin Mohamed Noor

Chairman - Bravanese community elders in Mombasa (Saint Annes Transit Camp)

P.O.BOX 16839 Mombasa - Kenya

C/O e-mail: - [adnanjei@hotmail.com](mailto:adnanjei@hotmail.com).

## Annex 8

Annex 8.9:

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### Report on minority groups in Somalia

**TO: H.E. ROBERT E. PATTERSON JR.  
FIRST SECRETARY  
U.S. EMBASSY  
P.O.BOX 30137  
NAIROBI – KENYA.**

**Date: April 15, 2000**

**Your Excellency Mr. Robert:**

**SUB: BRAVANESE REFUGEE IN MOMBASA AND THEIR OUTSTANDING PROBLEM.**

On behalf of the elders, youth and women of the Bravanese refugee in Mombasa and my own behalf, we would like to respectfully convey our warm and heartfelt greetings to your honorable and respective personality, and we would like to express our profound gratitude to the U.S. Government and it's public for providing many of our refugee resettlement and humanitarian assistance.

Your excellency, in relation to our former meeting dated on November, 1999 which we discussed on several issues related to the atrocities faced our refugee living in Mombasa and that of the community in general. I would like to inform you that the situation, conditions and the atrocities of our refugee in Mombasa, and the once scattered in other refugee camps in Kenya, specially Kakuma are very serious, and they are as follows: -

1. After the closure of refugee camps in Mombasa by the Kenyan government in 1997, our refugees who remained behind faced a lot of difficulties, specially cessation of all humanitarian assistance given by UNHCR, which was based on their refusal to shift to Kakuma Refugee Camp.

Our refugee remained in Mombasa, because of a well-founded fear of killing, insecurity, discrimination and oppression, because of our ethnical background

existing in Kakuma Refugee Camp.

Some of our refugees who moved to Kakuma Refugee Camp met with a lot of difficulties including killing, robbery, oppression, intimidation, humiliation and social discrimination from other Somali community living in Kakuma who were the prime responsible to our atrocities both in the country and in the camps. For example: - Adano Mohamed Ali belonging to our community in Kakuma was shot dead by thugs on 9/9/1999, but nothing was stolen as it was an organized killing on tribal affiliation of being from a minority clan of Bravanese.

## Annex 8

Annex 8.10:

### **Report on minority groups in Somalia**

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2. Police harassment and unwarranted arrests were faced by our refugees living in Mombasa. This is because our refugees lack authorized documents from UNHCR and the Kenya Government to allow them stay & live peacefully in Mombasa town and surrounding areas.

3. Our refugees are unable and unwilling to return to their home country. As they are from a minority group of Bravanese who bear no arms to defend themselves if they are attacked. This explains how fearful and hopeless in the situation there in Somalia and Kakuma. This shows as if our refugees are like birds on tree while the ground under them covers with a lot of water (i.e. floods) and it is not possible for them to survive because: -

A. UNHCR – stopped giving our refugees in Mombasa all humanitarian assistance.

B. Kenyan authorities are constantly telling us to leave the town, but we are not willing to do so, as it is not safe for our community.

C. Our refugees are unable and unwilling to return to their home country as there is no peace no government who protect and defend the rights of such a community.

As far as the plight of our refugees are concerned, the following personalities from the U.S congress witnessed and appealed to the international community to our aid and rescue, and they are as follows: -

- |    |                      |                              |
|----|----------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. | Albert G. Bustamante | (member of the US congress). |
| 2. | Steny H. Hoyer       | (member of the US congress). |
| 3. | Martin Olar Sabo     | (member of the US congress). |
| 4. | Jaime B. Fuster      | (member of the US congress). |
| 5. | Walter E. Fauntroy   | (member of the US congress). |
| 6. | Gerry E. Studds      | (member of the US congress). |
| 7. | Morris Udall         | (member of the US congress). |
| 8. | Gerry Sikorsks       | (member of the US congress). |



And in relation to our former meeting you suggested that I should come with documents and information that clarifies the atrocities facing our refugee in Mombasa and other camps and the community in general. I am attaching the following documents and the decision of the Mombasa court dated on March 16<sup>th</sup> 2000.

1. Ref. Agozimba dated on April 10<sup>th</sup> 1992.
2. Ref. Letters from Bravanese Refugee in Kakuma and other papers on the same issue.

## Annex 8

Annex 8.11:

### Report on minority groups in Somalia


#### APPEAL TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

Being concerned about the plight of our community and our refugee living in Mombasa, we are appealing to the U.S. government and it's public to: -

1. Solve our refugee crisis living in Mombasa, and kindly provide them resettlement in the U.S.A. based on humanitarian assistance.
2. Provide an urgent and substantial humanitarian assistance.
3. Provide our community some scholarships to study abroad.
4. Accept and provide visas to some of our elders and women in order to enable them to go to U.S. so that they can raise funds from Bravanese community living in the U.S.A. and in London (UK) to support the cause of their starving and humiliated community living in the refugee camps of Kenya.

Therefore, with the above mentioned atrocities I am kindly appealing to your honorable and respective office to look the matter and kindly reconsider the plight of our refugee in Mombasa by taking the necessary action in order to solve the problems of our refugee once and for all.

Yours sincerely,

Amin Mohamed Noor   
Chairman – Bravanese community elders in Mombasa (Saint Annes Transit Camp)  
P.O.BOX 16839  
Mombasa – Kenya  
C/o E-mail: - [achanjai@hotmail.com](mailto:achanjai@hotmail.com).



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## Annex 8

Annex 8.12:

### Report on minority groups in Somalia

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effort by helping Dr. Mustafa Hagi Noor, P.O. Box 82038, Mombasa, Kenya; Tel: 011 254 1 122 9144. **It can be done and you can make it happen.**

#### BARAVA

A year after the fall of the government of president Mohamed Siad Barre in January 1991, there has been no respite from massive violations of human rights in Barava. The city of Barava has been the scene of some of the most widespread and flagrant violations of human rights, especially since a new and particularly bloody round of fighting broke out again in November 1991. There is little sign that the fighting will diminish in the near future. Unknown hundreds of Bravanese civilians have been killed and injured, as both sides indiscriminately attack women and children.

The war in Barava is complex, including both a power struggle between two ambitious and ruthless men who display a callous disregard for the value of human life, and a struggle for basic resources, including food, by groups of impoverished but heavily armed men and boys.

According to Dr. Abud, who treated a number of wounded Bravanese people trapped in Barava without doctors, he witnessed the deliberate killing of a Bravanese man. Dr. Mustafa Hagi Noor also reported, while working in Barava, the deliberate shootings of a number of Bravanese, the exhibition of genitals to twelve-year-old Bravanese girls, the raping of women, and the deprivation of the population's possessions - money, gold, silver, various assets, and their transportation.

A fifteen-year-old boy, Jailani, was sitting outside a mosque with his brother, Abu, when a shell exploded. Abu was killed instantly, and Jailani suffered a fracture to his leg and is now in Mombasa under the care of Dr. Mustafa Hagi Noor.

But the situation is far from hopeless. The Bravanese Refugee Association deals not only with human rights issues, but also with health care and food.

... , with human rights issues, but also with health care and food.

**We write to request:**

- 1) a special international report for **Bravanese Refugees** reassessing U.S. foreign policy in light of the current human rights situation in Barava.
- 2) that an international organization provide the Bravanese refugees' community in Mombasa, Kenya economic and moral assistance.
- 3) assurance by Amnesty International during their staying in Kenya.

Finally, we need a thorough human rights report done by an objective professional, using interviews with refugees that would provide some indication of the seriousness

## Annex 8

Annex 8.13:

Report on minority groups in Somalia



April 10, 1992

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE

Economic Commission for Africa  
P.O. Box 3001  
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

### Bravanese Refugee: A Silent Struggle

Over six thousand Bravanese refugees have fled their city of nine thousand in East Africa to Mombasa, Kenya due to a combination of war and drought in Barava in the past three years. Hundreds more may soon either flee or be driven from their homeland. Its military dictator, Siad Barre, ruled the country for twenty-two years until earlier this year, when he was driven from the country in a popular uprising.

According to Bravanese Refugee Association Director Dr. Mustafa Hagi Noor, since February 1991, the Bravanese have been victims of looting by groups of armed gunmen belonging to various Somali tribal clans. Ninety percent of the refugees who fled the civil unrest and the accompanying drought and famine of the past few years are women and children, and most of them have been streaming southward to Mombasa, Kenya. According to the attorney for the Bravanese Refugee Association, Dr. Abud Musad Abud, Bravanese conditions in Mombasa resemble the aftermath of a holocaust. In Mombasa, a city of 700,000 people, there is not one doctor. This is a violation of all national and international laws.

These groups committed and are still committing horrible atrocities - killing innocent people and raping women. Exacerbating the situation is the almost total lack of facilities or even basic necessities, such as clean water. For example, in Barava they have very few medical supplies; they have to work with an overload of disease such as tuberculosis, which affects about half of the Bravanese adult population. The water in Barava is contaminated and the source of more infection such as chronic dysentery. Combined with the lack of food, this common disease can become a killer.

In Barava, this prolonged hunger has not only decimated the society but is beginning to unravel the fabric of a culture. Productive work has become impossible, families are disintegrating and the environment is slowly being destroyed as people strip the land of its meager resources in their struggle to survive. There is a pressing need in Barava for long term programs so that it does not have to depend on international aid in order to feed and clothe its people. International communities can contribute to this

P.O. Box 17846 · Boulder, Colorado USA 80301 303/938-9774 FAX 303/494-6666  
A non-profit 501(C) 3, charitable, tax-exempt organization dedicated to Third World issues

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## Report on minority groups in Somalia



of the human rights situation in Barava. So much has happened in Barava, we believe an updated report is needed at this time, given the long history of a consistent pattern of human rights abuses in Barava and the refugee situation in Mombasa.

We are increasingly alarmed by the fact that the international community has not provided any aid for the Bravanese Refugee Association. Thousands of Bravanese are thought to be in hiding in the countryside because they fear crossing the border without a visa. Approximately 5,000 women and children are known to be languishing in villages next to the Kismay and Kenyan border.

Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,

Sharif Abdurhman  
Coordinator  
International Development Institute

Albert G. Bustamante  
Member of Congress

Walter E. Fauntroy  
Member of Congress

Steny H. Hoyer  
Member of Congress

Gerry E. Studds  
Member of Congress



*Martin O Sabo*  
Martin Olav Sabo  
Member of Congress

Member of Congress

*Morris Udall*  
Morris Udall  
Member of Congress

*Jaime B Fuster*  
Jaime B. Fuster  
Member of Congress

*Gerry Sikorski*  
Gerry Sikorski  
Member of Congress

## Annex 8

Annex 8.15:

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### Report on minority groups in Somalia

#### ATTENTION:

UNHCR	NAIROBI
INS	NAIROBI
JVA	NAIROBI
US IMMIGRATION DEPARTMENT	
HERITAGE	NAIROBI
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL	NAIROBI
<u>7<sup>th</sup> July 99</u>	

Dear Sirs/Madams,

#### RE: THE BARAVANI COMMUNITY IN KENYA

We appreciate to present this report to your esteemed offices for immediate humanitarian action, as the general policy of the global resettlement is based on justice.

The Baravani is one of the most humiliated communities in Somalia before and after the devastated civil war.

Due to our professional skills and wealth position while in Somalia our community became the common target of almost all armed majority clans.

None of our properties were left save; the most vulnerable group from our community became subjected to all sorts of mental and physical mistreatment rape, confiscation of farmlands, houses, and business centers. Torture and persecutions were also common.

As a result most of Baravani people became displaced from their area of origin to the neighboring countries of Kenya and Ethiopia as refugees in need of humanitarian assistance.

In the refugee camps of Kenya, we are again suffering a lot, under the majority tribes who are living with us in the same camps.

Thanks to international communities and to UNHCR in particular, for granting resettlement to some of our community members. We also thank and appreciate to

the United State of America for the resettlement programs provided to the vulnerable from Baravani community.

The remaining Baravani families in Mombasa refugee camps were shifted and relocated in Kakuma for resettlement process, but the situation in Kakuma camp is quite different from that of Mombasa in every aspect of life mainly the security.

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### Annex 8.16:

#### **Report on minority groups in Somalia**

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Certainly, the pressure directly comes from the sub-ordinate staff of UNHCR in collaboration with Somali groups claiming to be leaders of the majority clans. Even in the refugee camps of Kenya.

For almost one year, most of the resettlement process are conducted under the name of our community Baravani but the beneficiaries are from majority clans who at the same time are mistreating us badly even in the UNHCR refugee camps in Kenya.

The Baravani communities in Kakuma refugee camp are not absolutely enjoying equality, justice they also lack freedom of speech to express their feelings.

Most of the sponsorships are processed under the coverage of Baravani minority group. This is a fabricated programme by the majority ethnic group in the camps and the related officers.

The Interpreters (Somalis) working with your officers facilitated this fabrications resettlement programme by not screening that is who or may be they don't know what is going on.

Most of our elders (signatories) were threatened several occasions with death incase found disclosing the open secret to the concerned Officers.

Though it is quite risky still it is very important to unveil the misterious incident of the abduction of Mr. Khadar Abu Mohamed (An outspoken Baravani ethnic origin) who was kidnapped on 15/11/98 from Eastleigh by a well known group (but currently we can not name them for security reasons).

Mr. Abu was abducted, injected with drugs to silent him then airlifted to Mogadishu (Somalia) like sick-person. More than two months of torture, humiliation and total denial of his basic rights Mr. Abu was released on ransom of US 8,500 (Eight thousand, five hundred US Dollars).

Mr. Abu is currently living in Mombasa and ready to break his silence with conditions for his personal security. In fact, the abduction of Mr. Abu became a lesson to the rest of our community members that is the main reason why we are sad and silent.

To avoid any bad consequence with side effect of this report we request the concerned

officers to keep it confidential and private.

Meanwhile, we kindly request you to intervene this misbehaviors conduct of fabrication network by changing the Somali interpreters (who are fully involved in the matter) by Baravani individuals for the betterment of our community.

Culturally, the Baravani community can easily be distinguished by their local language that can not be spoken by the rest of Somali people this will actually serve as the scale of screening.

## Annex 8

Annex 8.17:

### Report on minority groups in Somalia

Our community suggest the nomination of three Baravani individual to serve in the Screening of the complain regarding the resettlement process.

Following are how the Baravani community is sub-divided ethnically

**1. DAFARAAD**

- a) Erwere
- b) Reer Geesc
- c) Bakooli
- d) Mudur

**2. DAKIITIRE**

- a) Waransile
- b) Minhoraad
- c) Reer Suge
- d) Reer Hejo

**3. HUIJUBO**

- a) Reer Nigeye
- b) Huri
- c) Reer Keero
- d) Waqshiini

**4. WIRIILE**

- a) Galle
- b) Rubi
- c) Reer Adow
- d) Reer Aliyo

**5. GOYGAAL**

- a) Reer Hamar
- b) Reer Doyle
- c) Reer Fadhiile
- d) Mataangale

**6. IATIMI**

- a) Reer Shandi
- b) Hamar Baadiyo
- c) Reer Maqaani
- d) Karani

**7. BIIDA**

- a) Reer Wali
- b) Reer Faqi
- c) Reer Maalimu
- d) Reer Abdi Sheekh Ali

**8. ASHARAAF**

- a) Hassani
- b) Hussein

Submitted by:

The Elders of Baravani in Nairobi

- 1. SHEEKH MOHAMED HINDA
- 2. MOHAMED ABDULKADIR MIRO
- 3. BAZI HAJI SHEEKHUNA
- 4. NOOR MOHAMED IBRAHIM



CHIEF  
ELDER  
" "  
" "

*Signature of M. of CJZ*

- 5. MAKAY HUMO HAJI
- 6. ABDI HASSAN ABDULLAHI
- 7. OSMAN ABASHEEKH
- 8. MURIDI SHEEKH SHEGO
- 9. SHARIIF MOHAMED ALWI ✓

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## **Annex 9:**

Annex 9:

### **Report on minority groups in Somalia**

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**Annex 9**



# **ASHRAF WELFARE ASSOCIATION**

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**REPORTS, OPERATIONS DONE  
AND DEMANDS FROM:**

**ASHARAF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES  
P.O.BOX 1220  
TEL: 767122 EXT 213  
NAIROBI- KENYA.**

**DATE: 30<sup>TH</sup> JULY 2000**

**SUBJECT : CURRENT SITUATION MAJOR PROBLEM OF  
ASHARAF COMMUNITY MATTERS NEEDED TO IMPLIMENT**

**The Infinitive war , caused a prolonged acute suffer with destruction of all properties public and personally, and loss of many lives.**

**The religious, none confront, none armed, neutral, minority Somalis clan of asharafts forced them the with none resist devil war of Somalis to cross the border of Kenya. Being a refugee in Kenya for several years made the**



**Border of Kenya, Being a refugee in Kenya for several years make the matter worst then previous time. About hundred families are now available in Nairobi, when their Mombasa camp of SWELEH NGURU has been burned..**

**UNHCR and Kenya government has been silenced the community call, Means for to arrange them be back to their origin Camp, with this Respect they have no accommodation and all other human living resources they are overwhelming conditions.**

## Annex 9

### Annex 9.1:

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#### Report on minority groups in Somalia

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The (3) camps in (DHADHAAB, IFO, HAGARDER and DHAGAHLEY). There are families crying with insecurity regards to their clan night banditry, interrogations and the death threats are highly rated particularly in these camps for clan, they have belonged no particular land in Somalia or Africa to go back (No Province, District, Division, Location) and to take a gun for Ashrafs is totally prohibited in accordance of their tradition and religion wise.

At Kakuma it was unavoidable and it highly tensioned for all refugees in the camp, when part of the camp has been burned. About half estimation population number of that camp are now parasite on the part saved from the fire, share with them in every aspect of living condition, there is some Ashraf families living in Kakuma with that terror and have suffered tremendously in unimaginable harsh condition.

The resent clanical clashes in between Boran and Somalis of Isiolo have badly affected the Ashrafs. Children where cut hands, women's have been sexually violated and about 600 hundred heads consisting camels, cattle and goats looted as well as there homes have been burnt. Two hundred families of Isiolo Ashraf are in Nairobi/Garissa and they stay as internally displaced at the moment, no humanitarian activities has been done yet, except relatives contribution of sheltering and day base food.

In general, poverty, instability has waved cover in the hope and decision has gone out of control of the hands, so what is the need? First they are relayed to the Almighty God. , But relatives have to take action. Especially those who have capability to make contribution of wealth side, what most is to assist your people when crucial matter arises.

In the side of the progress we thankfully passing to congratulation for: - A US Ashraf visitor Mr. Harbi Shariff Ali, Who has given us more consideration to enhance the community resettlement program in his period of visiting Kenya, as well as organized the community management and cases has been submitted to UNHCR, we hope that shall soon be successful.

So in order to reach the target, it will need to tiredly push the matter for further resettlement expecties, The elders represented for this issue in the state have to give more priority and try to contact Agencies concerned.

## Annex 9


Annex 9.2:

### Report on minority groups in Somalia

Furthermore all parts of our people foreign and local highly be informed to take the matter seriously and have to think the possibility for clearing obstacles that lying in front of their community life upgrading and to work in conjunction where ever they are Inshaallah with the assistance of our Almighty God we shall reach our target AMEN.

Your assistance and co-operation needed is highly appreciated

Best regard,



**SHARIFF ABDIBASID ABDINUR**  
▪ **SECRETARY GENERAL**



## Annex 10:

Annex 10:

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Report on minority groups in Somalia

### Annex 10

#### THE SOMALI OUTCAST TRIBES

**CLAN:** MIDGAN

**SUBCLAN:** MADHIBAN, TUMAAL, YIOBIR, MUUSE – DHEERIYO, YAHAR, JAAJI, BOON

**RESIDENCE:** SOMALIA, ETHIOPIA, DJIBOUTI & KENYA

Somali Outcast minority tribes reside within the other Somali clans and are not allowed to live in a land of their own and even have self rule, organisations and associations. Therefore it is difficult to differentiate them from other Somali clans physically and religiously. Members of the minorities were and are still captives of majority communities known as 'PATRONS.' It is evident that all Somalis before and after the factional conflicts agree unanimously to oppress the outcast members. Our people don't have any secure environment in which they can establish their identity.

Medicins Sans Frontier (MSF) in Somalia once tried to identify locations that minority communities could live in, but unfortunately they failed miserably to issue a map (attached) covering the exact population of our people throughout the country. MSF produced what the political patrons wanted to be said.

The recent events of factional confrontations in the country brought arbitrary arrests, kidnappings, systematic killings, deliberate genocide and property lootings of outcast minority community. Those people indeed experienced the most savage and brutal atrocities ever committed to a living community in the world; even the youths were forced to boost the war machine of political conflicts within the majority clans against their own will. So there is no place inside Somalia where they can get security of both their own lives and property and almost treated as community in slavery or as victims of discrimination.

On the Political aspect, there was a protest note (hereby attached) warning that the previous mistakes never be repeated, the note entitled '**SHUT DOWN THE SO CALLED DJIBOUTI PEACE INITIATIVE FOR SOMALIA AND PUT IN PLACE A NEUTRALLY ASSISTED RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE**' was Issued in Nairobi Kenya on 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2000 by the minority community. Subsequent events have proved warnings contained in said protest note to be correct.

Minority community who remain inside the country live under a dog's life and those who fled to neighbouring countries still stay in refugee camps in untold misery.

When the International Community announced that they were ready to help the outcast minority people in the refugee camps, majority tribes who used a policy of oppression, discrimination and racial prejudices started to flood the refugee camps in the name of the outcast minority members. Lots of bogus claimants to our people live in towns and are granted resettlement program status. Here I have attached a copy of a case showing the aforesaid tribulations, The Case of a refugee Midghan, How they Suffer!.

## Annex 10

### Annex 10.1:

#### **Report on minority groups in Somalia**

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After a long consideration we witnessed those granted the status of resettlement in Europe and United States send money and contribute funds to their brothers with arms in Somalia, so the question still remains unanswered – Why do the developed countries fail to understand that the bogus refugees who receive social welfare help armed clans as to continue to flex their war muscles?. Have you ever considered that our community live under appalling conditions and traumatic experiences. You ask one another why Somali's problems seem unending, but you have to come to know people resettled abroad almost always flame conflicts and discriminatory practices.

We also draw your attention that these bogus claimants under the cover of our identity, forge documents printed in India, Pakistan, Somalia and Kenya. It is clear cut that you are unaware of the classification of forged or non-forged and the claimants of outcast minority of the non- minority. We stress the fact that you have to revise the past mistakes and be more cautious or careful of these in the future. On our part, we are prepared to give you a hand, cooperation and authentic research towards the outcast minority clans' question.

We hereby appeal to the International Community for consideration of this grave matter and start to look into the existing problems closely.

**Prepared by :**        **The Minority Community Living In Kenya.**

**Date**                :        **Nairobi, 18<sup>th</sup> September 2000.**





## Annex 10

### Annex 10.2:

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#### Report on minority groups in Somalia

01 Nov 2000 04:56

#### SOMALIA WATCH

- Title: [SW Country] ( Ecoterra - Nairobi) Somali Minorities Demand - **SHUT DOWN** the So-called Djibouti Peace Initiative for Somalia and **PUT IN PLACE** a Neutrally Assisted, Committed Reconciliation
- From:[]
- Date :[7 April 2000]
- 

"....we the minority communities of Midgan, Tumaal, Yibir, Yahar, Muse and Dhiriyo, who are residents or refugees in Kenya, totally reject the Djibouti Initiative and call on all progressive forces and peace-loving Somalis, living both inside and outside our motherland, to do likewise..."

**Somali Minorities Demand - SHUT DOWN the So-called Djibouti Peace Initiative for Somalia and PUT IN PLACE a Neutrally Assisted, Committed Reconciliation**

The so-called Djibouti Peace Initiative for Somalia is a disguise to perpetuate the crisis in our country. We demand to stop this proxy-peace initiative, misguided by the UN and other outside forces. The Somali crisis has its roots and embodiment also in the decades of enslavement of the Somali and non-Somali minority communities by the larger Somali clans. For those, who may not be aware, it is the continued enslavement and oppression of the minority communities by the large Somali clans that also the Djibouti initiative seeks to perpetuate. As patriotic people of the Somali territory, we cannot allow this to happen.

We thus wish to draw the attention of the International Community, the United Nations and all interested parties to the important fact, that in Somalia most people already see the Djibouti initiative as an exercise in futility, a waste of resources and an international travesty at best. We warn that this

travesty will lead to further ethnocide and insecurity.

We demand that the initiative be immediately wound up. At the same time, the international community should immediately put in place a more credible and workable initiative to assist Somalia in a process of the Somali People themselves to bring peace to all people of Somalia and the whole territory. The United Nations should abstain to initiate ill-designed initiatives using proxies, which are unacceptable to lead such a process.

A major key in solving the Somali crisis is the acknowledgement of the rights of the minority Somali communities, the correction of centuries of ethnocide and injustices committed against these

## Annex 10

### Annex 10.3:

#### **Report on minority groups in Somalia**

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communities by the larger clans and a reparation accord (compensation) as a condition for peace.

The crux of the Somali problem is that the larger communities have not only denied any basic rights for the Somali minority communities, but have - since centuries and until today - enslaved thousands of people from the Somali minorities. For the Somali problem to be solved, the wrongs exacted on the minorities by the large communities must first be spelt out, rectified and appropriate compensations agreed upon.

Djibouti, as part of the Greater Somalia, is part and parcel of the Somali problem and can not, therefore, be relied upon to solve the same. It can and is, indeed, aggravating the problem.

The Djibouti Initiative is not acceptable for a number of reasons. For one, Djibouti is seeking to use the opportunity to dominate Somalia for its own political, social and economic gains. As part of the Greater Somalia, the Djibouti Somalis are part of the major majority clans that have enslaved and denied the people of all minority groups their basic rights. There can be no doubt that Djibouti feeds and thrives on the continued exploitation also of the minority Somali communities.

Given the foregoing, we the minority communities of Midgan, Tumaal, Yibir, Yahar, Muse and Dhiriyo, who are residents or refugees in Kenya, totally reject the Djibouti Initiative and call on all progressive forces and peace-loving Somalis, living both inside and outside our motherland, to do likewise.

As Somali citizens, we members of the minority communities, whether living inside or outside Somalia, are not prepared to live under the continued domination and oppression of the larger communities and appeal to both the international community and to the United Nations to understand our plight and come to our assistance.

Though Somali citizens, but born and brought up in servitude, we were already displaced people in our own motherland. Now, driven out and forced to live as refugees or expatriates in different countries of the world, the worst that can happen is for us to return to servitude and oppression under anybody in our motherland.

In the Somali crisis, we had to suffer worse atrocities than the people in the Kosovo or in East Timor.

**These massacres in Somalia are well documented, but yet go widely unrecognised. We seriously warn that right now further ethnocide is in the making. We thus call on the international community, including the UN, to give the Somali crisis the seriousness it deserves and come up with a holistic initiative to really assist in solving the ongoing confusion once and for all, even if that means that certain, usually strongly involved stakeholders from the outside have to withdraw from any Somali peace initiative, because their motives are not honest.**

**We reject the Djibouti Peace Initiative for Somalia and call on the international community, the UN, all other parties involved, and all people concerned or interested to seriously address the Somali crisis and**